Philosophia (Israel), 16(3-4), 333 - 344.
YEAR: 1986
Extensive corrigenda Vol. 17, no. 3.
SUBJECT(S): Quine's second thoughts on quantifying in, appearing in the second, revised edition of _From a Logical Point of View_ of 1961, are shown to be incorrect. His original thoughts were correct.
ABSTRACT:
Additional tumult is supplied to pp. 152-154 of _From A Logical Point of View_, showing that being dated is no guarantee of being right. Among other things, it is shown that Quine's argument to th…
Read morePhilosophia (Israel), 16(3-4), 333 - 344.
YEAR: 1986
Extensive corrigenda Vol. 17, no. 3.
SUBJECT(S): Quine's second thoughts on quantifying in, appearing in the second, revised edition of _From a Logical Point of View_ of 1961, are shown to be incorrect. His original thoughts were correct.
ABSTRACT:
Additional tumult is supplied to pp. 152-154 of _From A Logical Point of View_, showing that being dated is no guarantee of being right. Among other things, it is shown that Quine's argument to the conclusion that limiting the universe of discourse to intensional entities does not "relieve the original difficulty over quantifying into modal contexts" is incorrect; that the contradictory of that conclusion is in fact true; and that an even stronger conclusion is true, with 'abstract' replacing 'intensional'.
