Elena Yi-Jia Zeng

This article demonstrates that David Hume's politics should be understood as both moderate and pluralistic. Commentators often describe Hume as a ‘sceptical Whig’ who advocates moderation. Yet this interpretation insufficiently reflects both the destructive and constructive sides of his scepticism. Hume's sceptical style and dispersed political writings make it difficult to systematically characterise his political thought, resulting in an absence of a distinctively Humean tradition in contemporary political theory. This article indicates that a pluralist framework better reflects Hume's sceptical politics by illuminating structural affinities between Humean scepticism and Berlinian pluralism in their arguments against dogmatism and relativism. I argue that Humean scepticism exerts stabilising effects on society and politics by encouraging a pluralist political culture. This includes maintaining diverse opinions and judgements, facilitating intersubjective understanding through sympathy, and establishing a dynamic equilibrium of competing opinions. These measures to accommodate disagreement are essential for the stability of opinion-based government.

Adam Ferguson’s imperial thought casts new light on the age-old republican dilemma of the tension between empire and liberty. Generations of republican writers had been haunted by this issue as the decline of Rome proved that imperial expansion would eventually ruin the liberty of a state. Many eighteenth-century Scottish thinkers regarded this as an insoluble conundrum and thus became critics of empire. Ferguson shared their basic views but, paradoxically, was still able to defend the British Empire in the debates over the American Revolution. His argument effectively offered a viable solution to the republican dilemma, which distinguished him from his contemporaries. In light of this, I argue that political representation was the pivotal conception for Ferguson to make empire and liberty compatible. It was on this ground that he could advocate the union with Ireland, which he believed would lead to a lasting balance of power in Europe. ; British Empire; liberty; balance of power; political representation; American Revolution; Anglo-Irish Union

John Locke’s theory of state is heavily constructed around his doctrine of consent. The doctrine indeed signifies a critical moment in the development of liberal and democratic theories in the history of political thought. Nevertheless, the doctrine has provoked various controversies and raises doubts on whether Locke’s early and later positions are reconcilable. This paper joins the scholarly debate through investigating the role of consent in Locke’s theory of state. It rejects the ahistorical readings of the doctrine that deliberation and voluntary intention constitute the necessary condition of consent. It also opposes the view that the doctrine of consent offers a moral ground for Locke’s argument on the legitimacy of government, nor does the doctrine directly makes the case for political obligation. Instead, I argue that the doctrine of consent normatively proclaims the essential value of liberty in Locke’s theory of state while historically it was employed as a response to England’s political reality. Locke’s articulation of the doctrine also reveals his life-long concern about the peril of anarchy. Thus, consent should be understood as a dynamic process of recognising the necessity of government while acknowledging the people’s resolution to be free.

James Mackintosh distinguishes himself from the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers for his eloquent apology for the French Revolution in the 1790s. His Vindiciae Gallicae refutes Edmund Burke’s criticism of the French politics and his praise of the English liberal tradition. Mackintosh establishes his own argument based on his Scottish predecessors’ views on commercial society while adopting the Lockean view of political consent. Scrutinising Mackintosh’s advocacy of political reform and his understanding of political legitimacy, this essay argues that Mackintosh’s take on these themes is a manifestation of establishing a modern theory of government in his political thought.

The concept of Justice constitutes a requisite foundation in Aristotle’s and Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) moral thought. This essay examines Smith’s understanding and application of the Aristotelian concept of justice through a comparative study, which elucidates the prima facie resemblance between Smith’s and Aristotle’s moral thought. It also attests that both the thinkers acknowledge the external and internal meaning of justice, namely, the harmony of the whole society and the moral agent’s state of character. Smith’s commitment to the theory of justice is, in fact, for the purpose of preserving liberty, which illuminates that a free society takes priority over a beneficent one in his political ideal.

Scottish philosophy and intellectual history have become the increasingly fashionable fields of academic studies. Alexander Broadie, one of the pioneers and an accomplished scholar of the Scottish Enlightenment, returns to the basic question, namely, “what is Scottish philosophy?”, and presents a comprehensive work on the history of Scottish philosophy. Broadie successfully elucidates the nature and significance of Scottish philosophy both historically and philosophically. He argues that Scottish philosophy must be studied in its historical context, for it is not only a philosophical enterprise but also a persistent tradition which has united the Scottish nation for centuries. The advancements in science, literature, politics, and culture in Scotland would be extremely unlikely, if not impossible, without such an intellectual culture established by thinkers in that tradition. This article is intended as a review of Broadie’s A History of Scottish Philosophy in the background of his shifting academic interests from philosophy to history while he holds the professorship in University of Glasgow. His commitment to Scottish philosophical culture deserves the attention of contemporary historians and philosophers, for his work opens up a space for dialogue between intellectual history and history of philosophy, an issue addressed at the end of this paper.