Duncan Richter

The idea of applied ethics suggests that ethics, typically in the form of normative theory, can be applied to various facts that are already given. But these facts can only be dealt with in language, and this language is very likely to express attitudes of one kind or another. Describing the facts then can be seen to be an ethical task. It is a task that calls for a variety of virtues. Honesty is certainly one of these, but justice and love might be relevant too. An honest description will be accurate, but not every accurate description is fair or kind. When considering a case in ethics, as when judging, or simply trying to appreciate, a work of art, we should look, think, and describe disinterestedly, impartially, but not so abstractly that we cease to have human reactions. Indeed, if Iris Murdoch is right, then we should attend lovingly and then describe accordingly.In describing a situation there are many things to consider, including the distance from which it should be described (at the level of individual decisions, for instance, or at a more political or systemic level), how it should be framed, whether, and, if so, how, it should be re-framed (as Socrates re-frames the question of whether he ought to break the law and escape from prison), whose point of view to emphasize, and so on. Deciding what kind of description is most pertinent calls for judgement, so it, like describing, is itself an ethical task.It is possible that once this work of virtuous, imaginative, and accurate description is done there will be no questions left to ask. Wittgenstein said that the facts belong to the assignment, not to its completion (Tractatus 6.4321), but some descriptions of situations are likely to be so moving or eye-opening that there is no question (at least for some people) about what to do. An example might be Claire Keegan’s description of circumstances in Small Things Like These, in which Bill Furlong comes to see, without even necessarily putting it into words, that he must rescue the girl he has found, whatever it costs him.In order to illustrate and explain the approach that I am recommending I will look in some detail at two examples, one from fiction and one from real life. The first is the case of Furlong. The second is the case of RaDonda Vaught, a nurse who mistakenly administered fatal medication to a patient. In Vaught’s case, there are many questions one could ask, including both ‘To what extent was she to blame for the death of her patient?’ and ‘What should be done to make similar cases less likely in future?’ Both which questions we are more inclined to ask and what answers we are likely to give to them depend on how the facts of the case are presented. Describing the facts as ethically as we can is likely to involve some give and take between the tasks of description and moral judgement.

Anscombe once said to Anthony Kenny that “On the topic of religion, Wittgenstein is sheer poison”. This paper offers an assessment of that view. I take it that Anscombe meant that Wittgenstein was a bad influence rather than that his views were necessarily false, although she seems to have been uncertain about what exactly his views were. In “Paganism, Superstition and Philosophy”, she identifies five ideas that make up “a certain current in philosophy which has a strong historical connection with Wittgenstein”. I identify some of the sources of these ideas, in Wittgenstein’s writing and in work by some of his followers, and consider what Anscombe’s objections to them might have been. I also look at whether we should think of these ideas as belonging either to Wittgenstein’s philosophy of religion or to his personal beliefs. This will involve some consideration of how far we can, or should try to, separate the personal from the philosophical. So far as he held objectionable views about religion, I argue that these ought to be considered personal rather than philosophical.

In G. E. M. Anscombe’s extensive correspondence with G. H. von Wright, one of the many topics that come up is the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of World War II. What she says in these letters is significant because of the interest in what she wrote elsewhere about the use of atomic weapons. It is especially interesting because she might seem to imply here that only a person with religious faith is capable of being just. This paper quotes the relevant passages from the correspondence, explores what she might have meant, and concludes that she is not committed to the view that only the faithful can be just.

Ludwig Wittgenstein suggested that in philosophy explanation should be replaced by description. I want to explore what this might mean in ethics. I first consider Wittgenstein and reasons to doubt that he supported a fact/value distinction as strongly or straightforwardly as is sometimes believed. Next I look at Iris Murdoch’s work as an example of what I take to be a good approach to ethics, and one that is consistent with Wittgenstein’s thought, as well as turning to recent work by some Wittgensteinian or post-Wittgensteinian ethicists and what it has to say about the value and importance of description. Finally, I try to add something new to this discussion, drawing on work by Donna Haraway and some work in virtue epistemology. Specifically, I suggest that ethics and virtue epistemology are more than merely parallel, I add to the defense of Alice Crary’s Wittgensteinian notion of wider rationality, and I show description of reality to be complicated but possibly a significant tool in moral philosophy.

Elizabeth Anscombe critica a Ludwig Wittgenstein por hablar de la «expresión natural de una intención» en sus Investigaciones filosóficas. Considero unas respuestas recientes a esta disputa, especialmente las de Richard Moran y Martin Stone (como coautores) y de Martin Gustafsson. Moran y Stone explican por qué Anscombe rechaza hablar de la intención de expresión de los animales no humanos, pero enfatizan tanto la importancia del lenguaje que resulta difícil ver sobre qué base las intenciones pueden atribuirse no arbitrariamente a los animales. Gustafsson se da cuenta de este problema y ofrece una solución basada en la biología y, en particular, en el conocimiento de lo que es y no es propicio para que prosperen los miembros de cada especie. Sin embargo, esto va más allá de lo que dice Anscombe e introduce otros problemas. A veces podemos ver lo que un individuo piensa hacer simplemente observando su comportamiento, sin hacer referencia a lo que es bueno o malo para los miembros de su especie. Esto es fiel a las palabras de Anscombe y parece evitar los problemas que afrontan los otros puntos de vista considerados.

This paper aims at explaining and defending some of Cora Diamond's thinking about the role of a kind of guides to thinking about ethics. Aids to thinking of this type can take a very general form but can also be applied in context‐sensitive ways. Maria Balaska has raised the question whether Diamond manages to avoid relativism. Oskari Kuusela also criticises Diamond, focussing on whether talk of human equality can be said to correspond to reality. I will consider these objections in turn and try to show that Diamond is not committed either intentionally or otherwise to relativism.

This paper aims to identify the main points that Peter Winch makes, or reminders that he offers, about understanding ourselves and others. It would no doubt be possible to construct a theory out of these ideas, but I try to avoid giving the impression that Winch does so. Instead, the most Wittgensteinian approach to the subject is, as Winch does, to describe, remind and thereby clarify, without putting forward any kind of questionable hypothesis. Winch's work brings out the fact that understanding people is importantly connected to both wisdom and practical being in tune with others, but identical with neither.

How, if at all, can we do moral philosophy in the light of the radical critique made by Elizabeth Anscombe in "Modern Moral Philosophy"? Among the principal theses of this essay is that ethical thinking suffers from a widespread appeal to incoherent uses of terms such as 'obligation,' 'ought,' 'right' and 'wrong.' I first explain and evaluate her thesis and the argument for it, and I then confront the challenge it poses: what ways are there of doing moral philosophy that avoid the kind of incoherence to which she has drawn our attention? The only way to show how it is possible for us to think about ethics is to demonstrate how to do so, using actual cases. The dissertation thus combines the critical study of central theoretical issues about ethics with concrete examination of serious practical issues . ;The first chapter deals directly with Anscombe's paper. In the next two, I examine the approaches to ethics recommended by other philosophers in the Wittgansteinian tradition to which Anscombe belongs: Sabina Lovibond, Renford Bambrough and Cora Diamond. A critique of Lovibond's Realism and Imagination in Ethics takes up the rest of chapter 2. Chapter 3 deals with Bambrough and Diamond. Drawing on their views, I suggest that moral philosophy should at least begin with an attempt to understand the facts relevant to central moral debates and issues. ;Chapter 4 focuses on the disagreement between the religious view of suicide as perhaps the ultimate sin and the non-religious view that suicide is often justified. I look at R. F. Holland's work as a good example of an attempt to understand the strengths and weaknesses of both sides of the divide. In a somewhat parallel way, chapter 5 is concerned with the abortion debate. Here I look sympathetically at recent attempts by Ronald Dworkin and Warren Quinn to find some ground away from the two familiar poles of the debate. I do not claim that such attempts are always successful, but the effort to understand what they involve is at least worthwhile

The A to Z of Wittgenstein's Philosophy is intended for anyone who wants to know more about the philosophy and the life of this enigmatic thinker. The book contains an introductory overview of his life and work, a timeline of the major relevant events in and after his life, an extensive bibliography, and, above all, an A-Z of ideas, people, and places that have been involved in his philosophy and its reception. The dictionary is written with no particular agenda and includes entries on philosophers who influenced Wittgenstein, those he influenced in turn, and some of the main figures in contemporary Wittgenstein scholarship. Suggestions for further reading are also included, as well as a guide to the literature on Wittgenstein and a bibliography broken down by subject area

There are intriguing hints in the works of Stanley Cavell and Stephen Mulhall of a possible connection between ethics and Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language, which are concerned with expressions of Empfindungen: feelings or sensations. The point of this paper is to make the case explicitly for seeing such a connection. What the point of that is I will address at the end of the paper. If Mulhall and Cavell both know their Wittgenstein and choose their words carefully, which I will take as given, then the (to me) irresistible inference is that they see a connection between Wittgenstein’s thoughts on ethics and his thoughts on private language. Yet this connection has not, as far as I know, been made explicit. Can it be? Should it be? These are my questions. Even if no one ever intended a connection between the “Lecture on Ethics” and the remarks on private language, those remarks do at least touch on issues raised in the lecture, and it is worth thinking about what the author of those remarks would say about the lecture. So in this paper I summarize the “Lecture on Ethics” (in part I), look at the private language remarks themselves (in part II), and then apply some ideas from these remarks to the “Lecture on Ethics” in part III. My conclusion will be that Wittgenstein’s later remarks are largely consistent with his earlier ones, the main difference being that some of what he first called nonsense he later called secondary meaning. One result of this change is that attempts to express the feelings that Wittgenstein regards as fundamental to ethics, aesthetics, and religion are first treated as doomed to result in nonsense but later as risky. Like cries of pain, they might or might not find a sympathetic audience.

The relevance of Wittgenstein for ethics depends on which Wittgenstein we mean. I argue that we should distinguish not only between Wittgenstein's personal opinions and his philosophy, but also, within his philosophical work, between broadly methodological remarks and what Wittgenstein might call genuinely philosophical remarks (which are not about philosophy but try to bring clarity to the mind bewitched by language). Wittgenstein's personal opinions will be considered irrelevant by most philosophers (although I try to show that they are not as crazy as some people might think), and his philosophical remarks consist only of what he calls?boring truisms?. It is to his methodology, therefore, that we might expect philosophers to look for ethical implications. If that methodology is well conceived, though, it should be ethically neutral. I argue that it is neutral in this way, that Wittgensteinian philosophy says nothing about ethics, but that its proper use will not likely leave our philosophical beliefs about ethics unscathed.