Dimitrios A. Vasilakis

Speaking to vital scholarship in ancient philosophy, including contemporary Greek academia, Dimitrios A. Vasilakis examines the notion of Love (Eros) in the key texts of Neoplatonic philosophers; Plotinus, Proclus, and the Church Father, Dionysius the Areopagite. The book outlines the crucial interplay between Plotinus, Proclus, and Dionysius' ideas on love and hierarchy in relation to both the earthly and the divine. Through analysing key texts from each philosopher, this enlightening study traces a clear historical line between pagan Neoplatonism and early Christian philosophy.

In this paper, I try to exploit some lessons drawn from reading Plato in order to comment on the methodological ‘meta-level’ regarding the relation between philosophizing and writing. After all, it is due to the medium of written word that we come to know past philosophers. I do this on the occasion of the ostensible conclusion in Plato’s Meno. This example illuminates the ‘double-dialogue’ hermeneutics of Plato and helps to differentiate Plato’s dialogues from dialogical works written by other philosophers, such as Berkeley. As a result, it becomes clear that, like with Plato’s case, a historian of philosophy must not only have a philosophical training, but also a subtle philological background, when attempting to come into dialogue with dead philosophers.

The present paper has a double aim: it attempts to present an aspect of Plotinus’ philosophical and hermeneutical methodology on the basis of relevant remarks in the treatise “On Eternity and Time”; it seeks to connect this attitude with contemporary methodological questions concerning the relation between philosophy and history of philosophy. After an introduction where it is emphasized that the term “Neo-Platonism” is of recent coinage, I exploit David Sedley’s remarks regarding the function of ancient philosophical schools: the quest for the “correct” interpretation of the school’s founder as a philosophical enterprise in itself is not an exclusively Neoplatonic characteristic. Nonetheless, the example of Plotinus’ Enneads III.7, owing to the complexity of its theme, shows that Plotinus does not pay attention only to the Platonic teachings regarding eternity and time, but also to all the other philosophical schools’ theories, including the Epicurean. The aim is the ascertainment of the truth inherent in them and its apt interpretation. Hence, I follow Steven K. Strange, who relates the Plotinian methodology to Aristotle’s endoxic method. After a presentation of similarities and differences between the two philosophers, I conclude that the problematic features posed by several philosophical theories are resolved via an innovative Plotinian reading of Plato. Thus, the non-Platonic theories play a role in the more adequate interpretation of Plato, which is identified with the successful answer to the philosophical problems. This fact makes us wonder as to the best characterization of Plotinus’ enterprise: philosophy or history of philosophy? Although the question is somehow anachronistic, Plotinus gives an explicit response in his aforementioned tractate: to the extent that he is interested in solving philosophical problems, rather than compiling a “catalogue” of past philosophical positions, his enterprise is not historical, but philosophical. Two final corollaries stem from this: to a certain extent, the previous enunciation explains the Neoplatonic reading of Plato; it teaches us that the difference between philosophizing and a historical treatment of philosophy does not lie only on the content, but also on the manner according to which the interpreter approaches past or contemporary philosophers.

This article deals with the complex relation between providence and descent in Neoplatonism, with particular reference to Proclus and especially his Commentary on the First Alcibiades. At least according to this work, descent is only a species of providence, because there can be providence without any descent. Whereas the gods provide for our cosmos without descending to it, a large group of souls provide for our cosmos by descending to it. The former kind of providence is better than the latter, even if it is necessary that souls descend in order to give existence to the beautiful cosmos. The following study deals with providence as descent, looking at it from two angles. In the first section I show that Proclus designates this form of providence in two rather surprising ways. One term he uses for it, which will be well known to readers of Plotinus, is τόλµα —this despite the word’s negative connotations due to its Neopythagorean and Gnostic origin. A second name for descended providence is ἐπιστροφή. Again, this may be surprising, since we usually expect this term to express the ‘turning back’ of a lower effect to its cause. In Proclus, the word ἐπιστροφή too can have negative connotations, but he also uses it in a positive way when applying it to providence. In the second part of the paper, I explain how Socrates’ providence for Alcibiades can be undefiled, even if Socrates necessarily descends as he offers providential guidance. Proclus’ comparison of Socrates with Hercules, who went to the Underworld in order to save Theseus, serves as a positive illustration of Socrates’ divinelike providence, and marks the deficiency of Socrates compared to the transcendent and undefiled providence of Neoplatonic divinities.

The Neoplatonists have been criticized for giving forced interpretations of Plato. Can this verdict justify modern commentators’ not paying attention to the Neoplatonic views on central Platonic problems, such as the accusation of ‘moral egoism’? The issue of Platonic eros, a proposal for a modus vivendi, serves as a significant test-case in order to answer this challenge. My approach is based on Proclus’ Commentary on the First Alcibiades. The Platonic successor approaches Socrates’ relation to Alcibiades as mirroring the structure of the divine realm. From this point of view, which platonically merges ethics with metaphysics, Proclus repeatedly states that it is an essential feature of the divine lover, who patterns himself upon the god Eros, to elevate along with himself his beloved towards the intelligible Beauty. This seems to go against the Symposium, which might suggest that the lover needs his beloved, because the latter constitutes the means for the former to recollect the source of real beauty. In contrast, for Proclus the ideal loving relationship is parallel to the demiurge’s providential relation to the Receptacle, and that of the philosopher-king to his city. Hence, Proclus presents us the quintessence of the erotic way of life and responds to Plato’s critics.

In this paper I examine how Brailas conceives of Modern-Greek identity. After an introduction, I look at Brailian texts where it is emphasized that Hellenism and Christianity are the two components of Greek national identity. Does this mean, though, that for Brailas these two elements express a similar mode of being? There are passages that can support this claim. Still, Brailas’ reader should not suppose that the Corfiote philosopher uncritically assumes a linear transition from Hellenism to Christianity. But if Christianity denotes the emergence of something new in history, how can it be compatible with Hellenism? Brailas’ answer is that as with the Mosaic Law, Christianity did not come to abolish Hellenism, but to fulfill it. Furthermore, the association of Christianity with Hellenism enabled the latter to survive throughout history both in the West and the East. Besides, for Brailas variety has always constituted the “harmony of Hellenism”.