Douglas R. Campbell

I argue that textual variants pose a problem for religious belief. Specifically, the existence of hundreds of thousands of textual variants in the New Testament’s manuscript tradition, many of them large and ideologically motivated, should reduce a believer’s confidence in the Bible as a source of information. This problem is different from the problems of evil and divine hiddenness because, whereas those problems entail the falsity of a religious claim, such as theism, this problem poses an epistemic challenge instead.

In this article, I consider two important literary features of the Timaeus. In the first section, I argue that the dialogue does not have a dramatic date and that Plato intended the conversation to be a timeless celebration of the divine. I push back on scholarly attempts to assign it a dramatic date and to argue that the conversation must be set during the Peloponnesian War. I join other recent commentators in denying that the Timaeus is a direct sequel to the Republic. In the second section, I argue that the opening words of the dialogue introduce key themes, rather than presenting a riddle to the reader about who the missing guest was. Attempts to identify Socrates’ missing guest are in vain and misunderstand the function of the opening words of the dialogue. I also object to so-called reader-response interpretations of the text that identify the missing guest as us, the reader.

This book makes several important contributions to the scholarship on Plato's Phaedo. It begins with the observation that the dialogue is filled with radical claims that scholars have often missed in their attempts to read Plato charitably: Plato's radical claims are replaced with more "reasonable-sounding views" (2). The problem with Plato's radicalism, according to Ebrey, is that it often looks like he is not supplying appropriate argumentation to back up the radical claims. However, in what Ebrey calls an "important thesis" of his book, he maintains that the Phaedo has an "unfolding structure" (2). This means that Plato makes a claim without defending it, and then later in the dialogue returns to that claim and... Read More.

"Doug Campbell lays out a comprehensive and fair-minded account of both the benefits and the drawbacks of social media for our era. He attaches these evaluations to both the individual and to society as a whole. The case studies are compelling and exhibit a keen awareness of the current moment. How should we live, now that many or even most of us are at least partially online? Campbell addresses this question from the point of view of privacy, attention, politics, misinformation, online ostracism, online friendship, and the potential benefits of simply quitting social media or at least some of its more pernicious platforms. Along the way, Campbell ties his discussions back to philosophical concerns raised by Plato, Aristotle, and Xunzi, among others. He also connects his discussion with recent work in feminist philosophy. And each chapter concludes with a succinct definition of key terms and suggested case studies and discussion topics that will engage students at all levels. An impressive accomplishment, and one that deserves a place in the classroom." —Mark Alfano, Macquarie University.

I argue that the attention economy wrongly commodifies attention. In the first section, I survey the conventional approach to the attention economy, which treats the ethical problems here as instances of questions about the moral limits of markets. I agree that this approach is justified, but I aim to broaden the debate by focusing on whether attention should be commodified at all. In the second section, I argue that attention is not properly subject to market forces. In the third section, I argue that subjecting attention to market forces leads, predictably, to the development and use of technology that violates the right to attention. In the fourth section, I argue that coercive paternalism offers the correct response to these problems and that two other solutions — the reliance on nudges and the reliance on social antibodies — are inferior.

I argue that Plato has a full-blown environmental philosophy. In the first section, I argue that Plato defended vegetarianism and that he did not see animals as existing for the sake of human beings. In this respect, animals differ from plants: plants do exist for our sake, but animals do not. Then, I argue that Plato is committed to important parts of today's ecocentrist environmental-ethical theories that hold up ecosystems as intrinsically valuable. I also argue that Plato believes that the Earth is worthy of our veneration and praise. I conclude by arguing that Plato's environmental philosophy does have some important limitations.

With an eye on the future of global ethics, I argue that social-media technologies are not morally neutral tools but are, for all intents and purposes, a kind of agent. They nudge us to do things that are bad for us. Moreover, I argue that we have a duty to quit using social-media platforms, not just on account of possible duties to preserve our own well-being but because users are akin to test subjects on whom developers are testing new nudges, and we ought to deprive them of their test subjects.

I develop an account of the role that biology plays in the Timaeus’ view of nous and other aspects of cognitive life. I begin by outlining the biology of human cognition. I then argue that these biological views shine an important light on different aspects of the soul. I then argue that the human body is particularly friendly to nous, paying special attention to the heart and the liver. I next consider the ways that the body fails to protect our nous. I conclude by comparing human nous with the cognition of non-humans.

This is an impressive and important book about perception in Plato’s Timaeus, but most of its readers will probably be researchers who are interested in much broader questions about the dialogue. There is nothing deficient or lacking about this treatment of perception, but this book should be put alongside Thomas Johansen’s Plato’s Natural Philosophy and Sarah Broadie’s Nature and Divinity in the sense that this is, for all intents and purposes, a monograph about the whole Timaeus, even though it is pitched as being focused on perception. There are only a few topics missing, such as the nature of the cosmic receptacle and psychic diseases. Virtually everything else, including the status of Timaeus’ so-called likely story, the generation of the lower gods, and the nature of bone, is discussed at length.

The editors have put together an interesting and important collection of twelve essays that trace the development of explanations of the human body that appeal to machines and other technological artefacts. Although the focus of the book is ancient authors, with the oldest being Homer and Pindar, the last essay reaches into the eighteenth century, at which point there are no longer mere analogies between human bodies and machines but a conception of the human body as something mechanized. The essays are put together in such a way that emphasizes the early-modern conception as the terminus of the ancient mode of inquiry.

In this article, I approach some phenomena seen predominantly on social-media sites that are grouped together as cancel culture with guidance from two major themes in Plato’s thought. In the first section, I argue that shame can play a constructive and valuable role in a person’s improvement, just as we see Socrates throughout Plato’s dialogues use shame to help his interlocutors improve. This insight can help us understand the value of shaming people online for, among other things, their morally reprehensible views. In the second section, I argue that it is required for the proper functioning of democratic institutions that some views be excluded from the public sphere, which follows some Platonic ideas from the Laws. In neither case do I argue that this approach is good in an unqualified sense or even ultima facie good. However, I maintain that these important insights from Plato’s dialogues illuminate crucial aspects of how we should think about cancel culture.

In this article, I make the case for the continued relevance of Plato’s Timaeus. I begin by sketching Allan Bloom’s picture of the natural sciences today in The Closing of the American Mind, according to which the natural sciences are, objectionably, increasingly specialized and have ejected humans qua humans from their purview. I argue that Plato’s Timaeus, despite the falsity of virtually all of its scientific claims, provides a model for how we can pursue scientific questions in a comprehensive way that stresses their connections to other disciplines, including the humanities, and that puts humanity qua humanity back in the picture. I then argue that being led by Plato’s philosophy to return humanity conceptually to the natural world can improve our thinking regarding climate change and other important environmental crises.

In this article, I argue that online echo chambers are in some cases and in some respects good. I do not attempt to refute arguments that they are harmful, but I argue that they are sometimes beneficial. In the first section, I argue that it is sometimes good to be insulated from views with which one disagrees. In the second section, I argue that the software-design principles that give rise to online echo chambers have a lot to recommend them. Further, the opposing principle, serendipity, could give rise to serious harm, in light of the conclusion of the first section that sometimes we are better off being insulated from some content online. In the third section, I argue that polarization can be a useful tool for inculcating the appropriate attitudes in a person.

I argue that Plato thinks that a sunaition is a mere tool used by a soul (or by the cosmic nous) to promote an intended outcome. In the first section, I develop the connection between sunaitia and Plato’s teleology. In the second section, I argue that sunaitia belong to Plato’s theory of the soul as a self-mover: specifically, they are those things that are set in motion by the soul in the service of some goal. I also argue against several popular and long-standing interpretations, namely, that sunaitia correspond to Aristotle’s idea of hypothetical necessity, that sunaitia are the ‘how’ in an explanation (whereas the true cause is the ‘why’), and that Plato’s causal views should be read through Aristotle’s fourfold schema. I conclude the article by surveying the history of sunaitia after Plato’s usage.

This article concerns the so-called irrigation system in the Timaeus' biology (77a–81e), which replenishes our body’s tissues with resources from food delivered as blood. I argue that this system functions mainly by the natural like-to-like motion of the elements and that the circulation of blood is an important case study of Plato’s physics. We are forced to revise the view that the elements attract their like. Instead, similar elements merely tend to coalesce with each other in virtue of their tactile features as the atomists describe. The notion of attraction is replaced with this notion of mere coalescence. I begin by outlining how blood is made from food. I then argue that an understanding of health and disease compels us to read Plato as if he were an atomist and to abandon the popular scholarly interpretations according to which the elements attract each other.

This article is featured in a special issue dedicated to theme, "the human being in the digital era: awareness, critical thinking and political space in the age of the internet and artificial intelligence." In this article, I consider the way that social-media companies nudge us to spend more time on their platforms, and I argue that, in principle, these nudges are morally permissible: they are not manipulative and do not violate any obvious moral rules. The moral problem, I argue, is not with nudging in principle but is instead with the fact that users are being nudged towards something bad for them. In practice, this often involves being nudged to spend an unhealthy amount of time using a social-media app or being nudged towards content that is bad for us, such as by promoting eating-disorder content to young girls. Since nudging is morally permissible, it is open to these companies to use the same technologies to nudge us towards the good.

This article concerns the place of Plato’s eschatology in his philosophy. I argue that the theory of reincarnation appeals to Plato due to its power to explain how non-human animals came to be. Further, the outlines of this theory are entailed by other commitments, such as that embodiment disrupts psychic functioning, that virtue is always rewarded and vice punished, and that the soul is immortal. I conclude by arguing that Plato develops a view of reincarnation as the chief tool that the gods have to ensure that virtue is victorious over vice throughout the whole cosmos.

I argue that, according to Plato, the body is the sole cause of psychic disorders. This view is expressed at Timaeus 86b in an ambiguous sentence that has been widely misunderstood by translators and commentators. The goal of this article is to offer a new understanding of Plato’s text and view. In the first section, I argue that although the body is the result of the gods’ best efforts, their sub-optimal materials meant that the soul is constantly vulnerable to the body’s influences. In the second section, I argue that every psychic disorder is a disruption of the motions of the inner psychic circles by the body; moreover, I defend my translation of 86b. In the final section, I argue that the goal of education is to restore the circles to their original orbits, and I disarm a possible objection that bad education is also a cause of psychic disorder.

I argue that Plato believes that the soul must be both the principle of motion and the subject of cognition because it moves things specifically by means of its thoughts. I begin by arguing that the soul moves things by means of such acts as examination and deliberation, and that this view is developed in response to Anaxagoras. I then argue that every kind of soul enjoys a kind of cognition, with even plant souls having a form of Aristotelian discrimination (krisis), and that there is therefore no completely unintelligent, evil soul in the cosmos that can explain disorderly motions; as a result, the soul is not the principle of all motion but only motion in the cosmos after it has been ordered by the Demiurge.