Elek Lane

Non-Cognitivism about metaphor – the thesis that there is no such thing as metaphorical meaning or content – is defended in a 1978 paper by Donald Davidson, and the view has lately enjoyed a revival due to work by Ernie Lepore and Matthew Stone. I argue that while non-cognitivists are right to emphasize that certain characteristic effects of metaphor – especially its relationship to ‘seeing as’ and the imagination – cannot be explained in terms of meaning, it does not follow that there is no work for metaphorical meaning to do. Metaphorical language (i) has non-literal truth conditions, which call for explanation in terms of meaning and content, and (ii) is compositionally operative: to determine the content of a complex sentence that embeds a metaphorical phrase, metaphorical contents must be composed along with literal contents. This fact is best explained through recourse to semantic compositionality and therefore the notion of metaphorical meaning.

To deadname is to call a trans person by a name they have rejected. Deadnaming has a visceral impact. Why? This paper canvasses several possible answers. While deadnaming may sometimes evoke painful memories or communicate that the speaker is transphobic, I suggest that deadnaming is hurtful for fundamentally prohibitionist reasons. When a deadname is used, it violates a prohibition that has been enacted by a trans person’s exercise of linguistic authority; violating this prohibition is impactful. I sketch how this explanation of impact can be readily extended to provide a rights-based account of the normative dimensions of deadnaming, too.

Alexander Miller has been writing about rule-following for the better part of 30 years, and it shows in his new book, Wittgenstein & the Possibility of Meaning (WPM), which displays an easy mastery of the topic and its literature. WPM divides into two thematic halves. The first three chapters consist of an overview of the problem(s) of rule-following and the secondary literature that has amassed on the topic, while the final two chapters present Miller's own non-reductionist account of rule-following.

What is the status of metaphorical meaning? Is it an input to semantic composition or is it derived post-semantically? This question has divided theorists for decades. Griceans argue that metaphorical meaning/content is a kind of implicature that is generated through post-semantic processing. Others, such as the contextualists, argue that metaphorical meaning is an input to semantic composition and thus part of “what is said” by an utterance. I think both sides are right: metaphorical meaning is an input to semantic composition and it is also derived post-semantically. I explain how this is possible by positing that successful metaphor involves coining a new word on the spot; this new metaphorical word is ambiguous with its literal counterpart. I show that an ambiguity theory of metaphor, far from being the obvious non-starter that it has long been treated as, actually offers elegant predictions of a whole suite of otherwise recalcitrant linguistic data.

Fictionalist theories of metaphor hold that metaphorical utterances aim at fictionality. Fictionalism successfully explains speaker judgments about the truth and aptness of metaphorical utterances, and it also accurately predicts the data around metaphor and autistic individuals (who have deficits in both imaginative play and metaphor comprehension). But fictionalism is not a viable theory of metaphor, despite these merits, because of (what I call) the problem of semantic entailment: semantic entailments that are normally valid fail under metaphorical interpretation, but fictionalism predicts otherwise. I argue this to ultimately show that theorists of metaphor should reject the linguistic side of the fictionalist story; but this leaves open the possibility of accepting psychological fictionalism, i.e., the hypothesis that fiction/make-believe is central to the cognitive processing of metaphor. Coupling psychological fictionalism with a different theory of metaphorical meaning and content (such as contextualism) promises to keep the explanatory upsides of traditional fictionalism while avoiding the problem of semantic entailment.

In virtue of what does a sign have meaning? This is the question raised by Wittgenstein's rule-following considerations. Semantic dispositionalism is a (type of) theory that purports to answer this question. The present paper argues that semantic dispositionalism faces a heretofore unnoticed problem, one that ultimately comes down to its reliance on unanalyzed notions of repeated types of signs. In the context of responding to the rule-following paradox—and offering a putative solution to it—this amounts to simply assuming a solution to the problem in one domain and using it to solve the same problem in another. Given, moreover, the level at which the rule-following paradox undercuts dispositionalism—the level of the notion of a sign's repetition—the objections made to the view also rule out causal/informational theories of meaning as well as communitarian/assertion-theoretic ones as potential solutions to the rule-following paradox.

In this essay, I seek to demonstrate the interplay of philosophical voices – particularly, that of a platonist voice and a community-agreement-view voice – that drives Wittgenstein’s rule-following dialectic forward; and I argue that each voice succumbs to a particular form of dialectical oscillation that renders its response to the problem of rule-following philosophically inadequate. Finally, I suggest that, by seeing and taking stock of the dilemma in which these responses to the skeptical problem are caught, we can come to appreciate Wittgenstein’s own view of what might constitute a proper a response to the so-called problem of rule-following. This view can be preliminarily characterized by saying that Wittgenstein’s aim is to dissolve the temptation to philosophically rebut the skeptical challenge posed by the rule-following dialectic, an aim he achieves by revealing the semantic emptiness of the apparent sentences that raise the skeptical problem.