Dolores G. Morris

The acceptance of causal closure has had a profoundly limiting effect on the philosophical treatment of sui generis mental causation in recent decades. Philosophical treatments of special divine action have been likewise hampered by a widespread commitment to closure. If fundamental reality is as closure tells us it is, then nonphysical minds—human and divine— are either causally impotent or redundant. In this paper, I reject this limitation as baseless. Specifically, I will show how Hempel’s dilemma poses a far greater challenge when applied to a causal closure principle than it did to the task of defining physicalism. Reponses to the dilemma can be used to disambiguate closure, but not without significant cost. In light of Hempel’s dilemma, there is no conception of closure that can do all of the following: rule out sui generis mental causation, have a reasonable chance of being true, and avoid problematic circularity. At the end of the day, I maintain that closure, properly understood, is, or ought to be, just one methodological stance among many. If this is correct, it is a stance that a theist can freely reject.

Dru Johnson’s account of Hebraic philosophy seems well-suited for the task of reconciling the Christian account of God with the reality of suffering. I outline two ways in which this is the case: one retrospective, one proactive. Looking back, if biblical philosophy is mysterionist, creationist, transdemographic, and ritualist, then we might understand the failure of a certain kind of theodicy in light of its failure to meet one or more of these criteria. Looking forward, we ought to keep these features in mind. I conclude by suggesting that Johnson’s account of truth is, in fact, best understood as a correspondence account.

Erik Wielenberg recently invoked the parent-child analogy in an argument against Christian theism. The argument relies on the claim that a loving parent would never allow her child to feel abandoned in the midst of what feels like gratuitous suffering. In this paper, I offer three clear counterexamples to Wielenberg’s central premise. At the same time, a successful counterexample does not a robust theology of suffering make. To that end, and with a careful eye towards anti-theodical concerns, I defend the need for a more proactive Christian philosophical examination of the role of suffering in a meaningful life.

In Religious Experience and the Knowledge of God, Harold Netland advances a critical-trust approach to religious experience. This approach raises important questions about what Michael Martin has called “negative religious experiences.” Netland responds by attacking Martin’s “negative principle of credulity,” but I argue that Netland’s response can be undermined if we take negative religious experiences not as experiences of God as absent, but as experiences of the world as godless. On this understanding, there is no need for a negative principle of credulity; the ordinary principle still applies and puts pressure on Netland’s response. I then raise concerns with Netland’s “argument from fulfilled expectations,” even as part of a cumulative case argument. Ultimately, I propose that careful attention to the impact of Christ on our Western moral framework might help to resolve both concerns.

Believing Philosophy Video Lectures introduces Christians to the tools and resources of philosophy, helping them understand, articulate, and defend their faith in an age of unbelief. Dolores G. Morris first explains why Christians should read and study philosophy. She begins by introducing learners to the long tradition of Christian philosophy and then explains the basic resources of philosophical reasoning: the role and aim of reason; distinctions between truth, reason, and provability; learning to read like a philosopher; and the fundamentals of philosophical arguments. In the remaining sessions, Morris explores a sampling of philosophical topics relevant to the Christian faith. These lessons focus on the problem of evil and the moral argument for the existence of God. The problem of evil is often invoked as an argument for atheism. In response, the moral argument considers the reality not only of evil but also of moral values in general as evidence for the existence of God. In evaluating these arguments, Morris introduces students to a variety of Christian philosophical positions, including skeptical theism, the free will defense, Reformed epistemology, Christian ethical theories, and a number of theodicies and defenses of the faith.

In this dissertation, I examine the implications of the problem of mental causation and what David Chalmers has dubbed the “ hard problem of consciousness” for competing accounts of the mind. I begin, in Chapter One, with a critical analysis of Jaegwon Kim’s Physicalism, or Something Near Enough. (2005) There, I maintain that Kim’s ontology cannot adequately address both the problem of mental causation and the “ hard problem of consciousness.” In Chapter Two, I examine the causal pairing problem for substance dualism. I demonstrate both that the substance dualist can respond to the argument at no great cost, and that the pairing problem applies, with equal force, to the irreducible qualia posited on Kim’s account. Chapters Three and Four are devoted to what I take to be the central argument against any kind of dualism: the causal exclusion argument. In Chapter Three, I examine dualistic responses to the exclusion argument that grant the causal closure of the physical world. I note that these responses, though technically adequate, are nevertheless theoretically unpalatable. In addition to requiring the dualist to adopt unconventional attitudes towards causation, responses of this variety also have the unfortunate result of rendering libertarian freedom impossible. Finally, in Chapter Four, I turn my attention to the question of causal closure. I maintain that the causal closure of the physical world, though widely affirmed, is nevertheless extraordinarily difficult to support. In light of Hempel’s Dilemma, causal closure is either false, compatible with dualistic interaction, or unacceptably stipulative. There is, I maintain, no causal closure principle up to the tasks required by the causal exclusion argument. For that reason, I conclude that the dualist ought not to worry about causal closure.