• In Search of Intuition
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy. forthcoming.
    What are intuitions? Stereotypical examples may suggest they are the results of common intellectual reflexes. But some intuitions defy the stereotype: there are hard-won intuitions which take deliberate effort to have, improved intuitions which contravene how matters naively seem to us, and expertly guided intuitions in which an expert in some domain guides a novice toward having an intuition he or she would not have had otherwise. I argue that reflection on these three phenomena motivates a con…Read more
  •  5
    The epistemic significance of perceptual learning
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6): 520-542. 2017.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper, I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
  •  280
    Against Emotional Dogmatism
    Philosophical Issues 26 (1): 59-77. 2016.
    It may seem that when you have an emotional response to a perceived object or event that makes it seem to you that the perceived source of the emotion possesses some evaluative property, then you thereby have prima facie, immediate justification for believing that the object or event possesses the evaluative property. Call this view ‘dogmatism about emotional justification’. We defend a view of the structure of emotional awareness according to which the objects of emotional awareness are derived…Read more
  •  100
    Reflection on the possibility of cases in which experience is cognitively penetrated has suggested to many that an experience's etiology can reduce its capacity to provide prima facie justification for believing its content below a baseline. This is epistemic downgrade due to etiology, and its possibility is incompatible with phenomenal conservatism. I develop a view that explains the epistemic deficiency in certain possible cases of cognitive penetration but on which there is no epistemic downg…Read more
  •  64
    Cognitive Phenomenology
    Routledge. 2015.
    Phenomenology is about subjective aspects of the mind, such as the conscious states associated with vision and touch, and the conscious states associated with emotions and moods, such as feelings of elation or sadness. These states have a distinctive first-person ‘feel’ to them, called their phenomenal character. In this respect they are often taken to be radically different from mental states and processes associated with thought. This is the first book to fully question this orthodoxy and exp…Read more
  •  319
    Consciousness and Knowledge
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness, Oxford University Press. forthcoming.
    This chapter focuses on the relationship between consciousness and knowledge, and in particular on the role perceptual consciousness might play in justifying beliefs about the external world. We outline a version of phenomenal dogmatism according to which perceptual experiences immediately, prima facie justify certain select parts of their content, and do so in virtue of their having a distinctive phenomenology with respect to those contents. Along the way we take up various issues in connection…Read more
  •  65
    Oxford University Press. 2013.
    Elijah Chudnoff elaborates and defends a view of intuition according to which intuition purports to, and reveals, how matters stand in abstract reality by making us aware of that reality through the intellect. He explores the experience of having an intuition; justification for beliefs that derives from intuition; and contact with abstract reality
  •  269
    The epistemic significance of perceptual learning
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6): 520-542. 2018.
    First impressions suggest the following contrast between perception and memory: perception generates new beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs; memory preserves old beliefs and reasons, justification, or evidence for those beliefs. In this paper I argue that reflection on perceptual learning gives us reason to adopt an alternative picture on which perception plays both generative and preservative epistemic roles.
  •  786
    The Nature of Intuitive Justification
    Philosophical Studies 153 (2). 2011.
    In this paper I articulate and defend a view that I call phenomenal dogmatism about intuitive justification. It is dogmatic because it includes the thesis: if it intuitively seems to you that p, then you thereby have some prima facie justification for believing that p. It is phenomenalist because it includes the thesis: intuitions justify us in believing their contents in virtue of their phenomenology—and in particular their presentational phenomenology. I explore the nature of presentational ph…Read more
  •  1037
    Intuitive knowledge
    Philosophical Studies 162 (2): 359-378. 2013.
    In this paper I assume that we have some intuitive knowledge—i.e. beliefs that amount to knowledge because they are based on intuitions. The question I take up is this: given that some intuition makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? We can ask a similar question about perception. That is: given that some perception makes a belief based on it amount to knowledge, in virtue of what does it do so? A natural idea about perception is that a perception makes …Read more
  •  240
    Epistemic Elitism and Other Minds
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 276-298. 2016.
    Experiences justify beliefs about our environment. Sometimes the justification is immediate: seeing a red light immediately justifies believing there is a red light. Other times the justification is mediate: seeing a red light justifies believing one should brake in a way that is mediated by background knowledge of traffic signals. How does this distinction map onto the distinction between what is and what isn't part of the content of experience? Epistemic egalitarians think that experiences imm…Read more
  •  203
    This paper is a result of a remarks delivered at the 2014 conference of the Florida Philosophical Association during a book symposium on Elijah Chudnoff's Intuition.
  •  519
    Phenomenal Contrast Arguments for Cognitive Phenomenology
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2): 82-104. 2015.
    According to proponents of irreducible cognitive phenomenology some cognitive states put one in phenomenal states for which no wholly sensory states suffice. One of the main approaches to defending the view that there is irreducible cognitive phenomenology is to give a phenomenal contrast argument. In this paper I distinguish three kinds of phenomenal contrast argument: what I call pure—represented by Strawson's Jack/Jacques argument—hypothetical—represented by Kriegel's Zoe argument—and glossed…Read more
  •  469
    Intellectual Gestalts
    In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Phenomenal Intentionality, Oxford University Press. pp. 174. 2013.
    Phenomenal holism is the thesis that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experiences that are parts of certain wholes. The first aim of this paper is to defend phenomenal holism. I argue, moreover, that there are complex intellectual experiences (intellectual gestalts)—such as experiences of grasping a proof—whose parts instantiate holistic phenomenal characters. Proponents of cognitive phenomenology believe that some phenomenal characters can only be instantiated by experienc…Read more
  •  324
    The reality of the intuitive
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (4): 371-385. 2017.
    According to current methodological orthodoxy philosophers rely on intuitions about thought experiments to refute general claims about the nature of knowledge, freedom, thought, reference, justice, beauty, etc. Philosophers working under the banner of ‘negative experimental philosophy’ have criticized more traditional philosophers for relying on this method. They argue that intuitions about thought experiments are influenced by factors that are irrelevant to the truth of their contents. Cappelen…Read more
  •  737
    The Rational Roles of Intuition
    In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions, Oxford University Press. 2014.
    NOTE: this is a substantial revision of a previously uploaded draft. Intuitions are often thought of as inputs to theoretical reasoning. For example, you might form a belief by taking an intuition at face value, or you might take your intuitions as starting points in the method of reflective equilibrium. The aim of this paper is to argue that in addition to these roles intuitions also play action-guiding roles. The argument proceeds by reflection on the transmission of justification through infe…Read more
  •  32
    Review of Mathematical Knowledge eds. Leng, Paseau, and Potter.
  •  575
    What Should a Theory of Knowledge Do?
    Dialectica 65 (4): 561-579. 2011.
    The Gettier Problem is the problem of revising the view that knowledge is justified true belief in a way that is immune to Gettier counter-examples. The “Gettier Problem problem”, according to Lycan, is the problem of saying what is misguided about trying to solve the Gettier Problem. In this paper I take up the Gettier Problem problem. I distinguish giving conditions that are necessary and sufficient for knowledge from giving conditions that explain why one knows when one does know. I argue tha…Read more
  •  564
    Presentational Phenomenology
    In Miguens & Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity, Ontos Verlag. 2012.
    A blindfolded clairvoyant walks into a room and immediately knows how it is arranged. You walk in and immediately see how it is arranged. Though both of you represent the room as being arranged in the same way, you have different experiences. Your experience doesn’t just represent that the room is arranged a certain way; it also visually presents the very items in the room that make that representation true. Call the felt aspect of your experience made salient by this contrast its presentational…Read more
  •  84
    Review of Seemings and Justification (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. 2014.
  •  595
    Is Intuition Based On Understanding?[I thank Jo]
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1): 42-67. 2013.
    According to the most popular non-skeptical views about intuition, intuitions justify beliefs because they are based on understanding. More precisely: if intuiting that p justifies you in believing that p it does so because your intuition is based on your understanding of the proposition that p. The aim of this paper is to raise some challenges for accounts of intuitive justification along these lines. I pursue this project from a non-skeptical perspective. I argue that there are cases in which …Read more
  •  764
    Awareness of Abstract Objects
    Noûs 47 (4): 706-726. 2013.
    Awareness is a two-place determinable relation some determinates of which are seeing, hearing, etc. Abstract objects are items such as universals and functions, which contrast with concrete objects such as solids and liquids. It is uncontroversial that we are sometimes aware of concrete objects. In this paper I explore the more controversial topic of awareness of abstract objects. I distinguish two questions. First, the Existence Question: are there any experiences that make their subjects aware…Read more
  •  996
    What Intuitions Are Like
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (3): 625-654. 2011.
    What are intuitions? According to doxastic views, they are doxastic attitudes or dispositions, such as judgments or inclinations to make judgments. According to perceptualist views, they are—like perceptual experiences—pre-doxastic experiences that—unlike perceptual experiences—represent abstract matters as being a certain way. In this paper I argue against doxasticism and in favor of perceptualism. I describe two features that militate against doxasticist views of perception itself: perception …Read more
  •  375
    Moral Perception: High-Level Perception or Low-Level Intuition?
    In Thiemo Breyer & Christopher Gutland (eds.), Phenomenology of Thinking, . forthcoming.
    Here are four examples of “seeing.” You see that something green is wriggling. You see that an iguana is in distress. You see that someone is wrongfully harming an iguana. You see that torturing animals is wrong. The first is an example of low-level perception. You visually represent color and motion. The second is an example of high-level perception. You visually represent kind properties and mental properties. The third is an example of moral perception. You have an impression of moral propert…Read more
  •  390
    Gurwitsch's Phenomenal Holism
    Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3): 559-578. 2013.
    Aron Gurwitsch made two main contributions to phenomenology. He showed how to import Gestalt theoretical ideas into Husserl’s framework of constitutive phenomenology. And he explored the light this move sheds on both the overall structure of experience and on particular kinds of experience, especially perceptual experiences and conscious shifts in attention. The primary focus of this paper is the overall structure of experience. I show how Gurwitsch’s Gestalt theoretically informed phenomenologi…Read more