•  6
    The Non-Reductionist holds that personal identity is a matter in whole or in part of “further facts,” facts over and above those about psychological and physical continuity and connectedness. If Non-Reductionism is true, then it is possible for there to be “nonsymmetrical fission cases” in which there is nonsymmetry with respect to further facts such that the fissioner is identical with one of the fission products but not the other, even though there is symmetry along each branch with respect to…Read more
  •  1
    Causal Processes and Causal Interactions
    PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1986 (1): 24-32. 1986.
    Wesley Salmon in Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World offers a causal account of scientific explanation (Salmon 1984). In this context he develops an analysis of the concept of causality, an analysis which marks a break with various contemporary theories of causation including the Neo-Humean view, counterfactual theory, and manipulability theory. His analysis also goes well beyond the confines of probabilistic accounts such as that developed by Suppes. Salmon attempts to …Read more
  •  32
    Mental identity
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 22 (2): 189-194. 1984.
  •  17
    This study is about what matters in survival--about what relation to a future individual gives you a reason for prudential concern for that individual. For common sense there is such a relation and it is identity, but according to Parfit common sense is wrong in this respect. Identity is not what matters in survival. In What Matters in Survival, Douglas Ehring argues that this Parfitian thesis does not go far enough. The result is the highly radical view "Survival Nihilism," according to which n…Read more
  •  11
    Fission and anticipating having an experience
    Synthese 198 (12): 12223-12234. 2020.
    According to Parfit’s assessment of fission, the fissioner can have prudential concern for each of the post-fission people and that concern will be rational in virtue of some relation he bears to those post-fission people. Parfit suggests that it is plausible that the relation that grounds rational prudential concern is not identity, but some other relation. This argument can be challenged by reference to Velleman’s account of anticipating having an experience on the reasonable assumption that p…Read more
  •  34
    Johansson on Fission
    Acta Analytica 34 (2): 155-163. 2019.
    Johansson, in “Parfit on Fission,” rejects Parfit’s thesis that fission demonstrates that identity does not matter in survival based on the following assumption (call the person who fissions, “Mr. Fissiony” and the fission products, “Lefty” and “Righty”): It is determinately true that Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty or that he is identical to Righty, but it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Lefty and it is indeterminate whether Mr. Fissiony is identical to Righty. Joh…Read more
  •  35
    Why Parfit Can Rebut Johnstonʼs Reductio
    Theoria 86 (5): 583-594. 2020.
    Theoria, EarlyView. Henry Pollock, in “Parfit's Fission Dilemma: Why Relation R Doesn't Matter”, examines the options available to Parfit for defending his “argument from below” from Johnstonʼs reductio objection. Pollock argues that Parfitʼs proposed defence against Johnston fails. In this article, I argue that Pollockʼs objections to Parfitʼs defence can be resisted.
  •  11
    Physical Causation
    Mind 112 (447): 529-533. 2003.
  •  41
    Donald Cary Williams
    In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. pp. 0. 2012.
    Stanford Encyclopedia article surveying the life and work of D.C. Williams, notably in defending realism in metaphysics in the mid-twentieth century and in justifying induction by the logic of statistical inference.
  •  49
    Why Parfit Cannot Generalize From Fission
    Analytic Philosophy 59 (3): 413-425. 2018.
    One of Parfit’s arguments for the thesis that identity never matters involves generalizing from “divergence” cases in which identity arguably does not matter. The primary divergence case for Parfit is fission. According to Parfit’s assessment, it is not true that the fissioner gets what matters with respect to either fissionee by way of being identical to each fissionee but does so by way of the M-relation, psychological continuity with its normal cause, the persistence of enough of the brain. …Read more
  •  14
    "Normal" intentional action
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (1): 155-157. 1985.
  •  82
    Motion, causation, and the causal theory of identity
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (2). 1991.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  140
    Causal relata
    Synthese 73 (2). 1987.
  •  36
    The Brownian Direction of Causation
    Journal of Critical Analysis 8 (2): 51-56. 1980.
  •  30
    Causation and causal factuals
    Erkenntnis 25 (1). 1986.
    Martin bunzl in "causal factuals" ("erkenntnis" 21, 1984) attempts to adapt and improve upon an approach to causation associated with the counterfactual theory of causation. Bunzl proposes to use possible world semantics to analyze causal sentences without reference to counterfactuals. In this paper I argue that bunzl's analysis is subject to problem cases which bear a close resemblance to those which plague counterfactual theory
  •  105
    Papineau on causal asymmetry
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 81-87. 1987.
  •  70
    Nonbranching and Nontransitivity
    Analysis 50 (4). 1990.
  •  3
    Enç On Functions
    Philosophical Inquiry 7 (2): 74-81. 1985.
  •  61
    Trope persistence and temporary external relations
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3). 1998.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  22
    Cohen, Exploitation, and Theft
    Dialogue 26 (2): 299-. 1987.
    G. A. Cohen in “More on Exploitation and the Labour Theory of Value” defends the thesis that the Marxist charge of exploitation against the capitalist cannot be supported by way of the labour theory of value. He suggests an alternative, non-labour-theoretic argument for this charge which depends on premises he takes to be more obvious than the labour theory of value. Cohen claims that his argument is the only way a Marxist couldjustify attributions of “exploitation” to the capitalist, if any suc…Read more
  •  72
    Spatial relations between universals
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (1). 2002.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  89
    Bunzl on causal overdetermination
    Philosophical Studies 39 (2). 1981.
  •  123
    Personal identity and the r-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 73 (3): 337-346. 1995.
    This Article does not have an abstract
  •  79
    The causal argument against natural class trope nominalism
    Philosophical Studies 107 (2). 2002.
    In this paper, I consider an objection to ``natural class''trope nominalism, the view that a trope's nature isdetermined by its membership in a natural class of tropes.The objection is that natural class trope nominalismis inconsistent with causes' being efficacious invirtue of having tropes of a certain type. I arguethat if natural class trope nominalism is combinedwith property counterpart theory, then this objectioncan be rebutted.