In this paper I shed light on the nature of a problem that transcendental philosophy faces through a comparison to Meno’s Paradox (Meno: 80d): the capacity to ask and solve its questions: "The question now is whether […] we have enough of a concept of [an object placed before us by reason] to be able to raise a question about it, but are so entirely lacking in means or faculties that we can never give the answer." (KrV: A 477/B 505) I characterize a strain of objections that have been directed a…
Read moreIn this paper I shed light on the nature of a problem that transcendental philosophy faces through a comparison to Meno’s Paradox (Meno: 80d): the capacity to ask and solve its questions: "The question now is whether […] we have enough of a concept of [an object placed before us by reason] to be able to raise a question about it, but are so entirely lacking in means or faculties that we can never give the answer." (KrV: A 477/B 505) I characterize a strain of objections that have been directed at the alleged incoherence of the limits inherent to the human standpoint established by Kant’s transcendental philosophy. I unpack on what grounds Kant claims that transcendental philosophy is capable of solving all of its questions, and how this implies that the strain of objections has misportrayed the nature of the limits established by Kant's philosophy.
