Dietrich Schotte

This paper argues that the common argument, that a state’s monopoly of violence is a necessary condition for peace, is flawed. First, it rests on anthropological assumptions about violent tendencies in human nature that may be valid for our society but cannot claim to correctly picture the (universal) human nature. Secondly, monopolies of violence are in reality less functional than they would need to be; most importantly, their agents distribute more violence than necessary or legitimate. Given their structural and institutional nature, this is hardly surprising, maybe even unavoidable. Therefore, the claim that a monopoly of violence is an indispensable or at least the best means to establish peace should be viewed more critically. For this reason anarchist proposals should not only not be scorned, they should rather be openly discussed and re-evaluated.

In Hobbes scholarship, interpretations of his political philosophy as a liberal one have been substantiated with the argument that it contains a doctrine of toleration and defends the subjects’ liberty of conscience. I will argue that this argument is wrong. While Hobbes does accept a (limited) possibility of inner dissent, he rejects any right of citizens to openly declare their dissenting opinions and suggests means to influence these opinions and beliefs. While according to Hobbes the state should secure and use a monopoly of public and political education this paper argues, drawing on recent scholarship, that this does not account for an unlicensed call to indoctrinate. Yet it also does not account for a doctrine of toleration, even if a limited liberty of conscience is granted.

Vor allem die philosophische Religionskritik fokussiert sich zu oft auf die Kritik an der Annahme der Existenz Gottes. Dabei gerät aus dem Blick, dass Religionen nicht allein in Überzeugungen bestehen, sondern komplexe soziale Praktiken darstellen, die das Leben ihrer Gläubigen strukturieren, orientieren, stabilisieren und/oder irritieren. Die hier versammelten Beiträge thematisieren diesen Aspekt von Religion in Auseinandersetzung mit dem von Rahel Jaeggi konzipierten Modell einer "Kritik von Lebensformen". Dieser Band liefert damit einen Beitrag sowohl zur Religions-, als auch zur Sozialphilosophie."-- Back cover.

Trotz der wiederholten Kritik an ihm scheint Johan Galtungs Begriff der „strukturellen Gewalt“ durch die Verbindung von sozialwissenschaftlicher Analyse und normativer Kritik komplexer sozialer Strukturen wie gemacht zu sein für die Analyse epistemischen Unrechts. Während andere Autor:innen deutlich klarer definierte und abgegrenzte Begriffe der strukturellen oder „institutionalisierten“ Gewalt vorgeschlagen haben, fehlt hier meist eine Diskussion der entsprechenden Phänomene, die den Begriff des „epistemischen Unrechts“ einbezieht. In diesem Aufsatz will ich unter Einbeziehung jüngerer Arbeiten zum Begriff der Gewalt zum einen zeigen, dass die bisweilen zu findende Rede von „epistemischer Gewalt“ sich unter Rückgriff auf einen engen Gewaltbegriff klarer bestimmen lässt: als seelische Gewalt, die durch direktes Zeugnisunrecht ausgeübt wird. Zum anderen möchte ich zeigen, dass der Begriff epistemischen Unrechts ein meist fehlender, aber notwendiger Bestandteil einer Analyse jener sozialen Strukturen ist, die als „institutionalisierte Gewalt“ bezeichnet werden müssen. Denn strukturelles „silencing“, „testimonial smothering“ und hermeneutisches Unrecht von bzw. gegen Opfer von Gewalt sind in den meisten Fällen ein essentieller Bestandteil institutionalisierter Gewalt.

Unlike other subjects of philosophy, violence is a familiar part of our everyday life, even if we usually encounter it primarily in the news. But does this mean that we already know what “violence” really is? So it would seem. Yet on second, philosophically mindful thoughts it becomes apparent that this seemingly trivial question is anything but easy to answer. This book offers a critical enquiry of the concept of violence, including detailed discussions of the concepts of collective and institutionalized violence. It shows that these concepts, while remaining “essentially contested”, can be defined sufficiently precise to expose and criticize the strategically motivated abuse of the concept of violence that we encounter all too often.

Public discussions no less than philosophical debates about violence, about its essence and justification, often discuss violence against inanimate objects such as buildings or statues. This concept of „violence against things“ is, however, contested, not least because other than humans or other animals, things do not suffer violence. This article discusses various approaches that make sense of and attempt to justify talking of „violence against things“. These various attempts are, however, all found wanting. „Violence against things“ can, the conclusion runs, at best be used as a shortcut for psychological violence that uses the destruction of highly valued objects as a means to seriously harm a person or group of persons.

Jürgen Habermas’ Zugehen auf die Religion ist wohl das prominenteste Beispiel einer auch aktuell in der Philosophie häufig zu findenden Tendenz, eine affirmative Haltung zur Religion und den durch sie vertretenen Ansprüchen und Konzepten einzunehmen. Entscheidend ist dabei diejenige Haltung zu religiösen Wahrheitsansprüchen, die Habermas bisweilen als „nachmetaphysisch“, vor allem aber als „agnostisch“ bezeichnet. Dabei nimmt der Agnostizismus, wie sich am Beispiel Habermas’ exemplarisch zeigen lässt, ein Modell religiöser Erfahrung an, das dieser eine Sonderstellung zuweist – und das den Geltungs- und Wahrheitsansprüchen der Religion und ihrer Vertreter nicht gerecht wird. Darüber hinaus ist zu prüfen, ob es philosophisch tragfähig ist. Denn dieses Modell kommt nicht ohne die implizite Annahme einer exklusiven Quelle religiöser Erfahrung, verschieden von Sinnlichkeit und Vernunft, aus – ohne gute Gründe für die Anerkennung oder auch nur Annahme einer solchen Quelle angeben zu können.Jürgen Habermas’s approach to religion is likely to be the most prominent example of a general tendency in current philosophy, which tends to an affirmative attitude towards religion and its claims on truth and validity. An attitude which Habermas sometimes calls “postmetaphysical” but primarly terms “agnostic” is thereby crucial to this position. As can be exemplified by Habermas’s arguments, agnosticism assumes a concept of religious experience which assigns to it an exceptional position in human life – and which, however, does not take the claims of truth and validity of religion and its agents at face value. Moreover, it is questionable if it presents a philosophically satisfactory account of religious experience. For this concept has to presume an exclusive source of religious experience, different from sense and reason – whereas it lacks the ability to present good reasons for its acknowledgement or even its assumption

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink′ the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an – at least implicitly – Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn′t depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective

In the last few years it has become fashionable to 'rethink' the heritage of the western secularist modernity and claim that it is, basically, Christian. One possibility of proving this thesis is to show that the founding fathers of secularism themselves argued from an - at least implicitly - Christian point of view, above all when setting up the normative standards for politics. One such deliberately secular founding father is Thomas Hobbes, and contrary to Christian or religious interpretations of his political philosophy two things can be shown: firstly his political philosophy doesn't depend upon religion or religious commitments and, furthermore, the underlying systematic arguments in favour of a political theology are not plausible, let alone effective.

A discussion of the nature of cruelty seems to be superfluous: it's infliction of pain for one's own pleasure. This definition is, however, problematic. Neither does it encompass all cases of cruel behaviour, nor is every suffering inflicted in favour of one's own pleasure cruel. Similarly, neither the disproportion of the suffering inflicted, nor the helplessness of the victim are good alternatives to es- tablish a more appropriate definition. In this paper I argue that while “cruelty" may be defined as “disproportionate infliction or allowing of pain", it is an “essentially contested concept". Therefore, this definition is partially open and concrete cases are and will remain contested.

Challenging the traditional dichotomies between morals and law or between mores and law, this paper establishes a distinction between morals, manners and law as three distinctive types of social norms. They have to be distinguished, or so I argue, concerning the way they are created, concerning the way they are sanctioned and concerning the obligatory status we assign them. Lastly, each of these types has a peculiar function as regards the stabilization of behaviour in the respective society. The overall aim of this paper is to argue in favour of a close scrutinization both of the function of manners and of normative criteria to answer the question which of the many different, historically and culturally contingent sets of manners should be embraced as truly good manners.

This book contains the first complete interpretation of all aspects of Hobbes's philosophy which treat religious convictions and practices. Not only his philosophy of religion and his philosophical theology, but also his biblical theology are treated in extense. The main thesis is that, according to Hobbes, neither philosophy nor politics in any way need a religious fundament; but since religions establish institutions and thus accumulate means of power, they are necessarily an object of politics. It is for this reason that religious convictions and practices are a - for a long time neglected - main topic of Hobbes's philosophy"--Publisher's pamphlet.