Đorđe Lazarević

In his seminal paper On the Notion of the Cause, Bertrand Russell famously attempts to show why the view that causation is a real and mind-independent feature of the world - called "causal realism" is false. His arguments are often cited as a definitive challenge to the metaphysical tradition that takes causality as a fundamental principle of reality. Yet, despite the apparent plausibility and power of his arguments, causal realism is still a predominant view within philosophy of causation today. This paper seeks to explore how causal realism has endured Russell's attack, examining not only the weaknesses in his arguments, but also the ways in which contemporary philosophers have redefined and strengthened the realist position. By analyzing the responses to Russell's arguments, we will try to pinpoint the lessons learned from his critique and demonstrate how it has informed the development of more sophisticated theories of causation. Doing so will also contribute to a redefinition of causal realism, showing how the debate with Russell has enriched our understanding of what it means for causal theory to be realistic.