Eilidh Beaton

The topics of refugee protection and family migration have both received significant attention in the philosophical literature. However, until recently, issues at the intersection of these two subjects were rarely discussed. In this entry, we outline and explore some of the most important questions concerning these issues of refugee family unity, separation, and reunification, considering what obligations (if any) states might have to respect and protect the value of family life for refugees in light of the different sorts of situations refugees may be in. In particular, we consider how the family unification rights of resettlement refugees may differ from the rights of first-asylum refugees, and how these issues might be complicated when unaccompanied minors are involved. Along the way, we discuss a number of related questions, such as: why should states respect and protect the unity of refugees’ families? which family members do refugees have rights to reunite with? and, how much weight should the importance of family life have in non-ideal circumstances when places for refugees in safe states are scarce?

In Chapter 5 of Justice for People on the Move, Gillian Brock argues that legitimate states may not remove long-settled undocumented immigrants. In this paper, I show that Brock’s claims in this chapter are compelling but limited in scope. Across each of the real-world examples she engages with throughout the chapter, there are clear and widely-acceptable case-specific reasons to think that these groups of undocumented people should be excused for violating immigration law. Partly as a result of her focus on these specific examples, her analysis leaves two important real-world cases of removal undiscussed: cases in which an individual becomes an undocumented resident at a time when that state’s immigration policy clearly indicated that they were not welcome; and cases in which an undocumented person faces removal after violating criminal law. In this paper, I will argue that removal would also be impermissible in these cases.

Political philosophy has long been criticised for its state-centricity. A recent version of this objection asserts that the discipline perpetuates a problematic methodological nationalism. Critics argue that political philosophers are widely disposed to interpret political phenomena from the perspective of the nation-state, and that this is detrimental to normative theorising. In this paper I argue that the objection to methodological nationalism should be dropped, at least in its current form. Specifically, I reconstruct three variants of the objection, and – borrowing insights from the ‘hard’ sciences and Elisabeth Camp’s account of perspectives – ultimately show that methodological nationalism is not the kind of thing that can be decisively objected to in a widely-persuasive manner. Therefore, I recommend that sweeping objections to nation-state-centricity be generally replaced with traditional targeted analysis of specific claims made in specific contexts. Despite the fine-grained nature of this approach, I show that it remains a fruitful way of addressing pervasive problems in the discipline.

In his interesting new article, Dimitrios Efthymiou argues that the EU quota system places too much emphasis on the number of individuals protected, to the detriment of certain aspects of the quality of protection. To rectify this imbalance he proposes an account of “robust” refugee protection, whereby protection should be conceptualised as a “a rich good”, and he recommends that long-term policy planning “prioritise minimising concessions to robustness”. My comments centre on some ambiguities in Efthymiou’s analysis. First, I invite Efthymiou to say more about what rich protection amounts to. Second, I suggest that decoupling richness from robustness could yield improvements in the conceptual clarity of the account, and discuss some implications of this decoupling for Efthymiou’s assessment of the EU quota system.

Special obligations toward compatriots are more controversial than other forms of partiality, because compatriot relationships are relatively “impersonal.” Even so, a variety of justifications for special duties among compatriots have been defended. This entry outlines three such accounts, drawing on categories identified in previous literature (Tan 2003, 2004; Beaton et al. 2021). The first two approaches – the instrumental approach and the institutional approach – derive special obligations to compatriots from general duties of justice. By contrast, the third approach is relational in nature and grounds the justification for compatriot partiality directly in the special relationship compatriots share.

This dissertation concerns the rights of refugees. It is a project of two parts. Part One provides an account of the scope of the right to refuge in international law. Here, I reject both the alienage and persecution requirements for refugee-status-eligibility outlined in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Instead, I defend a definition that extends the right to refuge to any individual whose human rights are urgently threatened, who has no effective recourse to their home government, and whose interests can only or best be satisfied by means of refuge. In Part Two, I turn to the question of what refugee-hosting states and societies owe to refugees within their borders. Here, I provide a refugee-specific framework for future discussion on the topic of integration, and outline some high-level rights and responsibilities states, refugees, and members of the host society have to facilitate integration between refugees and their host communities. I also provide an account of the scope and nature of refugee family reunification rights, arguing that states have stronger, broader, and less-conditional duties to reunite refugees with their families, especially when those refugees are children. I conclude with a summary of the arguments in this dissertation, and an outline of the primary principles upon which those arguments depend.

A handful of scholars have offered explanations for why states with otherwise restrictive immigration laws should relax their demands for people applying to immigrate for family reasons. However, much less has been said about the family unification rights of refugees. This paper extends the existing discussion on family-based immigration to refugees, arguing that: (1) states have stronger duties to reunite refugee families; (2) some refugees should be entitled to reunite with their “extended” family; (3) refugee family reunion should not be subject to financial conditions; and (4) the right to family reunion is especially strong for refugee children.

Are countries especially entitled, if not obliged, to prioritize the interests or well-being of their own citizens during a global crisis, such as a global pandemic? We call this partiality for compatriots in times of crisis “crisis nationalism”. Vaccine nationalism is one vivid example of crisis nationalism during the COVID-19 pandemic; so is the case of the US government’s purchasing a 3-month supply of the global stock of the antiviral Remdesivir for domestic use. Is crisis nationalism justifiable at all, and, if it is, what are its limits? We examine some plausible arguments for national partiality, and conclude that these arguments support crisis nationalism only within strict limits. The different arguments for partiality, as we will note, arrive at these limits for different reasons. But more generally, so we argue, any defensible crisis nationalism must not entail the violation of human rights or the worsening of people’s deprivation. Moreover, we propose that good faith crisis nationalism ought to be sensitive to the potential moral costs of national partiality during a global crisis and must take extra care to control or offset these costs. Thus, crisis nationalism in the form of vaccine nationalism or the hoarding of global supplies of therapeutics during a global pandemic exceeds the bounds of acceptable partiality.

In order to be eligible for refugee status under the 1951 Refugee Convention, an individual must have a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. A major problem with this condition for refugee status is that it leaves significant protection gaps, for it is generally agreed that individuals fleeing indiscriminate violence or generalized harm do not satisfy this requirement. In this paper, I evaluate existing arguments both defending and critiquing the persecution condition, and then outline my own account of the criteria that should replace it. I argue that my view is preferable to alternatives suggested in the literature because it satisfies three key desiderata: 1) it eliminates protection gaps; 2) it is feasible to implement in a world like ours; and 3) it preserves the importantly political nature of the institution of refugeehood.

Under the 1951 Refugee Convention, there are two necessary conditions for refugeehood: a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion and alienage – that is, being outside of one’s country of nationality or habitual residence. In 1985 Andrew Shacknove famously argued that both of these conditions should be rejected. Shacknove’s paper prompted much debate about the suitability of the persecution condition, but his rejection of the alienage requirement has received significantly less attention. In this paper I argue, against some recent defenders of the Convention, that Shacknove was right to claim that the alienage condition should be rejected. On my view, people who would be granted refugee status if they crossed a border, but who remain in their country of nationality, should also be eligible for refugee status.