Edvard Aviles-Meza

The close connection between attention and consciousness is widely acknowledged, yet some philosophers and psychologists defend the phenomenal overflow hypothesis according to which, in experience, we are conscious of more than we are attending to. While this view has been extensively discussed from a scientific perspective, here I approach it from a new angle: its epistemology. I claim that phenomenal overflow presents a novel epistemological challenge, which I call ‘the problem of introspective blink'. This challenge emerges from some truisms about introspection and consciousness: we primarily know our conscious states by introspection, and introspection requires attention. Thus, if there is conscious experience outside attention, there is a puzzle about our subjective access to it. I propose a solution to the problem of introspective blink, suggesting that certain conscious states can only be known through memory. I also claim that this model has consequences for cognitive science; in particular, the memory model offers novel insights to approach skepticism about subjective reports in cases of overflow.

According to dogmatism, our perceptual experience provides immediate justification for our beliefs about the external world. In particular, according to some versions of dogmatism, an experience with phenomenological strength (aka ‘phenomenal force’) is sufficient for immediate perceptual justification (call this ‘the phenomenal sufficiency thesis’). However, the sufficiency thesis has been challenged based on cases in which certain imaginative experiences with phenomenal force fail to justify. So, the dogmatist may claim that while phenomenal force is not sufficient, it’s still necessary for immediate perceptual justification (call this ‘the phenomenal necessity thesis’). In this paper, I would like to challenge the phenomenal necessity thesis on the basis of a psychopathological condition called ‘derealization disorder’. In particular, I’ll argue that cases of derealization show that phenomenal force isn’t necessary for immediate perceptual justification.