Dillon Cook

This article undertakes two projects rendering significant ramifications for philosophy/theology, if my assertions are correct. First, the philosopher/theologian known as St. Augustine of Hippo is most saliently recognized as a “white man”; if not a white man, “a European”; if not European, “a man of Rome”; or “Mediterranean”; etc. Outside the intellectual sphere, this is how he is often depicted in art, Penguin Classic books, and so on. Yet ironically, images of Augustine rarely circulate, if at all, as a Black-African-Indigenous person. Was Augustine nonwhite? Evidence is rendered that this is indubitably the case. Could Augustine have been modernly categorized as “Black?” Though I have immense and strong inclinations for asserting his Black-Africanness, they lack epistemic certainty, as does a project of inductive/abductive reasoning. However, despite traditional consensus, a compelling case is presented for Augustine’s racial Black-Africanness, even though it is complicated by his pursuit of “romanitas” with imperial Rome (the imperialists of the African Indigenous and continent). After ample evidence is given, a prima facie acceptance of Augustine’s Blackness is asserted. This opens the second project. Second, with this newfound understanding of Augustine as an Indigenous-Black-African alongside his status as a philosopher/theologian/mystic, a question arises of whether Augustine’s Christian mysticism/mystical elements could be syncretistic with Traditional African Religion’s (TAR) mysticism/mystical elements. From the outset, this seemed unlikely. As the project continued, the likelihood increased. The answer to the question is “Yes,” there is a “religious syncretism” but “what is it” and “how does it manifest?” Complicating matters, TAR is fungible with Indigenous philosophy or “African philosophy,” and the hidden epistemic/semantic landmines concerning this will be elaborated. These two projects as an aggregate, (while early in stage) if correct, will have the charged potential to be meaningful for oppressed peoples and restorative justice and will also have meaningful ramifications for philosophy and theology.

For the purposes of this paper, I attempt to wrestle with the question of whether or not it is a requisite for a “believer” (which turns out to be a loaded and ambiguous term) to be a part of a formal/institutional Christian Church. This is a difficult task to accomplish, and this, I admit. There is no way to answer this, truly with certainty. But Metaphysics are rarely grounded in “certainty.” This is true for many Christian Theological tasks as well. Nevertheless, this argument will be attempted by working with and off of the Black liberation theologian and philosopher, James H. Cone's basic structured argument found in "Black Theology & Black Power." It's important to note that Cone is a systematic theologian writing in 1969, a time where White America (and its "Christians") helped contribute to the assassination of Malcolm X and Martin Luther King Jr. Not to mention, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover was on a hunt for the next “Black Messiah,” had already infiltrated the Black Power movement, and that same year was making serious moves in undermining the Black Panther Party. Whereas White “Christian” America largely had his full support. After all the atrocities Black people in America have gone through, especially by its "Christians," many Black people had lost hope; they were broken, tired, many were angry—and righteously so. Cone’s 1969 argument reflects these Black sensibilities, a righteously angry theological and philosophical argument. I am attempting to wrestle with whether the basic structure of his argument is still applicable in contemporary America during the modern Black Lives Matter Movement. Thus, after rendering Cone’s argument from 1969, we imaginatively bend space and time to fast forward to the modern era 2020 and on, where we see if, by implication, Cone's argument is still relevant to the majority ("white") "Christian" Institutional/Formal Church. For the purposes of this paper, I will attempt to argue that Cone’s basic argument structure is still applicable, and that it is not a requisite for a Christian “believer” to be a part of a formal/institutional church. In this paper, I look at the ramifications of the Black Lives Matter movement in relation to the Christian formal institutional Church.

The following is a brief synopsis of my research concerning the Hispanic Liberation Theologian, Justo L. González' Christology rendered in one specific chapter, "The Word Made Flesh," of his book Mañana: Christian Theology from a Hispanic Perspective. However, it must be noted that what is argued here is limited in scope. What this is, is essentially a brief evaluative summary. González is a particular theologian that has not been read in full yet (including other works), therefore, González' arguments that I have critiqued may be sufficiently buttressed in other chapters post or prior to this particular chapter analyzed. Yet, it is the case, that the chapter itself isolated, manifests a fairly comprehensive account, and a worthy piece of theological/philosophical literature. Nevertheless, what occurs in the following writing is a very brief biographical introduction on González, a summary of González’ main points from his chapter “The Word Made Flesh,” and a reasoned evaluation of González’ argument, as I have interpreted it, with my own conclusion for this work. It is observed that, (1.) González is in the process of developing/arguing from a particular theological perspective with oppressed groups in mind, particularly Hispanics in relation to spiritual/physical liberation, and (2.) he is critical of the Christian Church, primarily the early historical Christian Church (but the modern-day Christian Church is not excluded) and its a priori presupposing of God/humanity (as it is tethered to socio-political corruption/imperialism) set apart from the existential experience and biblical revelation of the Christ. González offers a new Christology on the latter that will be discussed below. As mentioned above, it is the case that González may argue elsewhere something at odds with my argument below. For example, in the beginning of González book Mañana: Christian Theology from a Hispanic Perspective, he does seem to admit that he is in great debt, and/or owes much to the Christian tradition that he has inherited. Thus, it is clear that (1.) he is existentially tethered to, and embodied in the Christian tradition/spirit in some form or fashion, and (2.) González heralds some significant type of authority within Christian Scripture. González does admit this in the beginning of Mañana which is expected and normative within the Protestant Christian community. However, I think the conclusion that I offer in the following raises some questions about González’ logical consistency within this chapter. Essentially what is argued is that González has eroded the foundation that his argument stands on, thus it needs clarification and/or better buttressing for establishing his Christology. It is also argued that González doesn’t explicitly acknowledge his own use of rational theory in his own rejuvenated argument for his Christological foundation. This isn’t to say that I think González is wrong; he may be right. However, his Christological argument needs better founding or better clarification. (On another note: there were also problems I found in González’ reasoning when it came to dismissing previous controversial Christologies within the historical Christian tradition, and on occasion footnotes are made concerning the issue, but these issues would open up new trajectories beyond the scope of the purpose here.)