Dmitry Ananiev

The concept of imperfect duty has become increasingly prominent in a wide range of debates in moral philosophy. However, many problems related to imperfect duties remain underdiscussed. This thesis aims to fill some of these gaps. Specifically, I focus on three issues. One is the compatibility of imperfect duties with supererogation. It has been argued that due to their limitless nature, if we accept imperfect duties in our moral theory, then we should abandon the category of supererogation. Contrary to this, I argue that imperfect duties are compatible with supererogation. The second issue is the connection between latitude permitted by imperfect duties and demandingness of morality. It is often claimed that this latitude implies that morality is moderately demanding. I argue, however, that there is no interesting connection between latitude and demandingness: the implication is true only if we already assume, on independent grounds, that morality is not overly demanding. The third issue is that imperfect duties seem to help us solve the ‘inefficacy problem’. I argue that imperfect duties fail in this respect. They fail primarily because judgments about one’s compliance with the requirements of an imperfect duty can only be made by assessing one’s life overall. However, on such a scope, it is overwhelmingly unlikely that agents who act in collectively harmful ways violate any imperfect duties in virtue of so acting. But the fact that imperfect duties do not solve the inefficacy problem might not be too regrettable. To demonstrate this, in the final part of my thesis, I discuss the nature of cases that generate the inefficacy problem. It is thought that in some such cases, individual agents make no moral difference whatsoever to the outcome. I argue that when the harms in question are purely experiential, there are good reasons to think that cases of this kind are impossible. Individual agents in such cases have at least a chance of making a morally significant difference.

It has recently been suggested that the inefficacy problem can be addressed by appealing to Kantian imperfect duties, namely, duties to adopt and promote obligatory ends. The general idea is that an agent who participates in collective harm cases fails to appropriately commit to the obligatory end of others’ happiness. This chapter argues against such proposals. It argues that there are two general reasons why those who act in collectively harmful ways can maintain an adequate commitment to others’ happiness. One reason is that imperfect duties allow wide latitude, and this latitude permits them to ignore some cases of collective harm. The other is that even if one is required not to ignore some collective harms, one enjoys latitude for choosing how to attend to these harms. One may do so without refraining from acts that are potentially collectively harmful. Furthermore, the chapter argues that one might be appropriately committed to others’ happiness even if one makes a difference for the worse. The result, however, is not entirely negative. Although imperfect duties do not solve the inefficacy problem, they may guide people to cooperate and establish institutional arrangements to avoid collectively causing harm.

The concept of imperfect duty has become increasingly prominent in a wide range of debates in moral philosophy. However, many problems related to imperfect duties remain underdiscussed. This thesis aims to fill some of these gaps. Specifically, I focus on three issues. One is the compatibility of imperfect duties with supererogation. It has been argued that due to their limitless nature, if we accept imperfect duties in our moral theory, then we should abandon the category of supererogation. Contrary to this, I argue that imperfect duties are compatible with supererogation. The second issue is the connection between latitude permitted by imperfect duties and demandingness of morality. It is often claimed that this latitude implies that morality is moderately demanding. I argue, however, that there is no interesting connection between latitude and demandingness: the implication is true only if we already assume, on independent grounds, that morality is not overly demanding. The third issue is that imperfect duties seem to help us solve the ‘inefficacy problem’. I argue that imperfect duties fail in this respect. They fail primarily because judgments about one’s compliance with the requirements of an imperfect duty can only be made by assessing one’s life overall. However, on such a scope, it is overwhelmingly unlikely that agents who act in collectively harmful ways violate any imperfect duties in virtue of so acting. But the fact that imperfect duties do not solve the inefficacy problem might not be too regrettable. To demonstrate this, in the final part of my thesis, I discuss the nature of cases that generate the inefficacy problem. It is thought that in some such cases, individual agents make no moral difference whatsoever to the outcome. I argue that when the harms in question are purely experiential, there are good reasons to think that cases of this kind are impossible. Individual agents in such cases have at least a chance of making a morally significant difference.