Edward Wierenga

According to an ancient strand in Christian thought, God has a unique perspective on all of history: he sees everything that ever happens all at once. God's unique perspective is taken as a key component of his special _mode of existence_, eternity or timelessness. The opposing view is that God is not eternal, but _everlasting_; he is not timeless, but in time. In recent years it seems to have reached the status of a new orthodoxy among philosophers of religion. This chapter raises doubts about the objections in the literature to the doctrine of divine timelessness or the reasons in favor of divine temporality. In fact, the main considerations advanced in favor of divine temporality are objections to divine eternity. The latter fall into two categories: the first appeals to claims about required changes in what God knows; the second appeals to claims about divine action in the world.

Molinism holds that, in deciding which world to create, God exploits his _middle knowledge_, which is typically taken to include knowledge of _counterfactuals of freedom_. Counterfactual conditionals, however, do not satisfy _strengthening_ (of the antecedent). But then knowledge of the truth of a counterfactual of freedom would not give God enough on which to base a decision about which world to create; for such a conditional could be true while related ones with fuller information in the antecedent are false. This chapter rejects the suggestion that so‐called ‘counterfactuals of world‐actualization’ provide a way around the problem and instead develops an approach according to which the relevant conditionals are built up in stages, with the antecedents of the conditionals at each stage including information about the initial segment of the world up to that point. Finally, Molinism is defended against the objections of Perszyk, van Inwagen, and Zimmerman.

__Philosophy of Religion_ is an engaging introduction to the main tenets of this fascinating subject, written clearly and with detailed enough explanation to be accessible to those new to the field, whilst providing original and challenging ideas to more experienced students._ The ideal introduction to this fascinating subject, providing a clear and engaging entry point to the field The book lucidly introduces the main issues in philosophy of religion and develops a rigorous yet accessible approach to evaluating positions on these issues No previous exposure to philosophy is assumed, and more technical topics are introduced and explained before they are employed Original ideas and new approaches to concepts within the book ensure that it is also relevant to those already familiar with the subject.

The Nature of God explores a perennial problem in the philosophy of religion. Drawing upon developments in philosophy, most notably those in philosophical logic, Edward R. Wierenga examines the traditional divine attributes of omnipotence, omniscience, eternity, timelessness, immutability, and goodness. His philosophically defensible formulations of the nature of God are in accord with the views of classical theists. The author provides an account of each of the divine attributes by stating in contemporary terms what such classical theists as Augustine, Anselm, and Aquinas wrote about the nature of God; he then seeks to determine whether one can defend the ascription of traditional divine attributes to God against philosophical objections. Clearly written and comprehensive, The Nature of God contains a wealth of illuminating and original material on a central topic in the philosophy of religion.

Skeptical theism is a type of reply to arguments from evil against God’s existence. The skeptical theist declines to accept a premiss of some such argument, professing ignorance, for example, about whether God is justified in permitting certain evils or about the conditional probability that the world contains as much evil as it does, or evils of a particular sort, on the hypothesis that God exists. Skeptical theists are thus not supposed to be skeptical about theism; rather, they are theists who are skeptical about something else. But that raises the question of exactly what else. In particular, does skepticism with respect to some claims about God and evil lead to a more pervasive skepticism? More precisely, is skeptical theism committed to additional skepticism about God? Is skeptical theism committed to global skepticism, including skepticism about ordinary, commonplace beliefs? Or is skeptical theism at the very least committed to a broader skepticism about matters of morality? This paper takes up these questions. Skeptical theism, Global Skepticism, Moral Skepticism, God’s existence, Problem of Evil.

Is there anything new to be said about Anselm's ontological argument? Recent work by Lynne Baker and Gareth Matthews raises some interesting and important questions about the argument. First, Anselm's argument is set in the context of a prayer to God, whose existence Anselm seeks to prove. Is that peculiar or paradoxical? Does it imply that Anselm's prayer is insincere? Baker and Matthews have offered a novel interpretation of Anselm's argument, designed to solve a crucial problem with it. Does their interpretation succeed in solving that problem? This paper addresses both of these questions.

I discuss conditions for the validity of proxy consent to treatment on behalf of an incompetent person. I distinguish those incompetents who, when previously competent, expressed an opinion on the treatment in question from those who were never competent or who, though previously competent, never expressed an opinion on the proposed treatment. In the former case valid proxy consent usually requires respecting the stated wishes of the patient. The latter case is more difficult. I consider a widely-held principle which appeals to the counterfactual wishes of the incompetent person. I argue that it is unacceptable and propose in its place a principle having to do with the best interests of the patient. Keywords: proxy consent, informed consent, competence, hypothetical wishes, substituted judgment, counterfactual wishes CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

According to Myles Brand, ‘[t]he key to advocating a particularist account of events -or any account of events - is to provide adequate identity conditions’. He thinks that the function of an identity condition is ‘to specify the nature of’ events.To state an identity condition for events is to provide a way to complete the formula: The mere fact that a proposed completion of is true does not imply that it is an informative identity condition for events or that it plays any role in specifying the nature of events.

One of the strongest arguments for the incompatibility of divine foreknowledge and human free action appeals to the apparent fixity or necessity of the past. Two leading responses to the argument—Ockhamism, which denies a premiss of the argument, and the so-called “eternity solution”, which holds that strictly speaking God does not have foreknowledge—have both come under attack on similar grounds. Neither response, it is alleged, is adequate to the case of divine prophecy. In this paper I shall first state the argument in question and the two responses to it. I shall then consider objections to these responses, focusing primarily on how they deal with prophecy.