Dino Buzzetti

Title descriptionThis volume brings together papers originally presented at a seminar series on Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis, held at the University of Bologna in 1984. The seminars aimed at considering various aspects of the interplay between linguistic theories on the one hand, and theories of meaning and logic on the other. The point of view was mainly historical, but a theoretical approach was also considered relevant. Theories of grammar and related topics were taken as a focal point of interest; their interaction with philosophical reflections on languages was examined in presentations dealing with different authors and periods, ranging from the Middle Ages to the present day.

A sound historiographical account of the role of logic in the development of medieval philosophical and theological reflection requires a thorough examination of its historical roots and its theoretical implications. An apparent historiographical bias, due to the idea that only the development of contemporary formal logic enables a proper reconstruction of the whole history of logic, can be exposed by taking into account the case of the medieval discussions on the topics, starting from their late-antiquity legacy. An attentive inspection of the successive stages of the gradual formalisation process of medieval topical logic brings to the fore significant theoretical aspects in the philosophy of logic, all too often left aside in common contemporary discussions. In particular, the distinction between topical maxims and topical differences, or principles according to and principles from which an inference is drawn, highlights the specific nature of a major part of medieval logic, that deals with meta-logical issues by means of higher-order logical resources. It is precisely this special character of medieval logic that proves to be of the highest significance in the discussion of the most subtle theological—and just as well philosophical—questions that engaged medieval authors, thus testifying to the essential role of logic in the overall development of medieval thought.

At its beginnings Humanities Computing was characterized by a primary interest in methodological issues and their epistemological background. Subsequently, Humanities Computing practice has been prevailingly driven by technological developments and the main concern has shifted from content processing to the representation in digital form of documentary sources. The Digital Humanities turn has brought more to the fore artistic and literary practice in direct digital form, as opposed to a supposedly commonplace application of computational methods to scholarly research. As an example of a way back to the original motivations of applied computation in the humanities, a formal model of the interpretive process is here proposed, whose implementation may be contrived through the application of data processing procedures typical of the so called artificial adaptive systems.

Is some form of epoché possible on theological concepts? In which way? Is it possible consider their importance leaving their religious scope aside? Can the theological concepts tell us something unless we consider their essential reference to our relationship with a divine being? The answer to these questions let us to understand what means to be a secular scholar of medieval philosophy. It's impossible conversely to discuss this problem without dealing with medieval theology. And this concerns not only the nature of theology, but also and deeply the same idea of secularism. Therefore a fully aware historiography of medieval thought has to understand the theological speech and to encounter the depth of this theoretical question. So we can conclude that for a secular reading of the medieval theology is paradoxically essential to catch the intimate sense of religious thought and the historically defined forms of its actual conceptualizations.

The notion of 'imago Dei' is central in Cusanus' thought and an examination of his treatise 'De visione Dei' is crucial to the understanding that, in his view, what it means for us to be an image of God, is to engage in a process of mystical ascent, very much inspired by its Neoplatonic model, that amounts to getting to know ourselves as 'imago Dei'. It is the living experience of the unknowability of God, the 'docta ignorantia', so achieved, that constitutes the inspiring motive of his pursuits towards a 'concordantia' of different philosophical or theological opinions, and religious attitudes.