I explore various claims about the nature of phenomenal concepts and isolate two recurring intuitions. The first involves the epistemological role of phenomenal concepts: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that must be possessed by a subject who knows what it is like to have an experience of the type in question. The second involves the importance of experience: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that can be possessed on…
Read moreI explore various claims about the nature of phenomenal concepts and isolate two recurring intuitions. The first involves the epistemological role of phenomenal concepts: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that must be possessed by a subject who knows what it is like to have an experience of the type in question. The second involves the importance of experience: a phenomenal concept is supposed to be a concept of a type of experience that can be possessed only by a subject who has had an experience of the type in question. Most accounts of phenomenal concepts have stipulations designed to satisfy both these conditions. I argue, however, that they cannot jointly be satisfied. We thus face a choice: either we can possess phenomenal concepts of types of experiences we haven't had, or a phenomenal concept is not required for phenomenal knowledge. I argue that the latter is unacceptable, as the idea of a phenomenal concept is inextricably tied to issues involving the relationship between phenomenal knowledge and non-phenomenal knowledge. I defend a recognitional account of phenomenal concepts, whereby a subject possesses a phenomenal concept partly in virtue of being able to recognize an experience as being of a certain type and which does not require having had an experience of the type in question. I consider and reject the rival "quotational" account, which holds that a phenomenal concept actually contains its referent as a proper part. The latter part of my dissertation is an analysis of some prominent antiphysicalist arguments through the lens of phenomenal concepts. I consider, especially, a theme that runs through them, which is what Brian Loar calls 'the semantic premise', and which Stephen White has recently argued for: the claim that any true identity statement that involves noncontingent modes of presentation on both sides of the identity must be a priori.