• Adam Smith's politics
    In Knud Haakonssen (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Adam Smith, Cambridge University Press. 1996.
  • Bentham as Revolutionary Social Scientist
    Lumen: Selected Proceedings From the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 6 115-145. 1987.
  • Body, Mind, and Method (edited book)
    D. Reidl. 1979.
  •  91
  •  19
    Hume (review)
    Noûs 16 (3): 474-477. 1982.
  •  84
    David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill are often viewed as contributors to or participants in a common tradition of thought roughly characterized as ‘the liberal tradition’ or the tradition of ‘bourgeois ideology’. This view, however useful it may be for polemical or proselytizing purposes, is in some important respects historiographically unsound. This is not to deny the importance of asking what twentieth-century liberals or conservatives might find in the works of, say, D…Read more
  •  7
    Hume's 'Imagination' Revisited
    Lumen: Selected Proceedings From the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 17 127-149. 1998.
  •  19
    Jeremy Bentham was a British philosopher, jurist, and social reformer. He is regarded as the founder of modern utilitarianism.
  •  28
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 67-84. 1992.
    The Self-Defeating Character of Skepticism [ABSTRACT] Douglas C. Long Philosophical skepticism arises from a Cartesian first-person perspective that initially rejects as unjustified any appeal to sense perception. I argue that, contrary to the cogito argument, when a “purely subjective” epistemology cuts one off from justified beliefs about the world in this way, it undermines justified belief about one’s own existence as an individual in the world as well. Therefore, philosophical doubt e…Read more
  •  364
    The self-defeating character of skepticism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (1): 67-84. 1992.
    An important source of doubt about our knowledge of the "external world" is the thought that all of our sensory experience could be delusive without our realizing it. Such wholesale questioning of the deliverances of all forms of perception seems to leave no resources for successfully justifying our belief in the existence of an objective world beyond our subjective experiences. I argue that there is there is a fatal flaw in the very expression of philosophical doubt about the "external world.…Read more
  •  491
    The bodies of persons
    Journal of Philosophy 71 (10): 291-301. 1974.
    Much mischief concerning the concept of a human body is generated by the failure of philosophers to distinguish various important senses of the term 'body.' I discuss three of those senses and illustrate the issues they can generate by discussing the concept of a Lockean exchange of bodies as well as the brain-body switch.
  •  890
    The philosophical concept of a human body
    Philosophical Review 73 (July): 321-337. 1964.
    I argue in this paper that philosophers have not clearly introduced the concept of a body in terms of which the problem of other minds and its solutions have been traditionally stated; that one can raise fatal objections to attempts to introduce this concept; and that the particular form of the problem of other minds which is stated in terms of the concept is confused and requires no solution. The concept of a "body" which may or may not be the body of a person, which is required to state the tr…Read more
  •  308
    Second thoughts: A reply to mr. Ginnane
    Mind 70 (279): 405-411. 1961.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in pheno¬menological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking ar…Read more
  •  7797
    Descartes' argument for mind-body dualism
    Philosophical Forum 1 (3): 259-273. 1969.
    In his Meditations Descartes concludes that he is a res cogitans, an unextended entity whose essence is to be conscious. His reasoning in support of the conclusion that he exists entirely distinct from his body has seemed unconvincing to his critics. I attempt to show that the reasoning which he offers in support of his conclusion. although mistaken, is more plausible and his mistakes more interesting than his critics have acknowledged.
  •  189
    Second thoughts: A reply to mr Ginnane's thoughts
    Mind 70 (July): 405-411. 1961.
    In his article "Thoughts" (MIND, July 1960) William Ginnane argues that "thought is pure intentionality," and that our thoughts are not embodied essentially in the mental imagery and other elements of phenomenology that cross our minds along with the thoughts. Such images merely illustrate out thoughts. In my discussion I resist this claim pointing out that our thoughts are often embodied in events that can be described in phenomenological terms, especially when our reports of our thinking are i…Read more
  •  723
    Particulars and their qualities
    Philosophical Quarterly 18 (72): 193-206. 1968.
    Berkeley, Hume, and Russell rejected the traditional analysis of substances in terms of qualities which are supported by an "unknowable substratum." To them the proper alternative seemed obvious. Eliminate the substratum in which qualities are alleged to inhere, leaving a bundle of coexisting qualities--a view that we may call the Bundle Theory or BT. But by rejecting only part of the traditional substratum theory instead of replacing it entirely, Bundle Theories perpetuate certain confusions …Read more
  •  106
    Other Minds (review)
    Teaching Philosophy 1 (2): 190-192. 1975.
    D. C. Long’s review of a monograph Godfrey Vesey prepared on the problem of our knowledge of other minds for the Open University series on problems of philosophy. Vesey discusses philosophers’ disenchantment with the traditional argument from analogy as a solution to the problem. This has been fostered by Wittgensteinian objections to the idea that psychological words get their meaning by reference to our own “private” experiences. Vesey similarly argues for the thesis that a person cannot be…Read more
  •  49
    Causality, Interpretation, and the Mind (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 49 (3): 641-642. 1996.
    The author intends to show how an "interpretationist" conception of mental phenomena, extracted primarily from the writings of Davidson, with supplementation from Dennett and Wittgenstein, is compatible with a causal account of common-sense psychology. "When we interpret someone, we aim to make sense of her by attributing beliefs, desires, intentions, emotions and other propositional attitudes--attitudes in the light of which her behaviour is intelligible as, more or less, rational action. Inter…Read more
  •  625
    Disembodied existence, physicalism and the mind-body problem
    Philosophical Studies 31 (May): 307-316. 1977.
    The idea that we may continue to exist in a bodiless condition after our death has long played an important role in beliefs about immortality, ultimate rewards and punishments, the transmigration of souls, and the like. There has also been long and heated disagreement about whether the idea of disembodied existence even makes sense, let alone whether anybody can or does survive dissolution of his material form. It may seem doubtful that anything new could be added to the debate at this late date…Read more
  •  158
    Hovering in the background of investigations into human physiology is the promise or threat, depending upon how one looks at the matter that human beings are complete physical-chemical systems and that all events taking place within their bodies and all movements of their bodies could be accounted for by physical causes if we but knew enough. In this paper I consider the important question whether our coming to believe that this "mechanistic" hypothesis is true would warrant our relinquishing ou…Read more
  •  38
    Hume's Imagination' Revisited
    Lumen: Selected Proceedings From the Canadian Society for Eighteenth-Century Studies 17 127. 1998.