Dieter Mersch

What kind of relationship do we have with artificial beings (avatars, puppets, robots, etc.)? What does it mean to mirror ourselves in them, to perform them or to play trial identity games with them? _Actor & Avatar_ addresses these questions from artistic and scholarly angles. Contributions on the making of »technical others« and philosophical reflections on artificial alterity are flanked by neuroscientific studies on different ways of perceiving living persons and artificial counterparts. The contributors have achieved a successful artistic-scientific collaboration with extensive visual material.

What kind of relationship do we have with artificial beings (avatars, puppets, robots, etc.)? What does it mean to mirror ourselves in them, to perform them or to play trial identity games with them? Actor & Avatar addresses these questions from artistic and scholarly angles. Contributions on the making of »technical others« and philosophical reflections on artificial alterity are flanked by neuroscientific studies on different ways of perceiving living persons and artificial counterparts. The contributors have achieved a successful artistic-scientific collaboration with extensive visual material.

The chapter addresses the transformations of transparency and opacity in the realm of digital networks. Rather than discussing the question of digital transparency as opposed to control, Mersch argues that we should focus on the destiny of the social and the political in an age of computation. As a concept inherited from Enlightenment, transparency suffers from the insufficiently acknowledged dialectic inherent to the concept, whereby complete transparency would lead to obfuscation. Moreover, in the age of digitalization, the privileged medium supposedly producing ultimate transparency is the technological system of digital communication through networks, social platforms and data exchanges. What once pertained to Enlightenment’s program of human emancipation boils down to a mathematical form. The idea of a transparent society based on justice and trust reveals itself to be nothing but an empty surface.

The figure of the 'other' is fundamental to the concept of communication. Online or offline, communication, which is commonly defined as the act of sending or imparting information to others, is only possible in the face of others. In fact, the reason we communicate is to interact with others—to talk to another, to share our thoughts and insights with them, or to respond to their needs and requests. No matter how it is structured or conceptualized, communication is involved with addressing the other and dealing with the ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions of otherness or alterity. But who or what can be other? Who or what can be the subject of communication? Is the other always and only another human? Or can the other in these communicative interactions be otherwise? This book is about others (and other kinds of others). It concerns the current position and status of the other in the face of technological innovations that can, in one way or another distort, mask, or even deface the other. Ten innovative essays, written by an international team of experts, individually and in collaboration with each other, seek to diagnose the current situation with otherness, devise innovative solutions to the questions of alterity, and provide insight for students, teachers and researchers trying to make sense of the opportunities and challenges of the 21st century.

Providing a solid media-philosophical groundwork, _Beyond Mimesis_ contributes to the theory of mimesis and alterity in performance philosophy while serving to stimulate and inspire future inquiries where studies in media and art intersect with philosophy. It collects a wide range of philosophical and artistic thinkers' work to develop an exacting framework with clear movement beyond mimesis in aesthetic experiences in uncanny valleys. Together, the chapters ask if intersubjective acts of relating that are defined by alterity, responsivity or witness and trust can be transferred to artificial beings without remainder. The proposed framework uses a particularly fruitful theoretical model for this inquiry known as the “uncanny valley”—a fictitious schema developed in 1970 by Japanese roboticist Masahiro Mori. According to Mori, artificial beings or animated dolls become more eerie to us the more “humanlike” they appear. The model’s utility requires distinguishing between visual media and real life, but in general, it suggests that there is a fundamental incommensurability between people and artificial beings that cannot be ignored. This necessitates that all-too realistic representations as well as fictional encounters with artificial beings do not transgress certain limits. According to Mori, it is an ethical imperative of their design that they evidence a certain degree of dissimilarity with people. This notion seems especially applicable to artistic projects in which animated dolls or robots make explicit their “doll-ness” or “robot-ness” and thus inscribe a moment of reflexivity into the relations they establish. With contributions by Elena Dorfman, Jörg Sternagel, Dieter Mersch, Allison de Fren, Nadja Ben Khelifa, James Tobias, Grant Palmer, Stephan Günzel, Nicole Kuʻuleinapuananiolikoʻawapuhimelemeleolani Furtado, Misha Choudhry and a conversation between Carolin Bebek, Simon Makhali, and Anna Suchard.

Three phases of a cultural-philosophical criticism can be distinguished during the last 100 years: Firstly, the metaphysical critique of Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Adorno, secondly, the poststructuralist critique of representation as put forward by Roland Barthes, Michel Foucault, and Jacques Derrida and thirdly ecological critiques as a countermovement, as emanating from Speculative Realism, New Materialism, and Latour's Actor-Network-Theory. Beyond critiques of rationality and of power and discourse, ecological critiques situate the human being in the exterior, which in some traits allows a vitalism of matter to return. Most importantly, ecologism, where it sees itself as relationalism, confuses network relations with interpersonal relationships, which are always already socially terminated. Consequently, they prefer ontology over social philosophy.

In media philosophy since Benjamin, the concept of medium is conceived in terms of »translation« or »transport«. In a similar vein, Christoph Tholen has brought the literal sense of »metaphor« as »meta-pherein« into focus. In my paper I argue that Tholen's approach misses the »meta« (»in the middle« or »beyond«) of »metaphor«, corresponding to the Latin »trans«. This is contrasted with the greek »dia« that allows the development of a performative notion of medium, which orients itself at material practices of transition.