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Drew McDermott

Yale University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    43
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    16

 More details
  • Yale University
    Regular Faculty
New Haven, Connecticut, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  • All publications (43)
  •  33
    Free at last! Free at last! Thank evolution, free at last!
    Artificial Intelligence 169 (2): 165-173. 2005.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  109
    Non-monotonic logic I
    with Jon Doyle
    Artificial Intelligence 13 (1-2): 41-72. 1980.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  35
    Planning routes through uncertain territory
    with Ernest Davis
    Artificial Intelligence 22 (2): 107-156. 1984.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  43
    Temporal data base management
    with Thomas L. Dean
    Artificial Intelligence 32 (1): 1-55. 1987.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  63
    Modeling a dynamic and uncertain world I
    with Steve Hanks
    Artificial Intelligence 66 (1): 1-55. 1994.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  49
    Using regression-match graphs to control search in planning
    Artificial Intelligence 109 (1-2): 111-159. 1999.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  42
    Planning: What it is, what it could be, an introduction to the special issue on planning and scheduling
    with James Hendler
    Artificial Intelligence 76 (1-2): 1-16. 1995.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  33
    Level-headed
    Artificial Intelligence 171 (18): 1183-1186. 2007.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  48
    Kurzweil's argument for the success of AI
    Artificial Intelligence 170 (18): 1227-1233. 2006.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  28
    Reply to Carruthers and Akman
    Artificial Intelligence 151 (1-2): 241-245. 2003.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  72
    Nonmonotonic logic and temporal projection
    with Steve Hanks
    Artificial Intelligence 33 (3): 379-412. 1987.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  39
    Problems in formal temporal reasoning
    with Yoav Shoham
    Artificial Intelligence 36 (1): 49-61. 1988.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  38
    A general framework for reason maintenance
    Artificial Intelligence 50 (3): 289-329. 1991.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  31
    Building large knowledge-based systems: Representation and inference in the cyc project
    Artificial Intelligence 61 (1): 53-63. 1993.
    Science, Logic, and Mathematics
  •  100
    What matters to a machine
    In Michael Anderson & Susan Leigh Anderson (eds.), Machine Ethics, Cambridge Univ. Press. pp. 88--114. 2011.
    Machine Ethics
  •  130
    Review of Aristotle's Laptop: The Discovery of Our Informational Mind by Igor Aleksander and Helen Morton (review)
    International Journal of Machine Consciousness 6 (1): 45-48. 2014.
    Drew McDermott, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 45 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400071.
    Subjectivity and ConsciousnessConsciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational IssuesExplaining Consciou…Read more
    Subjectivity and ConsciousnessConsciousness and Neuroscience, Foundational IssuesExplaining Consciousness, Misc
  •  71
    Dodging the explanatory gap–or bridging it
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5-6): 518-518. 2007.
    Assuming our understanding of the brain continues to advance, we will at some point have a computational theory of how access consciousness works. Block's supposed additional kind of consciousness will not appear in this theory, and continued belief in it will be difficult to sustain. Appeals to to experience such-and-such will carry little weight when we cannot locate a subject for whom it might be like something
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceThe Explanatory Gap
  •  365
    Artificial intelligence and consciousness
    In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness, Cambridge University Press. pp. 117--150. 2007.
    Artificial Consciousness
  •  1446
    The Logic of Qualia
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that i…Read more
    Logic is useful as a neutral formalism for expressing the contents of mental representations. It can be used to extract crisp conclusions regarding the higher-order theory of phenomenal consciousness developed in (McDermott 2001, 20007). A key aspect of conscious perceptions is their connection to the distinction between appearance and reality. Perceptions must often be corrected. To do so requires that the logic of perception be able to represent the logical structure of judgment events, that is, to include the formulas of the logic as objects to be reasoned about. However, there is a limit to how finely humans can examine their own representations. Terms representing primary and secondary qualities seemed to be _locked,_ so that the numbers (or levels of neural activation) that are their essence are not directly accessible. Humans feel a need to invoke ``intrinsic,'' ``nonrelational'' properties of many secondary qualities --- their _qualia_ --- to ``explicate'' how we compare and discriminate among them, although this is not actually how the comparisons are accomplished. This model of qualia explains several things: It accounts for the difference between ``normal'' and ``introspective'' access to a perceptual module in terms of quotation. It dissolves Jackson's knowledge argument by explaining what Mary learns as a fictional but undoubtable belief structure. It makes spectrum inversion logically impossible by providing a degree of freedom between the physical structure of the brain and the representations it contains that redescribes putative cases of spectrum inversion as alternative but equivalent ways of mapping physical states to representational states.
    Philosophy of Mind, Misc
  •  56
    Minds, brains, programs, and persons
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 5 (2): 339-341. 1982.
    Philosophy of Cognitive Science
  •  94
    A vehicle with no wheels
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1): 161-161. 1999.
    O'Brien & Opie's theory fails to address the issue of consciousness and introspection. They take for granted that once something is experienced, it can be commented on. But introspection requires neural structures that, according to their theory, have nothing to do with experience as such. That makes the tight coupling between the two in humans a mystery.
    Neural Networks and Connectionism
  •  121
    Erratum: "What does a Sloman want?"
    International Journal of Machine Consciousness 2 (2): 385-385. 2010.
    Artificial Minds, MiscArtificial Consciousness
  •  77
    Zombies are people, too
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 617-618. 1990.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceZombies and the Conceivability Argument
  •  90
    Response to The Singularity by David Chalmers
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 19 (1-2): 1-2. 2012.
    The Singularity
  •  38
    How intelligent is deep blue?
    New York Times (May) 14. 1997.
  •  196
    Artificial intelligence meets natural stupidity
    In J. Haugel (ed.), Mind Design, Mit Press. pp. 5-18. 1981.
    Artificial Intelligence MethodologyArtificial Minds, Misc
  •  35
    Mind and Mechanism (edited book)
    Yale University. 2001.
    An exploration of the mind-body problem from the perspective of artificial intelligence.
    Computationalism in Cognitive Science
  •  109
    Tarskian semantics, or no notation without denotation
    Cognitive Science 2 (3): 277-82. 1978.
    Computational Semantics
  •  100
    Optimization and connectionism are two different things
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3): 483-484. 1989.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceNeural Networks and Connectionism
  •  120
    Computation and consciousness
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (4): 676-678. 1990.
    Philosophy of Cognitive ScienceComputationalism
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