In this article, we examine two philosophical theories of recognition: those of Paul Ricoeur and Alexandre Kojève. We trace this line of development in the theory of recognition as a return from Ricoeur to Kojève. Our hypothesis is that over the past twenty years, the theory of recognition has undergone a change in content and has transformed into a theory of misrecognition. In turn, the theory of misrecognition is grounded in the struggle between subjects and brings us back to the discourse of …
Read moreIn this article, we examine two philosophical theories of recognition: those of Paul Ricoeur and Alexandre Kojève. We trace this line of development in the theory of recognition as a return from Ricoeur to Kojève. Our hypothesis is that over the past twenty years, the theory of recognition has undergone a change in content and has transformed into a theory of misrecognition. In turn, the theory of misrecognition is grounded in the struggle between subjects and brings us back to the discourse of the struggle between the Slave and the Master. This transformation from struggle to reciprocity and vice versa, we argue, suggests that a theory of identity formation as a process of resistance to assujettissement is in demand at this moment in history. In the 2010s, as the theory of misrecognition took shape primarily in the English‑speaking world, the constitution of the subject began to be understood once again as the outcome of struggles within feminist, Marxist, and other emancipatory theories. We examine both Ricoeur’s arguments against Kojève, Althusser, and the theory of misrecognition in general, as well as the «return» of Kojève’s arguments in the contemporary theory of misrecognition.