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7A negação do número 2 em Grundgesetze e § 46 de Grundlagen: Resposta a Pedro BarbalhoPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 27 (2): 369-372. 2023.Na sua resenha do meu artigo A Negação Fregeana do Número 2, Pedro Barbalho criticou a minha tentativa de mostrar que, dada a reconstrução da sintaxe e da semântica do sistema em Grundgesetze que apresentei num artigo anterior, a suposição de Frege de que “|Ø-- 2” é uma expressão bem-formada com um sentido e uma referência pode ser satisfatoriamente explicada. Pedro Barbalho oferece uma explicação alternativa que é sugerida pela tese Fregena no § 46 de Grundlagen de que uma afirmação sobre um nú…Read more
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39Essays on Frege’s Conception of Truth (edited book)BRILL. 2007.In his writings on the foundations of logic, Gottlob Frege, the father of modern logic, sketched a conception of truth that focuses on the following questions: What is the sense of the word “true”? Is truth a definable concept or a primitive one? What are the kinds of things of which truth is predicated? What is the role of the concept of truth in judgment, assertion and recognition? What is the logical category of truth? What is the significance of the concept of truth for science in general an…Read more
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77Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language (edited book)Routledge. 2007.Whereas the relationship between truth and propositional content has already been intensively investigated, there are only very few studies devoted to the task of illuminating the relationship between truth and illocutionary acts. This book fills that gap. This innovative collection addresses such themes as: the relation between the concept of truth and the success conditions of assertions and kindred speech acts the linguistic devices of expressing the truth of a proposition the relation betwee…Read more
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16A tension in quine’s naturalistic ontology of semanticsGrazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1): 161-183. 2014.
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7Jacksons Argument des unvollstandigen Wissens und die Identitatstheorie der WahrheitFacta Philosophica 5 (1): 87-104. 2003.
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32Quine’s proxy-function argument for the indeterminacy of reference and frege’s caesar problemManuscrito 44 (3): 70-108. 2020.In his logical foundation of arithmetic, Frege faced the problem that the semantic interpretation of his system does not determine the reference of the abstract terms completely. The contextual definition of number, for instance, does not decide whether the number 5 is identical to Julius Caesar. In a late writing, Quine claimed that the indeterminacy of reference established by Frege’s Caesar problem is a special case of the indeterminacy established by his proxy-function argument. The present …Read more
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13Ontological Indifference of Theories and Semantic Primacy of SentencesKriterion - Journal of Philosophy 35 (2): 167-190. 2021.In his late philosophy, Quine generalized the structuralist view in the philosophy of mathematics that mathematical theories are indifferent to the ontology we choose for them. According to his ‘global structuralism’, the choice of objects does not matter to any scientific theory. In the literature, this doctrine is mainly understood as an epistemological thesis claiming that the empirical evidence for a theory does not depend on the choice of its objects. The present paper proposes a new interp…Read more
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23Freges Konzeption der WahrheitGeorg Olms. 2003.Frege hat über Jahrzehnte hinweg an einem Buch über die Grundlagen der Logik gearbeitet, dessen erster Teil folgenden Fragen gewidmet sein sollte: Ist Wahrheit definierbar oder ein „logisches Urelement“? Ist Wahrheit die Übereinstimmung eines inneren Bildes mit der Realität, oder ein Spezialfall der Beziehung zwischen dem Sinn eines Zeichens und seinem Bezug? Welchen Beitrag leistet der Sinn des Wortes ,wahr’ zu dem Sinn der Sätze, in denen es vorkommt? Sind die Wahrheitswerte – „das Wahre“ und…Read more
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19Individuating Abstract Objects: The Methodologies of Frege and QuineHistory of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 4 (1): 121-142. 2001.
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9Kants Ableitung der Formel des kategorischen Imperativs aus seinem bloßen BegriffHistory of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 6 (1): 97-111. 2003.
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12A tension in Quine's naturalistic ontology of ssemanticsGrazer Philosophiseche Studien 89 (1): 161-183. 2014.
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55Frege on negative judgement and assertionKriterion: Journal of Philosophy 59 (140): 409-428. 2018.ABSTRACT In “Die Verneinung”, Frege discusses two types of negation, a semantic one and a pragmatic one. Semantic negation consists in the application of the logical function denoted by ‘it is false that p’ to a thought, and pragmatic negation in the act of asserting or judging a thought as false. According to the standard interpretation, Frege does not acknowledge pragmatic negation, because it is logically redundant. He therefore rejects the classical dualistic view that both truth and falsity…Read more
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21Davidson's Criticism of the Proximal Theory of MeaningPrincipia: An International Journal of Epistemology 9 (1-2). 2005.According to the proximal theory of meaning, which is to be found in Quine’s early writings, meaning is determined completely by the correla-tion of sentences with sensory stimulations. Davidson tried to show that this theory is untenable because it leads to a radical form of skepticism. The present paper aims to show, first, that Davidson’s criticism is not sound, and, second, that nonetheless the proximal theory is untenable because it has a very similar and equally unacceptable consequence: i…Read more
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Apresentação: Anais do I Simpósio Internacional de Filosofia Verdade como ValorO Que Nos Faz Pensar 5-13. 2006.
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Ontologische Einsparungen mit Hilfe von Kontextdefinitionen: Die semantische KehrseitePhilosophisches Jahrbuch 109 (n/a): 97-113. 2002.
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133Frege on Truth, Assertoric Force and the Essence of LogicHistory and Philosophy of Logic 35 (3): 272-288. 2014.In a posthumous text written in 1915, Frege makes some puzzling remarks about the essence of logic, arguing that the essence of logic is indicated, properly speaking, not by the word ‘true’, but by the assertoric force. William Taschek has recently shown that these remarks, which have received only little attention, are very important for understanding Frege's conception of logic. On Taschek's reconstruction, Frege characterizes logic in terms of assertoric force in order to stress the normative…Read more
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12Die impliziten Prämissen in Quines Kritik der semantischen BegriffeGrazer Philosophische Studien 51 (1): 195-235. 1996.Quines Kritik an den grundlegenden semantischen Begriffen hat zwei wesentliche Prämissen: erstens daß die Linguistik als wissenschaftliche Disziplin der methodischen Restriktion unterstellt ist, empirisch sinnlose Hypothesen und Begriffe abzulehnen, und zweitens, daß die semantischen Begriffe tatsächlich empirisch sinnlos sind. Um die Überzeugungskraft der Ausführungen Quines untersuchen zu können, werden zunächst die verschiedenen Versionen von seiner Kritik analysiert, klar gegeneinander abgeg…Read more
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58Regeln für das korrekte Explizieren von BegriffenZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 61 (3). 2007.Obwohl das Explizieren von Begriffen wesentlicher Bestandteil der philosophischen Theoriebildung ist, finden sich nur wenige Arbeiten, die der Frage nachgehen, nach welchen methodischen Regeln diese Kunst auszuüben ist. Die vorliegende Arbeit will zur Schließung dieser Lücke beitragen. Es wird eine allgemeine Theorie der Begriffsexplikation skizziert, die an Vorarbeiten anknüpft, die von Geo Siegwart in neueren Schriften geleistet wurden. Die hauptsächlichen Ziele der Theorie sind: die adäquate …Read more
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22Multiplying entities without necessity: what does “necessity” mean in this context?Manuscrito 31 (1): 79-94. 2008.The aim of this paper is to defend Ockham’s razor against the objection recently made by Oswaldo Chateaubriand that we do not know how to decide which entities are necessary and which are not. The main thesis defended is that this distinction can be adequately explained in terms of the notion of ontological reducibility. It is argued that Oswaldo’s objections against this approach are not conclusive
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29Grundriss einer sprechaktanalytischen Theorie der WahrheitZeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 56 (2). 2002.Es wird ein neuer Ansatz zur Analyse des Wahrheitsbegriffs vorgestellt und verteidigt, der sich von Freges Einsicht leiten lässt, dass die "Form" des Behauptungssatzes das eigentliche Mittel der Sprache ist, um das Wahrsein von etwas auszudrücken. Die Kernthesen sind: 1. die Anwendung des Wahrheitsbegriffs ist eine wesentliche Konstituente des Behauptens und anderer elementarer Sprechakte; 2. dieser illokutionäre Gebrauch des Wahrheitsbegriffs ist primär gegenüber dem prädikativen Gebrauch ; 3. …Read more
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87Explicating truth: Minimalism and primitivism (review)Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 31 (1): 133-155. 2000.This paper pursues two goals. The first is to show that Horwich's anti-primitivist version of minimalism must be rejected because, already for formal reasons, the truth-schema does not achieve a positive explication of any property of propositions. The second goal is to develop a more moderate primitivist version of minimalism according to which the truth-schema is admittedly powerless to underpin truth with something more basic but it still succeeds in giving a complete account of the necessary…Read more
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100Does Frege use a truth-predicate in his ‘justification’ of the laws of logic? A comment on WeinerMind 117 (466): 403-425. 2008.Joan Weiner has recently claimed that Frege neither uses, nor has any need to use, a truth-predicate in his justification of the logical laws. She argues that because of the assimilation of sentences to proper names in his system, Frege does not need to make use of the Quinean device of semantic ascent in order to formulate the logical laws, and that the predicate ‘is the True’, which is used in Frege's justification, is not to be considered as a truth-predicate, because it does not apply to tru…Read more
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61A caracterização da lógica pela força assertórica em Frege. Resposta a Marco RuffinoManuscrito 35 (1): 61-83. 2012.According to the standard characterization of logic in Frege’s writings, the word “true” indicates the essence of logic, as the word “good” indicates the essence of ethics and the word “beautiful” the essence of aesthetics. In a posthumous writing from 1915, however, Frege says that it is the assertoric force, and not the word “true”, which indicates the essence of logic properly. Prima facie, this correction is in conflict with Frege’s criticism of the …Read more
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Ontological savings gained through contextual definitions: Semantic drawbacksPhilosophisches Jahrbuch 109 (1): 97-113. 2002.
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Faculty of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science and Study of Religion
PhD, 1991
Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Language |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |