Elena Gordon

Catharine Macaulay (1731 — 1791) is often construed as a historian, and moral and political philosopher chiefly concerned with the high privilege of reason. Accordingly, her Letters on Education (1790) are thought to advance her vision for how education must cultivate the rational capacities required to comprehend moral duty. In this paper, against scholarly consensus, I show that sympathy, not reason, makes possible the discovery of moral truths and inclines us to act in accordance with them. By attending to Macaulayan sympathy, this paper not only advances a novel approach to her moral philosophy, it also identifies a hitherto underappreciated aspect of her engagement with Hume. For Macaulay, Humean sympathy accounts for how fellow feeling produces social bias and leads us to draw distinctions among people according to their social rank (Hist. 6:xii). For Macaulay, this is not a necessary feature of sympathy: it is symptomatic of a failure to see that sympathy must be cultivated to establish the “consistent system of feeling” needed to penetrate distinctions of social rank and species using an “equal eye of compassion” (Hist. 6: xii). Macaulay’s account of how sympathy must be cultivated so that this potential is realized is advanced in the Letters.

Common sense philosophy often resolves the threat of skepticism by appeal to epistemic realism. Reidian common sense, for instance, establishes that perception allows us to form a veridical conception of external objects from information delivered by the senses. Based on an eighteenth-century English translation of his work, some scholars have assumed that Buffier similarly relies upon common sense to defend epistemic realism. Through a comparative analysis of Reid and Buffier, this chapter shows that, for the latter, common sense does not resolve external world skepticism by appealing to the metaphysical underpinnings of external objects. Instead, anticipating elements of Hume’s philosophy, Buffier argues that universal agreement concerning the existence of external objects based on the deliverances of the senses cannot be used to justify claims about their metaphysical status. His understanding of common sense is therefore distinct from Reid’s because it responds to skepticism by appealing to the recognition of the limits of sensation. This analysis thereby reveals that Buffier’s position is clearly anti-realist.

Fictions feature prominently in several of Hume’s important arguments about the external world. For example, Hume is clear that there would be no belief in the continued existence of objects, were it not for the fictions that are causally responsible for effecting this belief. Interpreters of Hume on the topic of fiction generally argue that the formation of fiction requires the possession of general ideas and the use of language. Drawing upon recent attempts in the literature to advance this claim, I offer reasons for why this general approach is undesirable. By examining Hume’s comments on the capabilities of children, this paper advances a novel approach to the topic of fictions in Hume’s philosophy that separates the matter of fiction formation from the use of language, arguing instead that it is not the use of language that establishes fictions; fictions exert their influence upon the mind before the use of language becomes available to us.