Dominic Scott

This paper tackles some issues arising from Plato's account of the democratic man in Rep. VIII. One problem is that Plato tends to analyse him in terms of the desires that he fulfils, yet sends out conflicting signals about exactly what kind of desires are at issue. Scholars are divided over whether all of the democrat's desires are appetites. There is, however, strong evidence against seeing him as exclusively appetitive: rather he is someone who satisfies desires from all three parts of his soul, although his rational and spirited desires differ significantly from those of the philosopher or the timocrat. A second problem concerns the question why the democrat ranks so low in Plato's estimation, especially why he is placed beneath the oligarch. My explanation is that Plato presents him as a jumble of desires, someone in whom order and unity have all but disintegrated. In this way he represents a step beyond the merely bipolarised oligarch. The final section of the paper focuses on the democrat's rational part, and asks whether it plays any role in shaping his life as a whole. For the disunity criticism to hold, Plato ought to allow very little global reasoning: if there were a single deliberating reason imposing a life plan upon his life, the fragmentation of life and character discussed earlier would only be superficial. I argue that Plato attributes very little global reasoning to the democrat. Aside from the fact that the text fails to mention such reasoning taking place, Plato's views on the development of character and his use of the state-soul analogy show that the democrat's lifestyle is determined just by the strength of the desires that he happens to feel at any one time

Given its brevity, Plato's Meno covers an astonishingly wide array of topics: politics, education, virtue, definition, philosophical method, mathematics, the nature and acquisition of knowledge and immortality. Its treatment of these, though profound, is tantalisingly short, leaving the reader with many unresolved questions. This book confronts the dialogue's many enigmas and attempts to solve them in a way that is both lucid and sympathetic to Plato's philosophy. Reading the dialogue as a whole, it explains how different arguments are related to one another and how the interplay between characters is connected to the philosophical content of the work. In a new departure, this book's exploration focuses primarily on the content and coherence of the dialogue in its own right and not merely in the context of other dialogues, making it required reading for all students of Plato, be they from the world of classics or philosophy.

[David Charles] Aristotle, it appears, sometimes identifies well-being with one activity, sometimes with several, including ethical virtue. I argue that this appearance is misleading. In the Nicomachean Ethics, intellectual contemplation is the central case of human well-being, but is not identical with it. Ethically virtuous activity is included in human well-being because it is an analogue of intellectual contemplation. This structure allows Aristotle to hold that while ethically virtuous activity is valuable in its own right, the best life available for humans is centred around, but not wholly constituted by, intellectual contemplation. /// [Dominic Scott] In Nicomachean Ethics X 7-8, Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of eudaimonia, primary and secondary. The first corresponds to contemplation, the second to activity in accordance with moral virtue and practical reason. My task in this paper is to elucidate this distinction. Like Charles, I interpret it as one between paradigm and derivative cases; unlike him, I explain it in terms of similarity, not analogy. Furthermore, once the underlying nature of the distinction is understood, we can reconcile the claim that paradigm eudaimonia consists just in contemplation with a passage in the first book requiring eudaimonia to involve all intrinsic goods.

The belief in innate knowledge has a history almost as long as that of philosophy itself. In our own century it has been propounded in a linguistic context by Chomsky, who sees himself as the heir to a tradition including such philosophers as Descartes, the Cambridge Platonists and Leibniz. But the ancestor of all these is, of course, Plato's theory of recollection or anamnesis. This stands out as unique among all other innatist theses not simply because it was the first, but also because it is in some respects the strangest: Plato proposed not just a theory of innate knowledge, but of forgotten knowledge, and this, of course, goes hand in hand with his interest in the pre-existence of the soul. But my concern here is with another difference that makes Plato's theory unique, though it is not as clear as the previous one: in fact it has been for the most part over-looked by commentators and scholars. I wish to argue that while other theories of innate knowledge or ideas hold that much of what is innate in us is realized automatically and with ease, be it knowledge of moral principles, the idea of cause and effect or linguistic competence, anamnesis is concerned only with the attainment of hard philosophical knowledge, which most of us never reach.

Maieusis pays tribute to the highly influential work of Myles Burnyeat, whose contributions to the study of ancient philosophy have done much to enhance the profile of the subject around the world. What is distinctive about his work is his capacity to deepen our understanding of the relation between ancient and modern thought, and to combine the best of contemporary philosophy - its insights as well as its rigour - with a deep sensitivity to classical texts. Nineteen of the world's leading experts in the field examine a wide range of topics in ancient philosophy, with a particular focus on Plato. Topics include Socrates and the nature of philosophy, the different aspects of eros in the Symposium, Republic and Phaedrus, the Phaedo's arguments for immortality, wars and warriors in Plato, and the different aspects of the cave allegory in the Republic..

Questions about learning and discovery have fascinated philosophers from Plato onwards. Does the mind bring innate resources of its own to the process of learning or does it rely wholly upon experience? Plato was the first philosopher to give an innatist response to this question and in doing so was to provoke the other major philosophers of ancient Greece to give their own rival explanations of learning. This book examines these theories of learning in relation to each other. It presents an entirely different interpretation of the theory of recollection which also changes the way we understand the development of ancient philosophy after Plato. The final section of the book compares ancient theories of learning with the seventeenth-century debate about innate ideas, and finds that the relation between the two periods is far more interesting and complete than is usually supposed.

The subject of this paper is poetic creativity as it features in various Platonic works: the nature and source of creativity, as well as the way in which it differs from the activity of philosophy. I shall argue that Plato gives us at least three quite different models of poetic creativity. One can be extracted from the Ion and the Meno, another from the Symposiim and a third from the Gorgias and Republic VI. The main focus of this paper will be on the model given in the Symposium where Diotima talks of how such poets as Homer and Hesiod succeeded in creating works that would secure them everlasting memory (209a-d). This passage has not received the attention it deserves within discussions of Platonic poetics, and it is all the more interesting when juxtaposed with the more familiar account of poetic creativity found in the Ion.

We study the mid- to far-IR properties of a 24?m-selected flux-limited sample of 154 intermediate redshift, infrared luminous galaxies, drawn from the 5 Milli-Jansky Unbiased Spitzer Extragalactic Survey. By combining existing mid-IR spectroscopy and new Herschel SPIRE submm photometry from the Herschel Multi-tiered Extragalactic Survey, we derived robust total infrared luminosity and dust mass estimates and infered the relative contribution of the AGN to the infrared energy budget of the sources. We found that the total infrared emission of galaxies with weak 6.2?m PAH emission is dominated by AGN activity, while for galaxies with EW6.2 0.2?m more than 50% of the LIR arises from star formation. We also found that for galaxies detected in the 250-500?m Herschel bands an AGN has a statistically insignificant effect on the temperature of the cold dust and the far-IR colours of the host galaxy, which are primarily shaped by star formation activity. For star-forming galaxies we reveal an anti-correlation between the LIR-to-rest-frame 8?m luminosity ratio, IR8? LIR/L8 and the strength of PAH features. We found that this anti-correlation is primarily driven by variations in the PAHs emission, and not by variations in the 5?15?m mid-IR continuum emission. Using the [Ne iii]/[Ne ii] line ratio as a tracer of the hardness of the radiation field, we confirm that galaxies with harder radiation fields tend to exhibit weaker PAH features, and found that they have higher IR8 values and higher dust-mass-weighted luminosities, the latter being a proxy for the dust temperature. We argue that these trends originate either from variations in the environment of the star-forming regions or are caused by variations in the age of the starburst. Finally, we provide scaling relations that will allow estimating LIR, based on single-band observations with the mid-infrared instrument, on board the upcoming James Webb Space Telescope. © ESO 2013.