Douglas Berger

These essays engage Jin Y. Park’s recent translation of the work of Kim Iryŏp, a Buddhist nun and public intellectual in early twentieth-century Korea. Park’s translation of Iryŏp’s Reflections of a Zen Buddhist Nun was the subject of two book panels at recent conferences: the first a plenary session at the annual meeting of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy and the second at the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association on a group program session sponsored by the International Society for Buddhist Philosophy. This exchange also includes a response from Park.

It has been a little more than two years since I, along with many others, learned of the death of a giant in modern philosophy, and the loss still registers, as classical Indian Nyāya philosophers would say, the presence of his absence. Equally significant for his illumination of the thought of Edmund Husserl and of debates in the classical Indian tradition, that giant was Jitendranath Mohanty (1928–2023). I, along with several generations of people in these fields, in India and the United States, had the unmatched privilege and good fortune of being his student. I have written and done conference presentations about my learning experience from Mohanty and about his works in other venues, and so the editors of... Read More.

This volume of essays offers direct comparisons of historic Western and Buddhist perspectives on ethics and metaphysics, tracing parallels and contrasts all the way from Plato to the Stoics, Spinoza to Hume, and Schopenhauer through to contemporary ethicists such as Arne Naess, Charles Taylor and Derek Parfit. It compares and contrasts each Western philosopher with a particular strand in the Buddhist tradition, in some chapters represented by individual writers such as Nagarjuna, Vasubandhu, Santideva or Tsong Khapa. It does so in light of both analytic concerns and themes from the existentialist and phenomenological traditions, and often in an ecumenical spirit that bridges both analytic and continentalist approaches. Some of the deepest questions in ethics, dealing with the scope of agency, value-laden notions of personhood and the nature of value in general, are intertwined with questions in metaphysics. One set of questions addresses how varying conceptions of selfhood relate to moral values ; another set of questions addresses how a conception of oneself or one’s selves should or should not affect how one thinks of happiness, or eudaimonia, or – in classical Indian terms – artha, sukha or nirvana. Western philosophy has featured discussion of both, but some would argue that certain traditions of Asian philosophy have offered a more sustained and even treatment of both sets of questions. The Buddhist tradition in particular has not only featured much discussion on both fronts, but has attracted many contemporary philosophers to its distinctive spectrum of approaches, and to what is – from many ‘Western’ points of view – a seemingly subversive analysis of ego, selfhood and personhood, whether in metaphysical, phenomenological or other incarnations.

Much has been written in the past century, and particularly in the last few decades, on the degrees to which Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were influenced by their acquaintances with South Asian Buddhist thought. In addition, comparative philosophy scholars have, apart from historical issues of influence, speculated about various ways in which Schopenhauerian or Nietzschean thought might have some significant resonance with various systems of classical Buddhism. However, considerably less has been written about how the works of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche might be assessed from Buddhist perspectives. In this essay, I wish to critically examine these two seminal nineteenth century thinkers on the basis of what ended up becoming one of the most important schools of Buddhist thought, namely early South Asian Vijńānavāda. I will demonstrate that Schopenhauer, with some qualification, argues that, though the ascetic can “deny the will-to-live” in a final act of world-renunciation, the will as thing in itself remains the ground of the world’s existence. For Nietzsche, the act of willing remains what I will call an “incorrigible” element of our existence, for even the act of interpreting on the part of would-be ascetics is a function of their will(s) to power and life. Classical Vijńānavāda thinkers, however, given their special reformulations of standard Abhidharma Buddhist frameworks, maintain that willing is a contingent function of the human psyche and conduct, and that eliminating it through practice is indeed the key to genuine and lasting awakening. In the end, Schopenhauer’s and Nietzsche’s differing conceptions of the will are thus profoundly un-Buddhist.

This book presents an introductory survey of the major themes, thinkers and texts, philosophical genres and profound insights of the Chinese philosophical tradition. Its coverage ranges from the foundational history of Chinese thought in the 6th-5th centuries BCE up to the present day. The first two chapters provide an overview of the broad history of Chinese philosophy, identifying its major texts and thinkers, and offer examples of the different literary styles in which philosophy was written throughout the ages. The remaining chapters explore major and ever-pervasive themes of Chinese philosophical reflection, from a holistic portrayal of the natural order and the relational nature of human beings to debates about ethics and personhood that span the entire development of the heritage. The major questions addressed by the volume are: What are the most important texts, and who are the most influential figures of the history of Chinese philosophy, and what were their historical and social circumstances? How did Chinese thinkers work in such a variety of literary styles: from dramatized conversation, storytelling and poetry to commentary and analysis to the many different genres of Buddhist literature to modern historical and academic writing? What are the varieties of cosmic or natural holism found in the various schools of Chinese philosophy--"Proto-Daoist," Buddhist, Confucian and modern-- and how are they articulated and defended? How have Chinese philosophers throughout history presented the nature of the person, in Confucian, Buddhist, Confucian and contemporary perspectives? Why is the notion of the relational person so persistently central to Chinese thought? How was the personhood of women conceptualized throughout the centuries, particularly by Chinese women philosophers? How did the various notions of personhood shape Chinese philosophers' views of ethics and the ideal social and political order? How did Confucian, Mohist, Legalist, Daoist, and Buddhist perspectives on these issues change through the centuries up to the present? Each chapter includes sections for Further Readings, and a Glossary at the back of the book briefly describes the major time periods, figures, themes and concepts in Chinese philosophy.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities ed. by Steven Burik, Robert Smid and Ralph WeberDouglas L. Berger (bio)Comparative Philosophy and Method: Contemporary Practices and Future Possibilities. Edited by Steven Burik, Robert Smid and Ralph Weber. London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2023. Pp. vi + 272. Paperback $40.28, isbn 978-1-350-29704-3.The editors Steven Burik, Robert Smid and Ralph Weber, who have all made important revisions to the theory of comparative philosophical method, have pulled together the contributions of ten other influential scholars in the field and their own work into this much-needed collection of essays. There has been much written about the methodology of comparative philosophy in the last hundred years. More recent reflections in this field have been strongly fueled by post-colonial evaluations as well as a proliferation of methodological approaches. Nonetheless, some consensus on what methods the field should adopt and to what ends still needs overt discussion. The editors argue in an Introduction and Epilogue to the volume that, now faced with the "obstacles" of often conflicting principles and aims of different methodological approaches which leads to their frequent mutual rejection, there is need for a wide acceptance of pluralism in the methodology of comparative philosophy (pp. 4–5). This methodological pluralism, for the editors, should be understood in two senses. Firstly, there should be a broad-based "methodological commitment to pluralism," which amounts to an acceptance that there is an existing plurality of philosophical traditions in the world which have very different foundational insights and worldviews (p. 254). Secondly, the fact that the plurality of philosophical traditions actually exhibits quite different approaches ought, despite any individual comparativist's preferred method, compel us to accept that this diversity is best dealt with by a plurality of research approaches (pp. 254–55). That is to say that, while the editors both acknowledge and endorse the particular specializations of any and all scholars engaged in intercultural philosophy, they urge each scholar to accept that both a descriptive and prescriptive pluralism of philosophical methodologies are necessary for the continued flourishing of the field. In order to demonstrate this descriptive and prescriptive pluralism, the editors organize the volume into what they call five "constellations" of discussion (p. 8).In the first "constellation" labeled "Necessary Conditions," Robert Neville, Jaap [End Page 1] van Brakel and Lin Ma offer general and detailed frameworks for what sorts of assumptions are needed for any comparative philosophical research to proceed fruitfully. Neville, while happily admitting that we need to be vigilant about biases and other limitations when crossing into other traditions, insists that philosophers need to at once be searching for the truth in any given comparison of ideas, while simultaneously always reflectively constructing the right categories on the basis of which the comparison may be justified and sound (pp. 22–27). Van Brakel and Ma present in their co-authored essay an elaborate blueprint for comparative research. This blueprint, while also conceding that there can never be "any one right interpretation" of any individual text, much less whole traditions, posit a basic "family resemblance principle" which highlights "mutually recognizable human practices" as the basic condition enabling comparative reflection in the first place (pp. 34–39).In the second "constellation," entitled "Generalization and Essentialization," Roger Ames and François Jullien insist in various ways that, while the essentialism that bedeviled previous eras of philosophy in general and comparative philosophy in particular should be rejected, generalizations are still fundamentally necessary to crystalize the most important ways in which traditions are distinct from one another. Ames, defending himself against recent allegations of essentialism in his approach, insists that the field needs to be supported by both a "self-reflective hermeneutical sensitivity" which acknowledges the positionality of the inquirer as well as a commitment to "search within the soil" of, in his case, the Chinese philosophical tradition for its own models of meaning (p. 58). To the latter end, Ames defends accurate generalizations which can help us understand "the language, the customs and the life-forms of a living tradition" since these, contrary to suspicions, aid us in preventing essentialization in comparative work (p. 63). Jullien...

Neil Young and Philosophy, edited by Douglas L. Berger, explores the meanings, importance, and philosophical dimensions of the music, career, and life of this prolific singer/songwriter over the past five decades. Neil Young’s music has touched on a broad range of cultural, political and personal issues, all of which have enormous ongoing relevance for our own times. In order to accommodate Young’s artistic breadth, contributions of scholars from a wide variety of fields-- American philosophy, ethics, American Indian philosophy, feminist philosophy, psychology, philosophy of mind and religious studies--are included in this collection. They examine everything from Young’s environmentalism, invocation of American Indian themes, images of women, and interpretations of human relationships to his confrontations with the music industry, his experiments with recording technologies, his approach to social change, and his methods of creativity. The book builds on the fundamental commitment of the Philosophy and Popular Culture series to see the artist as a philosopher.

Does cross-cultural philosophy stand in need of a hermeneutical expansion? In engaging with this question, the symposium focuses upon methodological issues salient to cross-cultural inquiry. Douglas L. Berger lays out the ground for the debate by arguing for a methodological approach, which is able to rectify the discipline’s colonial legacies and bridge the hermeneutical distance with its objects of study. From their own perspectives, Hans-Georg Moeller, Paul Roth and A. Raghuramaraju analyze whether such a processual and hermeneutically-sensitive approach can indeed open up new hermeneutic horizons. Their responses shed light upon cross-cultural philosophy’s continued embedment in Euroamerican professional philosophy and how the locality of its knowledge-seeking endeavors may indeed have repercussions on attempts to bridge temporal and spatial distances.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācarya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and TranslationDouglas L. BergerThe Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śaṅkarācarya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and Translation. Translated by John Grimes. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004. Pp. xii + 292.The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi or Crown Jewel of Discrimination has for centuries been celebrated as one of the most effective prakaraṇa grantha or independent pedagogical [End Page 616] treatises in the literature of Advaita, the nondualistic school of Vedānta, owing to its straightforward dialogical style and lucid presentation of bedrock theories of the school. It has been ascribed, along with literally hundreds of other works, to the preeminent philosophical commentator in Advaita's illustrious history, Śaṅkara (ca. 650-700 C.E.). Modern lndological scholarship, however, has contested both of these grounds for its fame, calling into question its consistency with the theoretical framework laid down by Śaṅkara as well as its traditional attribution to the hand of the medieval Kerela master.In The Vivekacūḍāmaṇi of Śahkarācārya Bhagavatpāda: An Introduction and Translation, his recent translation of The Crown Jewel—the tenth made into English—John Grimes sets out to defend the integrity of tradition against modern criticism. Grimes, whose incisive scholarship has given us a number of important works on Advaita such as An Advaita Vedanta Perspective on Language and Problems and Perspectives in Religious Discourse: Advaita Vedanta Implications, as well as A Concise Dictionary of Indian Philosophy, applies his considerable Sanskrit and Advaita acumen to The Crown Jewel in order to achieve a twofold goal. In the Preface he vows to contribute a readable translation that is attentive to the religious sensibilities and goals of the Vivekac&umacrḍāmaṇi to guide the reader to ultimate wisdom and liberation but also to offer a rendition that speaks to contemporary audiences in an inclusive way, opening the possibility of knowledge of purified Selfhood to male and female readers alike (pp. vii-ix). At the same time, given the length to which he goes concerning this matter in his extensive Introduction, Grimes proves himself keen to show that, despite modern objections and reservations, "a strong case can be made that the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi is a genuine work of Śaṅkara's and that it differs in certain respects from his other works in that it addresses itself to a different audience and has a different emphasis and purpose" (p. 13). What is offered to the modern reader in this translation, then, is a defense of the traditional authorial and authoritative status of this popular Advaita treatise.Grimes' presentation falls into two parts. The first is a fifty-page Introduction that includes the life and teachings of Śaṅkara, a rundown on the basic doctrines of Advaita Vedānta, and reflections on the various approaches to the study of author and school. Much of this Introduction is occupied with the question of whether the historical Śaṅkara actually wrote the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi, in a discussion that engages the criteria for reliably attributing a work to him set down by Paul Hacker a half century ago. Here, Grimes immerses himself in a debate in which Hacker came down on the side of Śaṅkara having written the work, while Daniel lngalls and Sengaku Mayeda, following Hacker's own criteria, have rejected this conclusion. Grimes point by point traverses Hacker's criteria of authorship, particularly Hacker's analysis of how Śaṅkara defines basic terms such as avidyā, anirvacanīya, prāgabhāva, and other related concepts in works such his commentary on the Brahmasūtra compared to how these are defined in The Crown Jewel. Grimes concludes minimally that "there is still a likelihood that Śaṅkara is the author of the Vivekacūḍāmaṇi" (p. 23).The second half of the work is the translation itself, which includes the voluminous Sanskrit text in romanized form, Grimes' verse-by-verse rendition, and explications [End Page 617] on the meaning of each verse complete with relevant textual references to the Upaniṣads and a lexicon of important Sanskrit terms.With regard to Grimes' contribution to the intriguing ongoing...

In verse nine of the Vigrahavyavartani, Nagarjuna gives a defense of his skepticism by insisting that he makes no proposition concerning the nature of reality. B. K. Matilal has argued that this position is not an untenable one for a skeptic to hold, using as an explanatory model Searle’s distinction between a propositional and an illocutionary negation. The argument runs that Nagarjuna does not refute rival philosophical positions by simply refuting whatever positive claims those positions might make, but rather he refuses the very act of making an assertion. From this kind of illocutionary negation, however, a certain paradoxicality arises: for in the negating the act of assertion, the skeptic is barred from asserting his or her own position, for under this condition, if he or she asserts that position, it is falsified! I want to argue that there are certain senses in which it seems that Nagarjuna’s resorting to the illocution we find in the Vigrahavyavartani may not have been necessary for the maintenance of his skeptical position, for he has recourse to prasanga counter-arguments which can always offset the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers whom he confronts. There are also places in the Karika itself, where certain pramanas seem to be employed, that give one the impression that this kind of skepticism and the pramanas are only inimical to one another insofar as the latter may lead to the metaphysical, essentialist extremes criticized by the Buddhists. Nagarjuna’s illocution in this light seems an attempt to radicalize his difference from a developing Nyaya extensionalist theory of the pramanas, a theory in which the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas are closer than anywhere else.

Discusses the journey of Buddhist ideas on awareness and personhood from India to China. Encounters of Mind explores a crucial step in the philosophical journey of Buddhism from India to China, and what influence this step, once taken, had on Chinese thought in a broader scope. The relationship of concepts of mind, or awareness, to the constitution of personhood in Chinese traditions of reflection was to change profoundly after the Cognition School of Buddhism made its way to China during the sixth century. India’s Buddhist philosophers had formulated the idea that, in order for human beings to achieve perfect enlightenment, they had to produce a state of awareness through practice that they described as “luminous.” However, once introduced to the Chinese tradition, the concept of the “luminous mind” was to become a condition already found within human nature for the possibility of achieving human ideals. This notion of the luminous mind was to have far-reaching significance both for Chinese Buddhism and for medieval Confucianism. Douglas L. Berger follows the transforming path of conceptions of the luminosity of consciousness and the perfectibility of personhood in order to bring into clearer relief the history of Indian and Chinese philosophical dialogue, as well as in the hope that such dialogue will be reignited.

For over twenty years Douglas Berger has advanced research and reflection on Indian philosophical traditions from both classical and cross-cultural perspectives. This volume reveals the extent of his contribution by bringing together his perspectives on these classical Indian philosophies and placing them in conversation with Confucian, Chinese Buddhist and medieval Indian Sufi traditions. Delving into debates between Nyaya and Buddhist philosophers on consciousness and identity, the nature of Sankara's theory of the self, the precise character of Nagarjuna's idea of emptiness, and the relationship between awareness and embodiment in the broad spectrum of Indian thought, chapters exhibit Berger's unusually broad range of expertise. They connect Chinese Confucian and Buddhist texts with classical Indian theories of ethics and consciousness, contrast the ideas of seminal European thinkers like Nietzsche and Derrida from prevailing themes in Buddhism, and shed light on the spiritual and political dimensions of the Mughal prince Dara Shukoh's immersion into Vedantic thought. Always approaching the arguments from an intercultural perspective, Berger shows how much relevance and resonance classical Indian thought has with ancient Confucian views of ethics, Chinese Buddhist depictions of consciousness and medieval Mughal conceptions of divinity. The result is a volume celebrating the rigor, vitality and intercultural resonance of India's rich philosophical heritage.

A variety of crucial and still most relevant ideas about nothingness or emptiness have gained profound philosophical prominence in the history and development of a number of South and East Asian traditions—including in Buddhism, Daoism, Neo-Confucianism, Hinduism, Korean philosophy, and the Japanese Kyoto School. These traditions share the insight that in order to explain both the great mysteries and mundane facts about our experience, ideas of "nothingness" must play a primary role. This collection of essays brings together the work of twenty of the world’s prominent scholars of Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, Neo-Confucian, Japanese and Korean thought to illuminate fascinating philosophical conceptualizations of "nothingness" in both classical and modern Asian traditions. The unique collection offers new work from accomplished scholars and provides a coherent, panoramic view of the most significant ways that "nothingness" plays crucial roles in Asian philosophy. It includes both traditional and contemporary formulations, sometimes putting Asian traditions into dialogue with one another and sometimes with classical and modern Western thought. The result is a book of immense value for students and researchers in Asian and comparative philosophy

Schopenhauer, perhaps more than any other Western philosopher, has been associated with Asian, and specifically Indian philosophy. The problem in the last hundred years of commentarial literature has been assessing what his relationship to pre-systematic Indian philosophical thought was. Both European and Indian scholars have vacillated over the years from great confidence that Schopenhauer's system was inspired by and even representative of classical Indian thought to a concurrence that Schopenhauer's knowledge of pre-systematic Hinduism and Buddhism was superficial and his invoking of their ideas was meant to reflect ideas that were strictly his own. This dissertation will establish that, while Schopenhauer did treat some aspects of pre-systematic Hindu and Buddhist thought superficially, he did appropriate the Upanis&dotbelow;dic notion of maya into his epistemology as a thesis of falsification, and this had great effects on his metaphysics of will and ethics of identification and compassion in the argumentation of his system. ;To this end, this dissertation will first examine the criteria of influence which have been used by the last hundred years of scholars in assessing Schopenhauer's relationship to pre-systematic Hindu and Buddhist philosophy, suggest that the criteria are inadequate as measures of influence, and formulate minimum and more reliable criteria. Next, Schopenhauer's first acquaintance with Anquetil Duperron's translations of the Upanis&dotbelow;ads during the formulation of his system in his notebooks from 1814 to 1818 will be investigated, in order to show how his developing systematic epistemology, metaphysics and ethics were effected by this encounter. The bulk of the dissertation will then be devoted to a detailed analysis of how crucial Schopenhauer's thesis of falsification, the result of his appropriation of the idea of maya, was for his representation theory, metaphysics of will and ethics of identification. The theory of falsification was indeed a necessary linking concept between the epistemology, metaphysics and ethics which helped give Schopenhauer's system cohesion. Finally, two enduring legacies of Schopenhauer's appropriation of ideas from pre-systematic Indian philosophical thought will be explicated, namely his stigmatizations of the Indian philosophical tradition with the stereotypes of pessimism and irrationalism, and the implications of his philosophical appropriation for cross-cultural philosophy.

In Categorisation in Indian Philosophy: Thinking Inside the Box, Jessica Frazier has brought together an impressive array of scholars who have contributed nine essays, plus an introductory and concluding chapter, both written by her, which collectively provide a most fruitful perspective for examining classical South Asian traditions of thought. Creating categorial frameworks was certainly a prolific activity among the ancient and medieval authors of the darśanas, and indeed these authors drew heavily from pre-scholastic texts and language to build their systems. Frazier in her concluding chapter gives a helpful synopsis of the various roles played by categories in Indian philosophies, classifying them as..

The scholarly career of Professor Chad Hansen has been devoted in large measure to an elucidation of the relationship between the classical Chinese language and the structure and aims of pre-Qin philosophical thought. His “mass-noun” hypothesis of classical Chinese thought, his notion of dao 道 as “guiding discourse,” and his clarifications of the significance of Mohism are marked achievements from which all of us have benefited immensely. In the opening chapters of A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, Hansen prefaces his interpretation of how the Chinese language lends uniqueness to its philosophical tradition with a sharp contrast to Indo-European language and thought. Hansen attempts to show how the Indo-European..

I am most grateful to Professors Garfield and Westerhoff for their comments on my article "Acquiring Emptiness: Interpreting Nāgārjuna's MMK 24 : 18" in the January 2010 issue of Philosophy East and West. Their responses to my essay and the critiques they offer, grounded in their considerable expertise in Buddhist philosophical schools, are well argued and rooted in thorough commentarial analysis. In what follows, I attempt to respond to their critiques and concerns.There can be no doubt that the occurrence of the phrase sā prajñāptir upādāya in MMK 24 : 18 has been understood by the bulk of the commentarial literature on the treatise as a compound technical term meaning something like "dependent designation." The..