Dominic LaMantia

Scotus’ theory of identity and distinction is a unique and central aspect of his thought, as he applies it throughout his metaphysics. On Scotus’ account of identity, the indiscernibility of identicals fails – i.e. A and B can be identical but not share all the same properties. As Ockham objected, Scotus is now in the difficult position of needing to provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for being identical, rather than simply invoking indiscernibility. The secondary literature has argued that the lack of actual or potential separation is both necessary and sufficient for identity. I argue that is incorrect and provide alternative necessary and sufficient conditions for identity and real distinction, along with an analysis of Scotus’ theory of identity and distinction more broadly. Scotus thinks instead that the lack of actual, potential, and proportional separation are necessary and sufficient conditions for identity. The deeper root of this view is that identity corresponds to a certain degree of unity, and is accompanied by a sharing of esse.