Starting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (to take apart being and appearing), Hannah Arendt points out the necessity to support a radical “phenomenalism”, which can be able to become politically relevant through 'spectacularity'. Far from the task of replacing an unknown being or substance, in Arendt's view all appearances are phenomena enhancing a singular exhibition on the 'world stage' in order to communicate an opinion or to perform deeds. Along this path,…
Read moreStarting from a specific critique of the traditional «metaphysical mistake» (to take apart being and appearing), Hannah Arendt points out the necessity to support a radical “phenomenalism”, which can be able to become politically relevant through 'spectacularity'. Far from the task of replacing an unknown being or substance, in Arendt's view all appearances are phenomena enhancing a singular exhibition on the 'world stage' in order to communicate an opinion or to perform deeds. Along this path, the encounter with Merleau-Ponty’s thought occurs at several levels. Specifically, the thesis of the ‘spectacular’ character of the world reveals itself in Arendt’s political theory as intimately linked to the thesis of an aesthetic and, at the same time ontological basis of experience, where opinion 'opens' to determined 'portions' of being. Such features of Arendt's political theory join it to Merleau-Ponty's theory of vision as “conditioned thought ” (by the world), “which advents” as “instituted” in a singular proper-body (Eye and Mind). According to Arendt, thought itself has to be considered not only as invisible (The Life of the Mind), but as a visible “doxa”, showing specific “aspects of world”, also revealed as specific positions to take and to defend in public. The paper suggests that the theoretical encounter of the two philosophers is a valuable asset in the context of contemporary political “publicity”.