Eileen C. Sweeney

This chapter shows the origins of diverse views of natural law in Aquinas as modern or anti-modern, secular or Christian in tensions present within Aquinas. Four areas of tension are traced: nature as informed by the biblical story of fall and redemption vs. nature as essence, the origin of natural law principles in nature (especially non-rational nature) vs. reason, the theological context of the “treatise on law” within the _Summa theologiae_ vs. the largely non-theologically based reasoning within the questions on law, and traditionalist vs. modern sounding determinations on particular political questions. Aquinas' natural law position has breadth and nuance but also tensions, giving rise to interpretations emphasizing only some of its parts. The chapter concludes by showing some mixed results of Aquinas' own application of natural law and with some criticisms of those who claim that natural law reliably yields wise, just, and uncontroversial determinations.

The essay examines Anselm’s De libertate arbitrii and De casu diaboli, arguing that the points made about the will and free choice are mirrored in the questions and struggles of the student interlocutor in the dialogues. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle, who want to bring us to see that virtue is the path to happiness, Anselm wants to show that we have free choice and are responsible for not choosing rightly (i.e., choosing justice for its own sake), and that human beings are autonomous but also finite and flawed. For this kind of learning, not just reasoning but insight and self-examination are required, a process reflected in the very human will, willfulness, and weakness of the student as he engages with his teacher.

John Rist's What Is a Person? is a scholarly, rich, and trenchant study of the history of the concept of personhood in Western thought. However, its sharp critique of modern and postmodern accounts of personhood, though thought-provoking, also uses jarringly polemical language, which further undermines the book's flawed overall argument. The first section, "Constructing the Mainline Tradition," carefully mines ancient and medieval sources, tracing with nuance and complexity the different threads in the notion of person. The threads are religious, philosophical, legal, and literary, and the philosophical sources are multiple. Rist does not privilege Boethius's definition in Contra Eutychem et Nestorium of person as...

In the period between the mid-12th and mid-13th centuries, the notion of 'science' replaced that of 'art' as the category against which all areas of academic inquiry including theology were measured. This dissertation selectively traces one aspect of this change as it is understood by Thomas Aquinas: the understanding of the relationship of sacred and secular study given these two different models of learning, art and science. ;Hugh of St. Victor's Didascalicon is discussed as it represents the acceptance and assimilation of the 'arts' into a program of Christian education in the 12th century. The author reinterprets two Augustinian themes--the epistemological theory of divine illumination and the notion that theology is 'faith seeking understanding'--and uses them to explain and parallel the methods and order of learning for secular and sacred study. ;Next some of the thinkers and texts which introduce and try to interpret the notion of science, its requirements, and its application to the various disciplines are covered. Chapter two is dedicated to two didascalic works which use the Aristotelian concept of science and Aristotle's classification of sciences to divide and define the secular sciences, and chapter three deals with the understanding of the nature of science and its relationship to theology in William of Auvergne, Robert Grosseteste, and the Summa Fratris Alexandri. These thinkers both introduce the notion of science with which St. Thomas works and form the background against which Aquinas articulates his interpretation of science and the sciences. ;In conclusion, I turn to Aquinas' view of the subjects and methods of theology and the theoretical sciences, which he explains using the language of Aristotelian science rather than that of the arts. St. Thomas reinterprets the requirements for science given in the Posterior Analytics in a way that makes them applicable to theology, and in the process changes their application to the secular sciences, resulting in an understanding of the learning process that is symmetrical to the one found in the Didascalicon. The sciences are formed and defined not in terms of their objects, but in terms of their rationes or formal perspective, and the method of the sciences and sacred theology Aquinas articulates is, as it is for Hugh of St. Victor, circular or dialectical. ;As with Hugh of St. Victor, the standard for secular study, in Aquinas' case 'science' not 'art', redefines sacred study or theology, and at the same time, secular study is shown to share certain properties of sacred study, namely the circular or dialectical structure implied by 'faith seeking understanding'

This paper argues that the role of nature in Aquinas’s account of virtue, action and law does not require the kind of adherence to Aristotle’s ‘metaphysical biology’ that is refuted by Darwin because of the way Aquinas transforms nature as applied to a rational being and as an analogy to elucidate virtue, habit and law. Aquinas’s grounding of ethics and law in the notion of nature is also not a kind of intuitionism designed to answer all moral questions and stop all ethical debates but a model which gives principles; these principles in turn are not that from which all conclusions can be derived with universality and certainty but are principles which are the topic of reasoned and ongoing debate about their interpretation and application in particular laws or practices. The paper then examines Aquinas’s application of the principles of natural law to evaluate human law as an example of this reasoned debate, which is both subject to error and correction, showing how Aquinas’s notion of nature can work in practical applied ethics.

The paper discusses Anselm's account of human finitude and freedom through his discussion of what it means to receive what we have from God in De casu diaboli. The essay argues that Anselm is considering the same issue as Jean Paul Sartre in his account of receiving a gift as incompatible with freedom. De casu diaboli takes up this same question, asking about how the finite will can be free, which requires that it have something per se, when there is nothing, as St. Paul asserted in Romans, that we have not received. Anselm's notion that we have two wills, one for benefit or advantage, and one for justice, allows for something to come per se from the individual who wills and also accounts for the willing of the good angels as the acceptance of what they are and have as received and, hence, as finite. The essay concludes with reflection on Sartre and Camus's The Plague taking as the central ethical and existential problem of human life, as Anselm does, the problem of finitude, and comparing their responses

This well-written volume consists of paired chapters on human being, understanding, freedom, and happiness on Aquinas and Sartre. Stephen Wang's project is to use Sartre to reveal the more "radical" aspects of Aquinas's thought and to use Aquinas to "unlock the meaning" of Sartre's more radical claims . There is a great deal that is fresh and illuminating in this rapprochement between two thinkers most would not join together. Because the aim is to bring the thinkers into conversation, Wang avoids any temptation merely to repeat their technical language. Overall, his account is helpful as a counter to distorted readings of Aquinas that overemphasize the determination of human ends and actions by nature, as well as his intellectualism and realism. Similarly countered are extreme readings of Sartre as an irrationalist and radical voluntarist.In the account of understanding, Wang points out that Sartre eschews both idealism and realism, arguing that, on the one hand, "consciousness adds nothing to being" but, on the other, it "reveals what is there through negation" . Aquinas occupies similar ground, Wang contends, holding that reason can observe the present reality in a number of different ways, not just one . The will

The paper examines the different uses of and responses to Aristotle’s account of science in the first wave of interpretation of Aristotle’s theory of science and works in natural science and metaphysics in the early 13th century in Roger Bacon and Albert the Great. The author argues that Bacon reduces all the disciplines to mathematics as the most scientific discipline, even as he argues that experimentum is at the center of scientific evidence and conclusions. Albert the Great, by contrast, gives a more strongly analogical account of science, with broader differences between different disciplines as operating according to different intellectual ‘lights’ and methods. Albert champions experimentum in physics in a special way, rejecting a mathematical physics.