Dylan Popowicz

As social creatures, we lean on the work of others to epistemically situate ourselves in our complex environments. A particularly important instance of our epistemic reliance on others is our dependence on epistemic authorities: those who hold some normative power over our epistemic behaviour. Often, accounts of such epistemic authority suggest that it is constituted by a connection to a certain set of true beliefs. I provide an alternative account that roots epistemic authority in an individual’s superior ability to participate in a certain kind of epistemic practice. Such a view better accounts for the variety of ways in which we engage with epistemic authorities: as sources of knowledge, as providers of understanding, as intellectual collaborators, and as pedagogues and guides. With this account in hand, I put it to work: first, in providing an account of what is required of an epistemic agent to remain epistemically autonomous, and epistemically responsible, when dealing with an epistemic authority; secondly, in establishing the role of epistemic humility in ensuring that relationships of epistemic authority function in an epistemically successful fashion.

We often consider medical practitioners to be epistemic authorities: “Doctor knows best,” as the saying goes. The place of expert judgment in evidence-based medicine hierarchies, and the crucial role of patient preferences and values in medical decision-making, however, pose problems for making sense of such authority. I argue that there is an account of such medical epistemic authority that does justice to the complexities of the doctor–patient relationship, while maintaining that medical practitioners hold an epistemically privileged position. Such a view can better inform medical practice by clearly illuminating the distinct roles of patients and doctors in decision-making processes.