•  3
    Forty years of avid bicycling came to a conclusion for D. Stephen Long in early October, 2020. Fearing his own imminent death required Long to reflect on life, on its beginnings, middle, and endings. This work uses the lessons learned from cycling, and the experience of the rapid onset of illness, to discuss God, friendship, racism, sexuality, justice, virtues, vices, and much more. It offers a moral theology but one more in keeping with how we take it up--not through theories but in the practic…Read more
  • On teaching and learning Christian ethics
    Georgetown University Press. 2024.
    This book addresses what it means to teach and learn ethics. While teaching ethics is universally applauded, how one goes about it is much more difficult and contested than is often recognized. The approach of the work is historical, philosophical, and theological. It begins with the historical transformation in the mid nineteenth century by Henry Sidgwick, who rejected establishing ethics on theology or metaphysics. G. E. Moore, John Rawls, Thomas Hurka, Bart Schultz, and Peter Singer later exp…Read more
  •  10
    Partaking of Reason in a Way: Aristotle on the Rationality of Human Desire
    Apeiron: A Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 55 (1): 35-63. 2022.
    Three times in Book 1 chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says desire partakes of reason in a way. There is a consensus view in the literature about what that claim means: desire has no intrinsic rationality, but can partake of reason by being blindly obedient to the commands of reason. I argue this consensus view is mistaken: for Aristotle, adult human desire has its own intrinsic rationality, and while it is to be obedient to reason, it is not blind obedience, for when reason tells…Read more
  •  21
    Aristotle's On the Soul: A Critical Guide (review)
    Philosophical Quarterly 73 (3): 861-863. 2022.
    Caleb Cohoe helms another excellent entry in the Cambridge Critical Guides series. The volume consists of thirteen contributions, nominally ordered to proceed t.
  •  13
    At EN VII.6 1149a24-b3, Aristotle offers an argument for the conclusion that akrasia due to thumos is less shameful than akrasia due to epithumia. The reasoning in this argument is obscure, for Aristotle makes two claims in particular that are difficult to understand; first, that in some way thumos “hears” reason when it leads to akrasia, and second, that thumos responds to what it hears “as if having syllogized” to a conclusion about how to act. This paper argues that previous attempts to under…Read more
  •  23
    Three times in Book 1 chapter 13 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle says desire partakes of reason in a way. There is a consensus view in the literature about what that claim means: desire has no intrinsic rationality, but can partake of reason by being blindly obedient to the commands of reason. I argue this consensus view is mistaken: for Aristotle, adult human desire has its own intrinsic rationality, and while it is to be obedient to reason, it is not blind obedience, for when reason tells…Read more
  •  5
    Desires, Their Objects, and the Things Leading to Pursuit
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    I offer a novel analysis of the relations between Aristotle’s three species of desire - appetite, temper, and wish - and the three things he says in EN 2.3 lead to pursuit - the pleasant, the beneficial, and the noble. It has long been tempting to think that these trios line up with one another in some way, ideally relating their members in one-to-one fashion. One account, by John Cooper, has gathered prominent adherents, but other authors, notably Giles Pearson, have argued we should give up on…Read more
  •  62
    On the Necessity of Deliberation in Aristotle
    Ancient Philosophy 41 (1): 167-184. 2021.
    Many authors have argued that Aristotle does not stay true to his official account on which every instance of choice must be preceded by deliberation, and it is a good thing that he does so because his official account has catastrophically bad theoretical implications. I argue that Aristotle does not deviate from his official account, and that the official account does not have the decisively bad implications others have claimed it to have. These objectionable entailments only obtain on a certai…Read more