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24What psychology means to meMens Sana Monographs 4 (1): 36. 2006.What the title of this article means to me after decades on a university faculty is very broad. It would include topics of my research and writing, of my graduate and undergraduate teaching, and of what I read in the area, including papers that have been submitted to me as editor of the American Journal of Psychology. What I can write here focuses on my research and writing and related metatheoretical views, including what I have considered the deeper and more significant questions formulated in…Read more
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12What should be the roles of conscious states and brain states in theories of mental activity?Mens Sana Monographs 9 (1): 93. 2011.Answers to the title's question have been influenced by a history in which an early science of consciousness was rejected by behaviourists on the argument that this entails commitment to ontological dualism and "free will" in the sense of indeterminism. This is, however, a confusion of theoretical assertions with metaphysical assertions. Nevertheless, a legacy within computational and information-processing views of mind rejects or de-emphasises a role for consciousness. This paper sketches a me…Read more
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48Inattentional awarenessPSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 7. 2001.The authors report "priming" effects for subjects they classify as "inattentionally blind" and interpret this as evidence for unconscious perception--an interpretation consistent with deeply entrenched metatheory. I question that interpretation, however, on methodological grounds. On these assessment procedures, some subjects could be classified as "inattentionally blind" despite representing the critical stimulus in conscious attention. Still others--presenting a more interesting challenge--cou…Read more
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2A case of syntactical learning and judgment: How conscious and how abstract?Journal of Experimental Psychology 113 541-555. 1984.
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Conscious representation and thought systemsIn Robert S. Wyer & Thomas K. Srull (eds.), The Content, Structure, and Operation of Thought Systems, Lawrence Erlbaum. 1991.
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30Mentalistic metatheory and strategiesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (3): 337-338. 2002.Mentalism (Dulany 1991; 1997) provides a metatheoretical alternative to the dominant cognitive view. This commentary briefly outlines its main propositions and what I see as strategies for its use and support at this stage. These propositions represent conscious states as the sole carriers of symbolic representations, and mental episodes as consisting exclusively of conscious states interrelated by nonconscious operations.
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3Awareness, rules, and propositional control: A confrontation with s-r behavior theoryIn T. Dixon & Deryck Horton (eds.), Verbal Behavior and General Behavior Theory, Prentice-hall. 1968.
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Strategies for putting consciousness in its placeJournal of Consciousness Studies 10 (1): 33-43. 2003.
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Higher order representation in a mentalistic metatheoryIn Rocco J. Gennaro (ed.), Higher-Order Theories of Consciousness: An Anthology, John Benjamins. 2004.
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On consciousness in syntactic learning and judgment: A reply to Reber, Allen, and ReganJournal of Experimental Psychology 114 25-32. 1985.
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48Consciousness, connectionism, and intentionalityBehavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 154-155. 1999.Connectionism can provide useful theories in which consciousness is the exclusive vehicle of explicit representation. The theories may not, however, handle some phenomena adequately: sense of agency, modes and contents of awareness, propositional and deliberative thought, metacognitive awareness and consciousness of self. They should, however, be useful in describing automatic, activational relations among nonpropositional conscious contents
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46How well are we moving toward a most productive science of consciousness?Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12): 75-98. 2008.Commentary on the Toward a Science of Consciousness Conference, Tucson 2008.
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Conscious attention and abstraction in concept learningJournal of Experimental Psychology 11 45-58. 1985.
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56Rules and similarity as conscious contents with distinctive roles in theoryBehavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (1): 24-24. 2005.Difficulty of distinguishing rules and similarity in categorization comes from reliance on relatively simple manipulation-response designs and a style of modeling with abstract parameters, rather than assessment of intervening and controlling mental states. This commentary proposes a strategy in which rules and similarity would be distinguished by their different roles in a theory interrelating reportable conscious contents in deliberative categorization.
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Consciousness in the explicit (deliberative) and implicit (evocative)In Jonathan D. Cohen & Jonathan W. Schooler (eds.), Scientific Approaches to Consciousness, Lawrence Erlbaum. pp. 179--211. 1997.
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University of Illinois, Urbana-ChampaignRegular Faculty
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Social Science |
General Philosophy of Science |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy of Social Science |