Dmitry Kolomytsev

The philosophical zombie — a being physically and functionally identical to a conscious human yet devoid of phenomenal experience — is widely regarded as conceivable without contradiction. This paper argues that such conceivability is an artifact of model-closure: the tacit assumption that the functional organization of a conscious system can be exhaustively specified within a closed state-space. The argument turns on a distinction between two forms of incompleteness. Uncertainty is the redistribution of probabilities among already given alternatives. Indeterminacy is the principled incompleteness of the space of possibilities itself, generated by self-reference. When functional identity is defined as algorithmic sameness within a closed state-space, indeterminacy is excluded in advance — and it is this exclusion that makes the zombie scenario appear non-contradictory. Cotard syndrome is used as a natural experiment that reveals phenomenality to be constitutive rather than incidental. Attempts to repair this within a closed framework — by adding informational parameters for presence or self-modelling — are shown to reproduce the problem structurally rather than solve it. The deeper reason for these failures is structural: no closed model can be equivalent to the system it models. The thought experiment of the philosophizing zombie brings this to a limit — the requirement of full functional identity undermines itself as soon as it is applied to genuine philosophical reflection. What makes the zombie persuasive is a commitment shared by physicalism, illusionism, and mysterianism alike: the demand for a closed ontological foundation. The paper concludes that consciousness is the mode of existence of a self-referential system within the horizon of its own structural incompleteness, and that the search for a closed foundation of consciousness does not illuminate it but dissolves it.

This text is an extended abstract of the full text: Kolomytsev D. Consciousness as the Limit Mode of Cognition (Reframing the Hard Problem). The "hard problem" is treated as a specific manifestation of universal gnoseological constraints. Consciousness is defined structurally—as a limit mode of cognition in which a system operates under maximized indeterminacy—and procedurally—as the outcome of an intensified cognitive cycle that gives rise to proactive self‑reference. The model offers unified treatments of classical thought experiments (Mary’s room, the Chinese room, philosophical zombies), derives the irreducible properties of consciousness as logically necessary, and situates them within a structured dialogue with several leading contemporary theories.

Context: Contemporary consciousness science remains in a state of methodological crisis, perpetually reproducing the "hard problem" and traditional dichotomies. This work proposes an alternative approach by analyzing the limits of cognition and mapping the structure of the cognizable. Approach: The work argues that the "hard problem" arises from a categorical error—an attempt to locate consciousness among objects, when consciousness is in fact logically bound to the immanent limit of the act of cognition itself. A conceptual apparatus is introduced that distinguishes structural information (I₊) from negative information (I₋), where I₋ operates as the active aspect of indeterminacy. A minimal ontological model is proposed: the Question–Answer cognitive cycle. Findings: The "hard problem" is reinterpreted as a particular manifestation of universal gnoseological constraints. Consciousness is defined both structurally — as the limit mode of cognition, wherein a system operates with maximal I₋/I₊ ratio — and procedurally — as the outcome of cognitive cycle intensification that engenders proactive self-reference. The model provides solutions to classical paradoxes (Mary's room, the Chinese room, philosophical zombies), derives the irreducible properties of consciousness as logically necessary, and engages in productive dialogue with several contemporary theories. Conclusion: This approach furnishes a conceptual framework that redirects focus from static neural correlates to the dynamics of indeterminacy generation and resolution, thereby opening new perspectives for interdisciplinary consciousness research.

The second part of the article explores a number of contemporary theories of consciousness, including those that are (1) close to identity theory, (2) functionalist, and (3) theories that take into account the qualities of phenomenal experience. It raises the question of whether these theories can serve as a methodological foundation for psychopathology. Modern theories of consciousness are based on different conceptual assumptions about the problem of subjective experience. As a result, research programs on consciousness and the brain vary greatly and are often incompatible with each other. Each theory explicitly or implicitly addresses mental disorders and proposes different perspectives on their understanding and treatment. Given the multitude of theoretical approaches proposed by these modern theories and the absence of a unified perspective in psychiatry, it is necessary to clarify attitudes toward phenomenal consciousness when addressing non-standard clinical issues and interpreting data from neurobiological studies. This article also discusses possible future directions for psychopathology based on issues related to phenomenal consciousness.

The first part of this article discusses the basic concepts of the nature of the psyche and their relationship to the methodological principles of psychiatry. Modern psychiatry is facing a conceptual crisis that has been brought about by the accumulation of data, especially from the field of neuroscience. The essential element underlying the crisis is the problem of phenomenal consciousness. Subjective experience is an important area of study in psychiatry, but it can be challenging to fit within the natural scientific understanding of the world. Psychiatry, as a medical discipline, is on the periphery of the search for a solution to this problem, occurring within the fields of philosophy and neuroscience. However, there are no definite answers regarding the nature of phenomenal consciousness, mainly due to conceptual contradictions. Psychiatry does not have a single, consistent approach to phenomenal experience. This complexity is a reason for adopting a pluralistic approach that recognizes the different “styles” of thinking about mental health conditions.