•  4
    Introduction: Faith and the Real
    Paragraph 24 (2): 5-22. 2001.
  • Avatar-Philosophy or Faitheism
    Imprint Academic. 2011.
    Are you prepared, either as an atheist or a religious believer, to have your ideas of God, the self, other people, the body, the soul, spirituality, and faith challenged in an unexpected and original way? Here is a book that moves out from under and away from the received notions of those ponderous topics, whether or not you believe in the divine. The author is a confessed atheist but one who rejects the approach of Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, Michel Onfray and the rest when they depa…Read more
  •  2
    In trust we reason
    The Philosophers' Magazine 37 31-34. 2007.
  • Arbitrariness and Motivation: A New Theory
    Foundations of Language 14 (4): 505-523. 1976.
  •  18
    A New Critical Realism: An Examination of Roy Wood Sellars' Epistemology
    Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 30 (3). 1994.
  •  15
    Wilcox and Katz on indirect realism
    Philosophy of the Social Sciences 16 (1): 107-113. 1986.
  •  20
    Recent work in perception
    American Philosophical Quarterly 21 (1): 17-30. 1984.
    This is a survey of the development of the philosophy of perception over the past twelve years. There are four sections. Part I deals largely with arguments for the propositionalizing of perception and for those types of externally founded realism that eschew inner representation. Part ii is devoted to three books that put the case for sense-Data (pennycuick, Jackson, Ginet) and some of the arguments against (pitcher). Part iii outlines james j gibson's psychological theory. Part iv takes up the…Read more
  •  66
    A sensory receptor, in any organism anywhere, is sensitive through time to some distribution - energy, motion, molecular shape - indeed, anything that can produce an effect. The sensitivity is rarely direct: for example, it may track changes in relative variation rather than the absolute change of state (as when the skin responds to colder and hotter instead of to cold and hot as such); it may track differing variations under different conditions (the eyes' dark-adaptation; adaptation to sound f…Read more
  •  7
    If a sensory field exists as a pure natural sign open to all kinds of interpretation as _evidence_ (see 'Sensing as non-epistemic'), what is it that does the interpreting? Borrowing from the old Gestalt psychologists, I have proposed a gestalt module that picks out wholes from the turmoil, it being the process of _noticing_ or _attending to_ , but the important difference from Koffka and Khler (Koffka, 1935; Khler, 1940), the originators of the term 'gestalt' in the psychology of perception ( is…Read more
  •  33
    What it isn't like
    American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1): 23-42. 1996.
  •  10
    The Entity Fallacy in Epistemology
    Philosophy 67 (259). 1992.
    In order to entertain the argument to be presented here, you have to begin by casting away a presupposition. The ultimate aim will be to restore it again as a presupposition, but the immediate aim will be to test for and make clear its undoubted worth and usefulness by imagining what happens to our knowledge-system when we remove it
  •  48
    Inspecting images: A reply to Smythies
    Philosophy 65 (252): 225-228. 1990.
  •  12
    Clamping and motivation
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (5): 643-644. 2003.
    Arthur M. Glenberg omits discussion of motivation and this leads him to an underestimation of the part played by pleasure and pain and desire and fear in both the clamping and the updating of percepts. This commentary aims at rectifying this omission, showing that mutual correction plays an important role.
  •  227
    A defence of Sellars
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 46 (September): 73-90. 1985.
  •  14
    The question of the assumed givenness of the singularity of the target
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 28 (4): 514-514. 2005.
    Interesting as the experiments are, their relevance to the real-life situation is rendered questionable by the unthinking use of given singularities as target objects. The evolutionary process does not respect what one agent takes to be a singular referent. A “singling” from the continuum is rather a varying feature of the necessity to track what is rewarding in it.
  •  20
    Percepts are selected from nonconceptual sensory fields
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (4): 429-430. 2003.
    Steven Lehar allows too much to his direct realist opponent in using the word “subjective” of the sensory field per se. The latter retains its nonconceptual, nonmental nature even when explored by perceptual judgement. He also needs to stress the evolutionary value of perceptual differences between person and person, a move that enables one to undermine the direct realist's superstitious certainty about the singular object.
  •  80
    It is the purpose of this article to explicate the logical implications of a television analogy for perception, first suggested by John R. Smythies (1956). It aims to show not only that one cannot escape the postulation of qualia that have an evolutionary purpose not accounted for within a strong functionalist theory, but also that it undermines other anti-representationalist arguments as well as some representationalist ones.
  •  39
    Gestalt Switching: Hanson, Aronson, and Harre
    Philosophy of Science 59 (3): 480-86. 1992.
    This discussion takes up an attack by Jerrold Aronson (seconded by Rom Harre) on the use made by Norwood R. Hanson of the Gestalt-Switch Analogy in the philosophy of science. Aronson's understanding of what is implied in a gestalt switch is shown to be flawed. In his endeavor to detach conceptual understanding from perceptual identification he cites several examples, without realizing the degree to which such gestalt switches can affect conceptualizing or how conceptualizing can affect gestalts.…Read more
  •  10
    A visual registration can be coloured without being a picture
    Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (2): 214-214. 2002.
    Zenon Pylyshyn here repeats the same error as in his original article (1973) in starting with the premiss that all cognition is a matter of perceiving entities already given in their singularity. He therefore fails to acknowledge the force of the evolutionary argument that perceiving is a motivated process working upon a non-epistemic sensory registration internal to the brain.
  • ‘What it Isn’t Like’1 (January, 1996), 23-45
    American Philosophical Quarterly 33 (1): 23-42. 1996.
    From an Indirect Realist point of view, the Knowledge Argument in the philosophy of perception has been misdirected by its very title. If it can be argued that sense-fields are at their basis no more than evidence, indeed, a part of existence as brute as what is usually termed the 'external', then, if 'knowing' is not essential to sensing, that argument has to be radically reconstructed. Resistance to there being an non-epistemic or 'raw feel' basis for sensing is very fashionable at the momen…Read more
  •  10
    The new representationalism: A reply to Pitson
    Philosophical Papers 16 (2): 125-139. 1987.