Dustin Sigsbee

What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists.

United States environmental justice policies confer special benefits and consideration to “environmental justice communities,” but the qualifications for this category are often unclear. This creates practical challenges for environmental justice practitioners in deciding what communities qualify. This challenge is moral because it concerns who deserves consideration and benefits. This paper provides environmental justice practitioners with moral guidance for navigating these challenges. The paper focuses on the most pressing issues for practitioners deciding qualifications for the purpose of determining eligibility of benefits: (a) what are ethically permissible criteria for determining qualification; and (b) ethically how should these criteria be employed?

“A dog is man’s best friend” is a well-known and widely used phrase, but are we right in thinking that dogs are our friends? If so, do we owe our dogs what we owe our friends? Aristotle recognized three different kinds of friends: friends of utility, friends of pleasure, and friends of virtue. I suggest that dogs can meet the conditions necessary for entering into the first two kinds of friendship, but that there is a potential moral hazard in thinking about our relationship with dogs in these terms. It is unclear whether dogs can meet the more stringent conditions necessary to enter friendships of virtue. Furthermore, the moral responsibilities that animal companion caregivers take on appear to be different than those of friendship. For these reasons, I challenge the notion that a neo-Aristotelian conception of friendship best captures the relationship we have with dogs.

Many animal ethicists have shifted from using the term “pet” to the term “animal companion,” but what exactly is an animal companion? Arguably, the most comprehensive description of what an animal companion is comes from Gary Varner, who builds upon the work of Deborah Barnbaum. This article examines what I call the Barnbaum-Varner definition of an animal companion. I suggest that while the definition mostly captures what we think of when we think of an animal companion, there are potential philosophical issues that may impede constructive use of this definition. A revised version of the Barnbaum-Varner definition is developed to avoid these issues.

What is the basis of our obligations to our animal companions? This is an important question for practical reasons, as the relationship that many individuals have with their animal companion is amongst the most intimate of relationships they share with a non-human animal. It is also important for theoretical reasons. One of those reasons is that our commitments to animal companions may appear to present a kind of puzzle. If we think that we have moral commitments to animal companions that we do not have to other animals, such as livestock or free-roaming animals, what could explain this? I argue that the explanation for this difference in moral commitments is the result of the special relationship we have with our animal companions. More specifically, the basis of our moral commitments to animal companions are like those incurred by parents. Further, it is argued that causing the existence of or voluntarily taking on commitments of care for especially vulnerable and dependent sentient organisms implies robust responsibilities aimed at nurturing and promoting individual flourishing. This conclusion has implications regarding several related moral issues, such as whether animal companions require a moral education, what end-of-life commitments animal companion caregivers have, and whether it is justified to feed our animal companions other animals or let them engage in predation. Further, these issues are of practical interest to animal companion caregivers, law makers, and veterinarians, as well as being of theoretical interest to legal scholars and ethicists.