Dylan Goldman

How does scientifically informed metaphysics make progress? One idea is that metaphysics based on science makes progress on the back of science. If science makes progress, then so too does the metaphysics based on that science. Some argue that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. Kerry McKenzie claims that naturalistic metaphysics cannot make progress, even in principle, because metaphysical theories cannot approximate the truth as science can. In this paper, I offer a response to the worry McKenzie raises. I claim that metaphysics is capable of making progress given an alternative account of scientific progress to hers, the truthlikeness account of progress. I argue that metaphysical theories, in principle, can increase in truthlikeness. According to the truthlikeness account of progress, if theories in a discipline increase in truthlikeness, then the discipline makes progress. Finally, I address two responses to an additional concern that those sharing McKenzie's perspective might have. In doing so, I sketch the groundwork for an alternative account of progress, one that leverages the tool-building approach to metaphysics that others have defended.

There are various kinds of arguments for Ontic Structural Realism (‘OSR’). These reasons vary from theory-change in the history of physics, underdetermination of theory choice in physics, the semantic view of scientific theories, permutation invariance in quantum mechanics, and metaphysical underdetermination in quantum mechanics. This paper is motivated by the suspicion that there are different arguments that have been given, that the premises they rely on are not equally convincing, and that the arguments’ premises lead to the acceptance of different ontological versions of OSR. Specifically, there are three aims of this paper. First, I distinguish and reconstruct two distinct arguments for OSR based on quantum mechanics—what I call the ‘Direct Quantum Argument’ and the ‘Underdetermination Argument’. Second, I distinguish two epistemic principles and I argue that the two quantum arguments rely on different epistemic principles, with the Underdetermination Argument relying on the less secure epistemic principle. Third, I argue that each quantum argument most naturally leads us to different ontological versions of OSR. I suggest that the Direct Quantum Argument supports non-eliminativism and the Underdetermination Argument supports eliminativism. I end by reflecting on where this leaves the contemporary dialectic regarding OSR.