This chapter investigates the theoretical origins, intellectual development, and articulation of the ‘relative’ autonomy of the modern form of law. It argues that jurisprudential studies grounded in Marx’s and Engels’s materialist dialectical conception of history have underpinned this notion. These approaches suggested the conceptual compatibility between autonomy and non-autonomy, highlighting the law’s self-determined reflexivity as concurrently responsive to and ineluctably dependent on the …
Read moreThis chapter investigates the theoretical origins, intellectual development, and articulation of the ‘relative’ autonomy of the modern form of law. It argues that jurisprudential studies grounded in Marx’s and Engels’s materialist dialectical conception of history have underpinned this notion. These approaches suggested the conceptual compatibility between autonomy and non-autonomy, highlighting the law’s self-determined reflexivity as concurrently responsive to and ineluctably dependent on the social whole’s structures. The chapter seeks to elucidate how selected scholarly interpretations build upon, diverge from and critically assess Marx’s and Engels’ original ideas while evaluating their strengths and limitations. Ultimately, the work will showcase discursive continuities and discontinuities within this paradigm. The chapter bridges historical and philosophical insights with jurisprudence, suggesting that scepticism towards law targets not its concept but its modern form.
