PhilPeople

University College London

Associate Professor

University of Oxford

Faculty of Philosophy

DPhil, 2016

Homepage

London, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Areas of Specialization

Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

Areas of Interest

Philosophy of Mind

Normative Ethics

Ancient Greek and Roman Philosophy

Social and Political Philosophy

Aristotle on the Copresence of Pleasure and Pain in Courage: Nicomachean Ethics 3.9, 1117b1–20
Luke Jennings

Phronesis. forthcoming.

Aristotle’s claim in Nicomachean Ethics 3.9 that the active exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) of courage is pleasant only insofar as it attains the end appears to conflict with the account of Metaphysics Θ.6, according to which activity (ἐνέργεια) is an actuality whose end is present at any moment it continues. If activities contain their ends, how could courageous activity fail to attain the end and not be pleasant? I propose we resolve this tension by distinguishing between ‘technical-narrow’ and ‘end-exclu…Read more
Aristotle’s claim in Nicomachean Ethics 3.9 that the active exercise (ἐνεργεῖν) of courage is pleasant only insofar as it attains the end appears to conflict with the account of Metaphysics Θ.6, according to which activity (ἐνέργεια) is an actuality whose end is present at any moment it continues. If activities contain their ends, how could courageous activity fail to attain the end and not be pleasant? I propose we resolve this tension by distinguishing between ‘technical-narrow’ and ‘end-exclusive’ descriptions of activity. In courage, the active exercise characterized without reference to the fine is painful, whereas the technical-narrow activity is necessarily pleasant.