Economic approaches to science underline the social structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective epistemic success, and typically endorse a common conclusion, namely that individual virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for science to be successful. We analyze a central example, the invisible hand argument, in reference to a case of collective epistemic failure, namely the credibility crisis. While divergent motivations might also serve the collective goals of scie…
Read moreEconomic approaches to science underline the social structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective epistemic success, and typically endorse a common conclusion, namely that individual virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for science to be successful. We analyze a central example, the invisible hand argument, in reference to a case of collective epistemic failure, namely the credibility crisis. While divergent motivations might also serve the collective goals of science, our analysis shows that the presence of a significant proportion of virtuous scientists in a scientific community is a necessary condition for its success.
