Donald A. Landes

ABSTRACT Whether explicitly or implicitly, Kant's critical project weighs heavily upon Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception. This article argues that we can understand Merleau-Ponty's text as a phenomenological rewriting of the Critique of Pure Reason from within the paradoxical structures of lived experience, effectively merging Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic and Transcendental Analytic. Although he was influenced by Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of Kant's first version of the Transcendental Deduction, Merleau-Ponty develops a unique position between Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger via an embodied and lived synthesis that collapses Kant's distinction between sensibility and the understanding, and that makes sense of temporality and subjectivity as a paradoxical trajectory.

Engages the work and career of a central figure in contemporary philosophy. Hugh J. Silverman was an inspiring scholar and teacher, known for his work engaging and shaping phenomenology, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, structuralism, poststructuralism, and deconstruction. As Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literary and Cultural Studies at Stony Brook University, State University of New York, Silverman’s work was marked by “the between,” a concept he developed to think the postmodern in the space between philosophy and non-philosophy. In this volume, leading scholars explore and extend Silverman’s philosophical contributions, from reflections on the notions of care, time, and responsibility, to presentations of the practices and possibilities of deconstruction itself. They provide an assessment of Silverman’s life and work at the intersection of philosophy, ethics, and politics.

As a descriptive philosophy, it might seem that the ethical nowhere has its place in phenomenology. And yet, phenomenology is every-where shot through with normative concerns. This section includes articles from the 2018 conference Toward a Phenomenological Ethics, where two themes emerged regarding the elusive place of the ethical in phenomenology: first, research demonstrates that early phenomenology was indeed oriented by the ethical; second, Critical Phenomenology examines ethical questions in terms of intersubjectivity and oppression. In this introduction, I suggest that the place of the ethical in phenomenology implies a certain paradoxical logic of expression, and I consider the relationship between expression and encroachment. This points to a double responsibility for the cultivation of our own virtual and the virtual that we collectively sustain. I conclude with a brief re????lection on how these ideas might help us to rethink our responsibilities in the age of COVID-19.

Although Merleau-Ponty and Blanchot both seek to undermine the classical subject of philosophical discourse as embodied in the self-transparent “I think,” their methodologies appear to be worlds apart. In his early work, Merleau-Ponty is engaged in a phenomenological rethinking of subjectivity via an elaboration of Husserl’s “I can,” whereas Blanchot seems to defer all subjectivity in his nomadic exploration of the space between literature, criticism, and theory. Rather than seeking to avoid this tension by focusing on Merleau-Ponty’s later work, this paper demonstrates the philosophical significance of reading Blanchot alongside Merleau-Ponty’s early work. This, I argue, reveals the radical nature of Merleau-Ponty’s early account of subjectivity (from the “I can” to the “I speak” to the violence of perception) as well as a certain phenomenological and ethical significance in Blanchot’s readings of the myths of the Sirens and of Orpheus and Eurydice.Bien que Merleau-Ponty et Blanchot cherchent tout deux à ébranler le sujet classique du discours philosophique tel qu’il est incarné dans la transparence à soi du “je pense”, leur méthodologies semblent être très éloignées. Dans ses premiers travaux, Merleau-Ponty s’engage dans une reformulation phénoménologique de la subjectivité à travers une élaboration du “je peux” husserlien, tandis que Blanchot paraît reporter toute subjectivité dans son exploration nomade de l’espace, entre littérature, critique et théorie. Plutôt que d’échapper à cette tension en se concentrant sur les travaux tardifs de Merleau-Ponty, cet article vise à montrer l’intérêt d’une lecture de Blanchot au fil des premiers travaux de Merleau-Ponty. Cela révèle la nature radicale des premières considérations de Merleau-Ponty sur la subjectivité (du “je peux” au “je parle”, jusqu’à la violence de la perception), tout autant qu’une certaine signification phénoménologique et éthique de la lecture par Blanchot du mythe des Sirênes, ou de celui d’Orphée et Eurydice. Nonostante Merleau-Ponty e Blanchot cerchino entrambi di minare il soggetto classico del discorso filosofico, incarnato da un “io penso” trasparente a se stesso, le loro rispettive metodologie appaiono diametralmente opposte. Nei suoi primi scritti, Merleau-Ponty è impegnato in un ripensamento fenomenologico della soggettività attraverso una rielaborazione dell’“io posso” di Husserl, mentre Blanchot sembra rinviare l’intera sfera della soggettività alla sua esplorazione nomadica dello spazio tra letteratura, critica e teoria. Anziché cercare di aggirare questa tensione concentrandosi sugli scritti più tardi di Merleau-Ponty, questo articolo mette in luce la rilevanza filosofica di una lettura di Blanchot condotta a fianco dei primi scritti di Merleau-Ponty. Come intendo sostenere, questo rivela la natura radicale delle prime considerazioni di Merleau-Ponty sulla soggettività (dall’“io posso” all’“io parlo” alla violenza della percezione) e al contempo un significato fenomenologico ed etico della lettura di Blanchot del mito delle Sirene e di quello di Orfeo ed Euridice.

Pour Merleau-Ponty et Nancy, le sujet et son monde co-naissent ensemble dans le mouvement paradoxal du sentir. Dans cette perspective, le sentir serait alors un point de départ privilégié afin de déconstruire les théories classiques de la subjectivité et pour construire une nouvelle compréhension décentrée du sujet. Même si ces deux philosophes divergent sur la question du sujet, il est possible de les rapprocher sur la question du sentir et en particulier à propos de l’expérience de l’écoute. De cette façon, nous ferons ressortir un ton radical chez le premier Merleau-Ponty et un timbre (ou une tonalité) phénoménologique chez Nancy. Pour ce faire, nous démontrons que l’écoute révèle la subjectivité comme activité de « coexistence » (et non pas de « coïncidence »), comme « co-naissance » (et non pas connaissance), et comme « trajectoire » (et non pas présence statique). En d’autres termes, c’est par la voie de l’écoute qu’on retrouve une théorie radicale de la subjectivité déjà présente dans la Phénoménologie de la perception, ainsi qu’une tonalité phénoménologique chez Nancy. For Merleau-Ponty and for Nancy, the subject and his or her world are born together (co-naissent) in the paradoxical movement of sensing. From this perspective, sensing is thus a privileged point of departure for the deconstruction of classical theories of subjectivity and for the construction of a new notion of a decentered subjectivity. Even though it may appear that these two thinkers diverge precisely with regard to the definition of the subject to be theorized, by bringing them together on the topic of sensing (and “listening” in particular), we are able to bring out a radical tone in Merleau-Ponty’s early work as well as a phenomenological timbre in Nancy’s thought. In this paper I demonstrate that listening reveals how subjectivity is an activity of “co-existence” rather than “co-incidence,” of “co-birth” (co-naissance) rather than “knowledge” (connaissance), and is a trajectory rather than a static presence. In other words, by listening to listening we rediscover a radical theory of subjectivity already at work in Phenomenology of Perception and a phenomenological tonality in the work of Nancy. Per Merleau-Ponty e Nancy, il soggetto e il suo mondo co-nascono nel movimento paradossale del sentire. In questa prospettiva, il sentire sarebbe allora un punto di partenza privilegiato per decostruire le teorie classiche della soggettività e costruire una nuova comprensione decentrata del soggetto. Anche se i due filosofi divergono sulla questione del soggetto, è possibile avvicinarli circa la questione del sentire e in particolare a proposito dell’esperienza dell’ascolto. In questo modo, cercheremo di far emergere un tono radicale nel primo Merleau-Ponty e un timbro (o una tonalità) fenomenologica in Nancy. Per farlo, mostreremo come l’ascolto riveli la soggettività come attività di “coesistenza” (e non di “coincidenza”), come “co-nascenza” (e non conoscenza), e come “traiettoria” (e non presenza statica). In altri termini, è attraverso l’ascolto che ritroviamo una teoria radicale della soggettività già presente in Fenomenologia della percezione, così come una tonalità fenomenologica in Nancy.

_ Source: _Volume 45, Issue 3, pp 369 - 385 In “The Vestige of Art,” Jean-Luc Nancy argues that art is neither representation nor inscription, but rather _exscription_. The figure is the vestige of an expressive gesture; it represents neither a separable idea nor the one who traced it but, rather _exscribes_ their presence and their world in the event of expression. As such, Nancy’s aesthetics in _The Muses_ deploys a certain logic of expression best understood in the tradition of Merleau-Pontian phenomenology. Echoing Merleau-Ponty’s notion of speech accomplishing, rather than translating, thought, Nancy’s understanding of the expressive gesture suggests an event that brings forth a self that does not pre-exist its expression and that is paradoxically always already past, always already fallen into material vestiges. By connecting Merleau-Ponty’s notion of a “past that has never been present” to Nancy’s concept of _exscription_, I argue that reading Nancy’s _The Muses_ and Merleau-Ponty’s “Eye and Mind” together suggests an importantly restructured “phenomenology” of painting that is in fact more of an ontology of intercorporeality

Although the suggestion that Kant offers a significant contribution to Virtue Ethics might be a surprising one, in The Metaphysics of Morals Kant makes virtue central to his ethics. In this paper, I introduce a Merleau-Pontian phenomenological perspective into the ongoing study of the convergence between Kant and Virtue Ethics, and argue that such a perspective promises to illuminate the continuity of Kant’s thought through an emphasis on the implicit structure of moral experience, revealing the insights his perspective contains for establishing an embodied phenomenology of virtue. These two aims are accomplished by exploring Kant’s ‘proto-phenomenological’ descriptions of the weight of the moral law, his implicit ‘existential’ account of human nature, and his notion of the art of navigating the complex moral terrain that involves a certain Spielraum. When thus viewed, Kant’s virtue ethics sketches out a subtle understanding of embodiment and temporality

Two key themes structure the work of French philosopher of science Gilbert Simondon: the processes of individuation and the nature of technical objects. Moreover, these two themes are also at the heart of contemporary debates within Ethics and Bioethics. Indeed, the question of the individual is a key concern in both Virtue Ethics and Feminist Ethics of Care, while the hyper-technical reality of the present stage of medical technology is a key reason for both the urgency for and the success of the field of Bioethics. And yet, despite its potential for thinking about these issues, Simondon’s philosophy remains largely unknown. Rather than exploring Simondon’s complex ontology for itself, the aim of this paper is to establish what contribution his work can make in Ethics and Bioethics on two essential questions: the relational structure of the self and the nature of the human-technology relation. I argue that Simondon’s re-conceptualization of the individual harmonizes with perspectives in Feminist Bioethics and points toward what I call an “open” Virtue Ethics that takes relations to be essential. In order to establish this connection, I explore at length the relational approach to Feminist Bioethics offered by Susan Sherwin’s work. I argue that a Simondonian account of technology and of the individual furthers the relational understanding of the self, offers a characterization of Virtue Ethics that is in harmony with the Ethics of Care, and clarifies a notion of responsibility that is implicated in the complex reality of the modern technological milieu.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) is one of the central figures of 20th-century Continental philosophy, and his work has been hugely influential in a wide range of fields. His writings engage in the study of perception, language, politics, aesthetics, history and ontology, and represent a rich and complex network of exciting ideas. The Merleau-Ponty Dictionary provides the reader and student of Merleau-Ponty with all the tools necessary to engage with this key thinker: a comprehensive A to Z that provides summaries of all his major texts and articles, clear and straightforward explanations of his terminology and innovative concepts, and detailed discussions of the figures and philosophies that influenced his work. The book also includes a philosophical introduction, a chronology of Merleau-Ponty's life and works, and suggestions for further reading. This dictionary is the ideal reading and research companion for students at all levels.

Jessica Wiskus’s book The Rhythm of Thought: Art, Literature, and Music (University of Chicago Press, 2013) is a fascinating study of Merleau-Ponty’s late philosophy inrelation to the artistic expression of Mallarmé, Cézanne, Proust, and Debussy. By invoking examples from across the arts and citations from across Merleau-Ponty’soeuvre, Wiskus provides us with a style for reading some of Merleau-Ponty’s difficult late concepts, including noncoincidence, institution, essence, and transcendence.In this review, we explore some of the key concepts and insights of Wiskus’s rich, interdisciplinary book and offer some places where the depth that it opens up perhapsinvites further exploration.