Dylan Flint

Trying to secure a source of contingency in Leibniz's philosophical theology has been a central concern for Leibniz scholars over the past century. This article examines some of the most promising strategies on offer, including the “per se” account, the “infinite analysis” account, and the “moral necessity” account. I suggest that a helpful distinction can be made between strategies which try to locate a source of contingency in the objects of God's choice and strategies which try to locate a source of contingency in God's actions. I then argue that act‐based strategies fare better because object‐based strategies struggle to account for a number of Leibniz's core philo‐theological commitments, most notably his commitment that God is both free and praiseworthy. I then argue that the moral necessity account of the contingency of God's actions is Leibniz's most promising act‐based strategy because the moral necessity account most clearly satisfies Leibniz's contingency condition on free action. I then conclude by pointing out problems that a fully satisfying moral necessity account must overcome.

This paper locates a source of contingency for Leibniz in the fact that God can do otherwise, absolutely speaking. This interpretative line has been previously thought to be a dead-end because it appears inconsistent with Leibniz’s own conception of God, as the ens perfectissimum, or the most perfect being (Adams, 1994). This paper points out that the best argument on offer which seeks to demonstrate this inconsistency fails. The paper then argues that the supposition that God does otherwise implies for Leibniz (at least) that God would not be praiseworthy, which is an absurd implication—or a violation of the principle of sufficient reason (PSR)—but that this is not, strictly speaking, an inconsistency—or a violation of the principle of contradiction (POC). While praiseworthiness is a perfection—and is compossible with God’s other perfections—and so God must instantiate it, this paper argues that, given the nature of praiseworthiness for Leibniz, it in fact makes sense to say that praiseworthiness is merely a contingent perfection of God.

Over the span of eleven years, Nicolas Malebranche and Antoine Arnauld, two prominent sympathizers of the Cartesian tradition, engaged in a rigorous debate. In his initial set of criticisms, Arnauld objects that a natural consequence of Malebranche’s theory of ideas is idealism.1 This charge of idealism has puzzled scholars: why did Arnauld believe this? Han Adriaenssen2 has convincingly argued that Arnauld’s charge of idealism is founded on the representationality of Malebranchean ideas. According to Arnauld, ideas represent for Malebranche in much the same way that portraits do—by inciting a perceiver to form a conception of whatever they pertain to. The portrait of Louis XIV, for example, represents the French monarch by inciting a conception that pertains to him in a perceiver. However, a portrait will only represent Louis XIV to a perceiver that is already familiar with the king. Only then will the conception of Louis XIV arise in a perceiver that actually pertains to him. Similarly, then, an idea of the sun will only represent it to a perceiver with a previous conception of the sun. But, for Malebranche, the conception of an object requires the perception of the idea which represents that object. Thus, a perceiver cannot have a conception of the sun prior to the perception of its idea. Malebranchean ideas accordingly fail to function as representations of their objects. In failing to represent external objects, moreover, the ideas in the divine intellect are not just the immediate objects of our perception, but the only objects of our perception. Consequently, Arnauld concludes that Malebranche’s view leads to idealism. Arnauld’s objection, however, presupposes a particular account of representation, namely, resemblance. For a prior conception of what an idea represents would be required in order for the idea to actually represent its object only if ideas represented by resembling their objects as portraits do. This paper will challenge the traditional3 characterization of the representationality of Malebranchean ideas in terms of resemblance. I argue that a careful examination of Malebranche’s texts, and of the Neoplatonic-Augustinian sources upon which Malebranche bases his theory of ideas, reveals that Malebranche is not steadfastly committed to the view that ideas represent by means of resemblance, but instead, by archetypal participation. On this view, Malebranchean ideas are divine archetypes wherein the essences of objects participate by being the exemplary causes of these essences. And it is in virtue of this causal relation that ideas represent the essences of objects. So, as regards external bodies, the idea of intelligible extension is the archetype of bodies which represents their essence, viz., extension, in virtue of being the exemplary cause of extension in bodies. When we interpret Malebranche’s view of ideational representation this way, the charge of idealism broached by Arnauld, and some recent commentators4, dissipates. This is because Malebranchean ideas, in conjunction with particular sensations, can direct a perceiver to the cognition of individual bodies that participate in the idea of intelligible extension without a prior conception of these bodies.