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Ece Özdemir

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    No Problem: Evidence that the Concept of Phenomenal Consciousness is Not Widespread
    with J. Sytsma
    Journal of Consciousness Studies 26 (9-10): 241-256. 2019.
    The meta-problem is 'the problem of explaining why we think that there is a problem of consciousness' (Chalmers, 2018, p. 6). This presupposes that we think there is a problem in the first place. We challenge the breadth of this 'we', arguing that there is already sufficient empirical evidence to cast doubt on the claim. We then add to this body of evidence, presenting the results of a new cross-cultural study extending the work of Sytsma and Machery (2010).
    Consciousness and MaterialismExplaining Consciousness?Conscious StatesOther Psychophysical RelationsRead more
    Consciousness and MaterialismExplaining Consciousness?Conscious StatesOther Psychophysical RelationsExperimental Philosophy: ConsciousnessExperimental Philosophy, Misc
  • Bilim Topluluğunun Yapısı ve Bilim Etiği İle İlişkisi
    with Ayhan Sol
    Felsefe Tartismalari 40 1-18. 2008.
    On the assumption that science is an activity of the scientific community, we propose a model that enables us to defend the claim that science has moral norms of its own. According to the proposed model, science ethics is the set of all norms that originate from the interdependence relations of individual scientists, make the sustainability of this community possible and contribute to scientific progress
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