Elena Ostos

The orthodox idea that episodic memory refers to particular events in the past has recently been challenged in light of the pervasive presence of episodic memories for multiple but similar events. Most authors implicitly endorse that these memories, which I will call “generalised episodic memories,” are experienced differently from particular ones. It is through these experiential features that the subject becomes aware of the generalized character of an episodic memory. However, most authors have focused on the objective factors that make an episodic memory generalized, particularly in questions concerning mnemic reference. In this paper, I turn instead to the subjective question, i.e. what distinguishes particular episodic memories from generalized ones from the subject’s point of view. I explore different ways in which this subjective question could be addressed and then favor a metacognitive view, according to which generality is experienced as an epistemic feeling produced by metacognitive monitoring. Finally, I argue that this conception of the generality–particularity dimension has important implications for the overall study of the phenomenology of episodic memory.

Fungi have always been the greatly overlooked ones in certain fields. Even though philosophers have begun to wonder whether it is possible to recognize intelligent behaviour in plants, this concern has poorly reached the fungal kingdom. Therefore, this paper aims to raise awareness about intelligent conduct in fungi by exploring the extension of plant neurobiology into the realm of fungal cognition. It traces the historical roots of plant neurobiology and its shift to 4E cognition, challenging traditional cognitive exclusion based on the absence of a nervous system. The study also delves into the debates surrounding minimal cognition criteria within post-cognitivism and examines whether these requirements are satisfied by fungal organisms. Experimental results regarding sensitivity responses in mycelial networks are presented, along with empirical evidence of electrical activity analogous to neuronal processes. In conclusion, this article proposes a post-cognitivist-friendly philosophy of fungal cognition, reframing the absence of a traditional brain as an opportunity to consider the mycelial network as a “hyphae-brain,” similar to the “root-brain” defended by proponents of plant cognition.