Douglas Ehring

The Non-Reductionist holds that personal identity is a matter in whole or in part of “further facts,” facts over and above those about psychological and physical continuity and connectedness. If Non-Reductionism is true, then it is possible for there to be “nonsymmetrical fission cases” in which there is nonsymmetry with respect to further facts such that the fissioner is identical with one of the fission products but not the other, even though there is symmetry along each branch with respect to non-further facts. If it is also true that the fissioner gets what matters with respect to the fission product to which the fissioner is not identical in those cases, it is possible for identity and what matters to come apart. If the Non-Reductionist is to hold fast to the importance of identity, she must demonstrate that the fissioner does not get what matters in survival with respect to the fission product to which he is not identical in cases of nonsymmetrical fission. One way to get this result would be to demonstrate that Non-Reductionism in and of itself has the implication that the fissioner does not get what matters with respect to the fission product to which he is not identical in the nonsymmetrical fission case. Parfit offers an argument that is meant to show that the Non-Reductionism qua Non-Reductionism has just this result. I outline Parfit’s argument and suggest that it does not work.

Wesley Salmon in Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World offers a causal account of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984). In this context he develops an analysis of the concept of causality, an analysis which marks a break with various contemporary theories of causation including the Neo-Humean view, counterfactual theory, and manipulability theory. His analysis also goes well beyond the confines of probabilistic accounts such as that developed by Suppes. Salmon attempts to explicate the concept of causation by way of two concepts, that of a causal process and that of a causal interaction, which, he defines with some precision and care. In this paper I will present a series of problem cases which run contrary to Salmon’s line of analysis.In developing his analysis of causation Salmon makes use of the notion of a “process”.

This study is about what matters in survival--about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In What Matters in Survival, Douglas Ehring argues that this Parfitian thesis does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view "Survival Nihilism," according to which nothing matters in survival. Although we generally have motivating reasons to have prudential concern, and perhaps even indirect normative reasons for such concerns there is no relation that gives you a basic, foundational normative reason for prudential concern. This view goes beyond what Parfit calls the Extreme View. It is the More Extreme View and is in effect something like an error theory about prudential reason as a special kind of normative reason.

According to Parfit’s assessment of fission, the fissioner can have prudential concern for each of the post-fission people and that concern will be rational in virtue of some relation he bears to those post-fission people. Parfit suggests that it is plausible that the relation that grounds rational prudential concern is not identity, but some other relation. This argument can be challenged by reference to Velleman’s account of anticipating having an experience on the reasonable assumption that prudential concern with respect to a person P consists, in part, in the ability to anticipate having certain experiences of P. According to Velleman, the fissioner cannot anticipate having the experiences of the fission products. In this paper, I suggest, first, that even if we accept Velleman’s account of anticipating having an experience, there are variants of fission in which his account is satisfied and, second, that his account may have the implication that prudential concern does not require anticipatory concern.

Johansson, in “Parfit on Fission,” rejects Parfit’s thesis that fission demonstrates that identity does not matter in survival based on the following assumption (call the person who fissions, “Mr. Fissiony” and the fission products, “Lefty” and “Righty”): It is determinately true that Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty or that he is identical to Righty, but it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty and it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Righty. Johansson argues that there are identity-based answers to the following questions that apply in fission case: (Future Time) Concerning any future time, what matters in my relation to it? (Future Person) Concerning any future individual, what matters in my relation to him? The identity-based answers are these: (Future Time Answer) That I am identical with someone at that time. (Future Person Answer) That it is not false that I and that future individual are identical and that this relation of it not being false that we are identical is not close to not obtaining. I argue that the combination of these answers is inconsistent with the implication that if person C1 at t1 stands in the mattering relation to person C2 at t2, then C1 gets what matters with respect to t2 and that the degree to which the relation specified in Future Person Answer holds between Mr. Fissiony and Lefty in the fission case does not match up to the degree to which Mr. Fissiony gets what matters with respect to Lefty.

One of Parfit’s arguments for the thesis that identity never matters involves generalizing from “divergence” cases in which identity arguably does not matter. The primary divergence case for Parfit is fission. According to Parfit’s assessment, it is not true that the fissioner gets what matters with respect to either fissionee by way of being identical to each fissionee but does so by way of the M-relation, psychological continuity with its normal cause, the persistence of enough of the brain. The same is true in all other divergence cases by Parfit’s accounting. Parfit generalizes. From (E) Whenever M and identity diverged, it would be M that mattered, not identity. Parfit infers (F) Whenever M and identity diverge and even when these relations coincide, it is M that matters, not identity. In this paper, I challenge the inference from (E) to (F).

G. A. Cohen, in his ‘The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom,’ addresses the classical Marxist claim that workers are forced to sell their labour power under capitalism. This claim has been the object of much debate and controversy. Cohen brings his very considerable analytical skills to bear on this question with the result that he supports, in distinctive but non-conflicting ways, both sides of the controversy. On Cohen’s analysis this claim is ambiguous, i.e., the term ‘proletariat’ has two importantly different senses. In the distributive sense, workers need not be coerced, but in the collective sense, they are coerced, i.e., each individual worker is free to leave the working class, but the class of workers' as a whole does not possess a similar freedom. In this paper, I will argue that Cohen’s argument does not establish that the proletariat qua individuals are not forced to sell their labour power. It will also be argued that, in fac;t, there is no definite answer to the question of whether or not workers are forced to sell their labour power. Freedom and coercion are matters of degree, for the relevant range of cases, and, hence, it is not appropriate to ask whether or not the workers are coerced. I will, however, attempt to show that, contrary to the spirit of Cohen’s thesis, proletariat as individuals suffer from a diminished degree of freedom in the sale of their labour power.

G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any such justification is possible. In this paper, I will argue that, given Cohen's objections to the labour-theoretic argument, his “Plain Argument” itself retains too great a similarity to that argument. A new interpretation of the basis of the charge of exploitation is offered which requires neither the labour theory nor that which is dubious in Cohen's formulation.