• Truth's Harmony in Plato's Musical Cosmos
    Dissertation, Vanderbilt University. 1996.
    Plato provocatively characterizes truth $$ in terms of harmony $$ at various points throughout his dialogues. While limited attention has been directed toward the role of musical concepts in Plato's general cosmology, not any attention has been directed toward how musical concepts function in relation to Plato's characterization of truth. In fact, this issue has had little occasion for consideration. Almost every contemporary translator empties terms such as $\grave\alpha\rho\mu o\nu\acute\iota\…Read more
  •  14
    Schlabach, Gerald W. Unlearning Protestantism: Sustaining Christian Community in an Unstable Age (review)
    Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 23 (1-2): 212-214. 2011.
  •  7
    Brown, Montague. Restoration of Reason: The Eclipse and Recovery of Truths Goodness and Beauty (review)
    Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies 20 (1-2): 184-186. 2008.
  •  16
    Protestant Free Church Christians and Gaudium et Spes
    with Michael D. Beaty and Scott H. Moore
    Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 10 (1): 136-165. 2007.
  •  16
    Hope's Promise for Christians in the Not Yet and In Between
    Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 14 (3): 104-132. 2011.
  •  86
    Does Reasonable Nonbelief Exist?
    Faith and Philosophy 18 (1): 75-92. 2001.
    J. L. Schellenberg’s Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason claims that the existence of reflective persons who long to solve the problem of God’s existencebut cannot do so constitutes an evil rendering God’s existence improbable. In this essay, I present Schellenberg’s argument and argue that the kind of reasonable nonbelief Schellenberg needs for his argument to succeed is unlikely to exist. Since Schellenberg’s argument is an inductive-style version of the problem of evil, the empirical improbabi…Read more
  •  114
    Reasonable Doubts About Reasonable Nonbelief
    Faith and Philosophy 25 (3): 276-289. 2008.
    In Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, J. L. Schellenberg argues that the phenomenon of “reasonable nonbelief” constitutes sufficient reason to doubtthe existence of God. In this essay I assert the reasonableness of entertaining doubts about the kind of reasonable nonbelief that Schellenberg needs for a cogent argument. Treating his latest set of arguments in this journal, I dispute his claims about the scope and status of “unreflective nonbelief,” his assertion that God would prevent reasonable…Read more