Dominic Dold

Argument We expound the notion of “distinct experience” (experientia distincta) as introduced in the writings of the early modern polymath Joachim Jungius (1587–1657) and operative in his scientific practice. After contextualizing “distinct experience” historically (e.g., vis-à-vis Francis Bacon’s [1561–1626] concept of “experience”) and embedding the notion conceptually into the broader category of “division” (divisio), we reconstruct the “Problem of Distinct Experience”: Jungius’ epistemology of science involves a circularity or an infinite regress because scientific methods (inductions and demonstrations) presuppose divisions, which are, in turn, built on distinct experiences, themselves presupposing divisions. However, we argue through a careful historical case study on his investigations of fossilia that his research practice shows why the problem posed only a limited threat for him and his contemporaries. We finish with a brief philosophical appraisal, contrasting his views with those of Jacopo Zabarella (1533–1589).

Latin philosophical uses and discussions of signs (signa) and signification (significatio) occupy the whole duration of the Long Middle Ages, from Augustine of Hippo (d. 430 CE) to the Coimbra commentaries (ca. 1592–1606). Medieval philosophizing on signs and signification has a dual character: theorizing was firmly situated within the conceptual horizon staked out by authoritative sources, but also expanded that horizon through vigorous debate. This chapter introduces both sides through representative cases. The authoritative coordinates discussed are Augustine’s semiotics, the semantic theory sketched in the Latin translation of and commentaries on Aristotle’s De interpretatione by Boethius (d. 524), and the grammatical writings by Priscian (fl. 500). The medieval discussion is exemplified through Pseudo-Kilwardby’s commentary on the Priscianus maior (after 1230), Albert the Great’s periphrastic commentary on De interpretatione (ca. 1254–1257), and Walter Burley’s middle commentary on the same work (ca. 1302).

In the recent philosophy literature, there have been several attempts to use the seminal result by Geroch and Jang (1975) to precisify Harvey Brown’s claim that the geodesic principle can be recovered as a theorem in General Relativity, and then to critique it. We contend that the philosophical debate has unfolded in a curious way: even though Geroch and Jang’s paper contains two distinct approaches to the problem of geodesic motion, the philosophical literature has focused on only one of them. We then argue that the neglected approach offers an alternative—and more physical—set of resources to explain geodesic motion. Motivated by this approach, we prove a new “physical Geroch-Jang theorem”, which provides a scale-relative interpretation of the geodesic principle in General Relativity. We, thereby, make new resources available to re-evaluate Brown’s arguments as well as those of his critics.

The author of the Summa Halensis claims that the human body is maximally composite and argues for this using a proof strategy that intends to deduce the body’s composition from the human soul’s immateriality. This study examines that claim and argument, which is given both in a shorter and a longer form. The core of the article consists in a careful reconstruction of both forms, along with an enquiry into its Jewish Neoplatonic sources (first and foremost the Fons vitae) and its appearance in zoological commentaries contemporary to the Summa written by Peter of Spain and Albert the Great. It emerges that the argument brings into play various features of the Summist’s hylomorphic theory, especially a pluralism about substantial forms.