Drew Smith

Critics of Eternal Relations of Authority and Submission (ERAS) frequently attack the view on the grounds that it lies outside the bounds of orthodoxy—here understood as the set of affirmations contained within the ecumenical creeds and councils. In this article, I argue that none of the current attempts to establish the heterodoxy of ERAS succeed. To begin, I offer a summary of the view, noting its core commitments. Second, I respond to each of the three arguments marshaled by critics of ERAS to demonstrate its heterodoxy: (i) ERAS entails that the persons of the Trinity possess distinct natures; (ii) ERAS entails that the Son lacks omnipotence; (iii) ERAS is incompatible with the doctrine that God has one will. In the end, I conclude not that ERAS is true, but that critics have failed to provide compelling evidence of its heterodoxy.

Recently, Jc Beall has advanced a model of the incarnation according to which one can reconcile the apparently incompatible attributes attributed to Christ by taking them as true contradictions. In this paper, I argue that Contradictory Christology proves incompatible with a central class of atonement theories. I begin by expositing Beall’s model in contrast to two models operating upon the assumption of classical logic. Next, I demonstrate the incompatibility between Beall’s theory and theories of the atonement on which Christ’s suffering was a necessary condition of salvation. Finally, provide a brief survey of three prominent atonement theories, highlighting their endorsement of this principle.

I aim in this article to contribute two points to the ongoing discussion regarding strong DDS and modal collapse. First, I will examine a recent version of the modal collapse objection formulated by R. T. Mullins, demonstrating that one can modify the argument to survive its most forceful rejoinder. Having established the cogency of Mullins's modal collapse argument, I next aim to heighten the severity of the conclusion. In particular, I demonstrate that the success of the modal collapse argument entails a moral collapse wherein well-established principles of ethical reasoning fail. Finally, I examine a recent attempt by Katherine Rogers to undercut some of the unwelcomed results of a modal collapse via an appeal to the theistic multiverse. I conclude that this maneuver proves ineffective against the moral collapse objection.

Multifaceted models of the imago Dei attempt to capture most, if not all, of what rival views assert regarding the nature of this attribute. However, theologians have not thus far developed these models with an eye towards model-theoretical virtue. I take some first steps in that direction by formulating a version of the multifaceted model built upon the Thomistic conception of love as exposited by Eleonore Stump. I demonstrate that if one assumes the imago Dei includes the capacity for love so described, then on minimal auxiliary assumptions, one can derive much of what rival views posit by entailment.

In his 2013 monograph Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Timothy Williamson develops and defends a view he terms necessitism. According to necessitism, everything that exists does so necessarily (alternatively, necessarily everything is necessarily something). I demonstrate that necessitism is incompatible with the conjunction of two doctrines rooted in the broadly Nicene tradition: God’s metaphysical sovereignty and freedom. First, I exposit and formalize the two doctrines in question. Next, I expound Williamson’s theory of necessitism. Third, I demonstrate the formal incompatibility of the conjunction of the two doctrines with necessitism. Finally, I conclude with reflections on the implications of this incompatibility.

At the latter half of the twentieth century, Richard Swinburne proposed a model of the incarnation built upon Freud’s divided mind theory. Over the course of two publications, Tim Bayne has formulated the most robust critique of Swinburne’s model to date. In this paper, I argue that Bayne’s objections rest on key misinterpretations of Swinburne’s work. Moreover, when one properly understands the model, these objections lose their force. I begin by expositing Swinburne’s divided mind model (DM), highlighting its four foundational theses. Next, I respond to Bayne’s objections against DM, demonstrating they rest upon misconceptions of the model.