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53The Sorites Paradox (edited book)Cambridge University Press. 2019.For centuries, the Sorites Paradox has spurred philosophers to think and argue about the problem of vagueness. This volume offers a guide to the paradox which is both an accessible survey and an exposition of the state of the art, with a chapter-by-chapter presentation of all of the main solutions to the paradox and of all its main areas of influence. Each chapter offers a gentle introduction to its topic, gradually building up to a final discussion of some open problems. Students will find a co…Read more
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15Inclosure and IntoleranceNotre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 62 (2): 201-220. 2021.Graham Priest has influentially claimed that the Sorites paradox is an Inclosure paradox, concluding that his favored dialetheic solution to the Inclosure paradoxes should be extended to the Sorites paradox. We argue that, given Priest’s dialetheic solution to the Sorites paradox, the argument purporting to show that that paradox is an Inclosure is unsound, and discuss some issues surrounding this fact.
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The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent (edited book)Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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50Vagueness and Thought, by Andrew BaconMind 131 (524): 1375-1386. 2022.It’s difficult nowadays to write an interesting new book on vagueness, but Andrew Bacon has succeeded. He hasn’t done so by putting forth revolutionary views ab.
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The role of utterances in Bradwardine's theory of truthIn Christoph Kann, Benedikt Löewe, Christian Rode & Sara Liana Uckelman (eds.), Modern views of medieval logic, Peeters. 2018.
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36The Final CutJournal of Philosophical Logic 51 (6): 1583-1611. 2022.In a series of works, Pablo Cobreros, Paul Égré, David Ripley and Robert van Rooij have proposed a nontransitive system (call it ‘_K__3__L__P_’) as a basis for a solution to the semantic paradoxes. I critically consider that proposal at three levels. At the level of the background logic, I present a conception of classical logic on which _K__3__L__P_ fails to vindicate classical logic not only in terms of structural principles, but also in terms of operational ones. At the level of the theory of…Read more
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Non-transitivism and the Sorites paradoxIn Sergi Oms & Elia Zardini (eds.), The Sorites Paradox, Cambridge University Press. 2019.
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46Substructural approaches to paradox: an introduction to the special issueSynthese 199 (3): 493-525. 2021.
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Breaking the chains : following-from and transitivityIn Colin R. Caret & Ole T. Hjortland (eds.), Foundations of Logical Consequence, Oxford University Press. 2015.
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1Beyond Sense? New Essays on the Significance, Grounds, and Extent of the A Priori (edited book)Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
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66Closed without boundariesSynthese 199 (Suppl 3): 641-679. 2020.The paper critically discusses two prominent arguments against closure principles for knowledge. The first one is the “argument from aggregation”, claiming that closure under conjunction has the consequence that, if one individually knows i premises, one also knows their i-fold conjunction—yet, every one of the premises might exhibit interesting positive epistemic properties while the i-fold conjunction might fail to do so. The second one is the “argument from concatenation”, claiming that closu…Read more
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87Instability and Contraction: Méditations hégéliennes IJournal of Philosophical Logic 48 (1): 155-188. 2019.In other works, I’ve proposed a solution to the semantic paradoxes which, at the technical level, basically relies on failure of contraction. I’ve also suggested that, at the philosophical level, contraction fails because of the instability of certain states of affairs. In this paper, I try to make good on that suggestion.
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106Scepticism and Perceptual Justification (edited book)Oxford University Press. 2013.How can experience provide knowledge, or even justified belief, about the objective world outside our minds? This volume presents original essays by prominent contemporary epistemologists, who show how philosophical progress on foundational issues can improve our understanding of, and suggest a solution to, this famous sceptical question.
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87Unifying the Philosophy of Truth (edited book)Imprint: Springer. 2015.This anthology of the very latest research on truth features the work of recognized luminaries in the field, put together following a rigorous refereeing process. Along with an introduction outlining the central issues in the field, it provides a unique and unrivaled view of contemporary work on the nature of truth, with papers selected from key conferences in 2011 such as Truth Be Told (Amsterdam), Truth at Work (Paris), Paradoxes of Truth and Denotation (Barcelona) and Axiomatic Theories of Tr…Read more
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33Further Reflections on Sentences Saying of Themselves Strange ThingsLogic and Logical Philosophy 26 (4): 563-581. 2017.Milne [2005] argued that a sentence saying of itself that it does not have a truthmaker is true but does not have a truthmaker. López de Sa and Zardini [2006] worried that, by parity of reasoning, one should conclude that a sentence saying of itself that it is not both true and short is true but not short. Recently, Milne [2013] and Gołosz [2015] have replied to López de Sa and Zardini’s worry, arguing in different ways that the worry is illfounded. In this paper, I’ll address these replies and …Read more
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125Luminosity and vaguenessDialectica 66 (3): 375-410. 2012.The paper discusses some ways in which vagueness and its phenomena may be thought to impose certain limits on our knowledge and, more specifically, may be thought to bear on the traditional philosophical idea that certain domains of facts are luminous, i.e., roughly, fully open to our view. The discussion focuses on a very influential argument to the effect that almost no such interesting domains exist. Many commentators have felt that the vagueness unavoidably inherent in the description of the…Read more
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1Higher-Order Vagueness and Paradox: The Glory and Misery of S4 DefinitenessThe Baltic International Yearbook of Cognition, Logic and Communication 1. 2005.
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137Knowing how to establish intellectualismGrazer Philosophische Studien 77 (1): 217-261. 2008.In this paper, we present a number of problems for intellectualism about knowledge-how, and in particular for the version of the view developed by Stanley & Williamson 2001. Their argument draws on the alleged uniformity of 'know how'-and 'know wh'-ascriptions. We offer a series of considerations to the effect that this assimilation is problematic. Firstly, in contrast to 'know wh'-ascriptions, 'know how'-ascriptions with known negative answers are false. Secondly, knowledge-how obeys closure pr…Read more
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79Truth, Demonstration and KnowledgeTheoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 30 (3): 365-392. 2015.After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that that principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted feasible-knowability principle but that the overall view underlying the new principle sti…Read more
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181Knowledge-How, True Indexical Belief, and ActionPhilosophical Studies 164 (2): 341-355. 2013.Intellectualism is the doctrine that knowing how to do something consists in knowing that something is the case. Drawing on contemporary linguistic theories of indirect questions, Jason Stanley and Timothy Williamson have recently revived intellectualism, proposing to interpret a sentence of the form ‘s knows how to F’ as ascribing to s knowledge of a certain way w of Fing that she can F in w. In order to preserve knowledgehow’s connection to action and thus avoid an overgeneration problem, they…Read more
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42Review of Nathan salmon, Content, Cognition, and Communication: Philosophical Papers Ii (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2009 (6). 2009.
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118Living on the Slippery Slope : The Nature, Sources and Logic of VaguenessDissertation, University of St Andrews. 2008.According to the dominant approach in the theory of vagueness, the nature of the vagueness of an expression ‘F’ consists in its presenting borderline cases in an appropriately ordered series: objects which are neither definitely F nor definitely not F (where the notion of definiteness can be semantic, ontic, epistemic, psychological or primitive). In view of the various problems faced by theories of vagueness adopting the dominant approach, the thesis proposes to reconsider the naive theory of v…Read more
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42Fitch’s paradox of knowability is an apparently valid reasoning from the assumption (typical of semantic anti-realism) that every true proposition is knowable to the unacceptable conclusion that every true proposition is known. The paper develops a critical dialectic wrt one of the best motivated solutions to the paradox which have been proposed on behalf of semantic anti-realism—namely, the intuitionistic solution. The solution consists, on the one hand, in accepting the intuitionistically vali…Read more
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1Vagueness and Practical InterestsIn Paul Egre & Nathan Klinedinst (eds.), Vagueness and Language Use, Palgrave Macmillan. 2011.In this paper we focus mainly on a kind of contextualism theory of vagueness according to which the context dependence has its source in the variation of our practical interests. We largely focus on Fara's version of the theory but our observations work at different levels of generality, some relevant only to the specifics of Fara's theory others relevant to all contextualist theories of a certain type.
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43Truth, Demonstration and Knowledge. A Classical Solution to the Paradox of KnowabilityTheoria : An International Journal for Theory, History and Fundations of Science 30 (3): 365-392. 2015.After introducing semantic anti-realism and the paradox of knowability, the paper offers a reconstruction of the anti-realist argument from the theory of understanding. The proposed reconstruction validates an unrestricted principle to the effect that truth requires the existence of a certain kind of “demonstration”. The paper shows that the principle fails to imply the problematic instances of the original unrestricted knowability principle but that the overall view still has unrestricted epist…Read more
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77Naive truth and naive logical propertiesReview of Symbolic Logic 7 (2): 351-384. 2014.A unified answer is offered to two distinct fundamental questions: whether a nonclassical solution to the semantic paradoxes should be extended to other apparently similar paradoxes and whether a nonclassical logic should be expressed in a nonclassical metalanguage. The paper starts by reviewing a budget of paradoxes involving the logical properties of validity, inconsistency, and compatibility. The author’s favored substructural approach to naive truth is then presented and it is explained how …Read more
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Paradoxes |
Logic and Philosophy of Logic |
Nonclassical Logics |
Metaphysics and Epistemology |