E. Bassett

Nudges typically assume that a person’s identity is fixed, forming part of the context around which the rest of the choice architecture is arranged. I challenge this assumption by introducing the concept of an aretaic nudge: an intervention designed to target an individual’s self-conception, their understanding and evaluation of who they are as an agent. Building on a reasons-focused account of nudging, I explore what it means for self-conception to be the target of a nudge and defend the concept of an aretaic nudge against reductionist objections, showing that we should think of it as targeting as an irreducible normative framework through which our dispositions, beliefs, and actions are evaluated. I also refute the objection that targeting identity imposes costs incompatible with nudging, demonstrating that existing nudges already implicitly or explicitly attempt to alter agents’ self-conceptions. I conclude that establishing aretaic nudges as a distinct category improves our ability to identify and evaluate distinctive, often neglected ethical questions around agency and practical identity in behavioural policy.